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This thesis examines the concept of ‘habit’ and notions of ‘habitual dispositions’ in late early modern 
English thought. It’s primary aim is to highlight the ways in which the process of acquiring habitual 
dispositions was an integral part of late Early Modern English intellectual life, which was founded 
upon the need to habituate the individual to internalise moral virtues and to govern their passions and 
actions so as to cultivate religious sociability, establish epistemological consensus, and maintain civil 
society.  Chapter 1 presents a new reading of the concept of ‘right reason’ through a close examination 
of the works of Henry More and John Wilkins. Chapter 2 examines the notion of habitual dispositions 
in Restoration religion, focusing on how a group of loosely connected moderate divines attempted to 
fashion a religion that was founded on habitually acquired moral beliefs and dispositions. Chapter 3 
then shifts the focus to the context of the new experimental philosophy, demonstrating how 
experimental philosophers such as Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke were preoccupied with cultivating 
good experimental habitual behaviour and dispositions. The fourth and final chapter, in light of the 
genealogy of habit that has been mapped out in the first three chapters, presents a new reading of John 
Locke’s educational programme. The broader aim of this thesis is to historicise the late-Early Modern 
English conception of habit as well as highlight its importance in English intellectual thought. A 
proper historicisation of late Early Modern English intellectual approaches to, and uses of habit will 
help us see that not only was habit viewed favourably, but that it was also a crucial part of intellectual 
life and could provide a safeguard against a multitude of pressing intellectual, religious, and civil 
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This thesis examines the role of ‘habit’ and ‘habituation’ in late Early Modern English 
intellectual life. It takes habit, in its broadest sense, to mean the procedural character of 
virtuous behaviour and dispositions and interprets it as a process of self-inspection that 
supposed the individual’s awareness of responsibility for their actions throughout the period 
that is under review. In other words, a process of continuous endeavour of training oneself 
into the habit of acting virtuously. By procedural, in this instance, I take to mean the methods 
by which the individual was to be habituated to internalise moral virtues and to govern their 
passions and actions. In this sense, this thesis explores how English intellectuals believed that 
most individuals governed their behaviour primarily through habitually acquired mental 
dispositions rather than through conscientious internal motivations. My concern primarily is 
to highlight the ways in which the process of acquiring habitual virtues was an integral part 
of late Early Modern English intellectual life, which was founded upon the need to habituate 
people to internalise moral virtues and to govern their passions and actions so as to maintain 
and cultivate religious sociability, epistemological consensus, and civil society. This thesis 
thus argues that late Early Modern English intellectuals were preoccupied with the concept 
of habit and the notion of habituation and that this preoccupation shaped the development of 
English religion, the new experimental philosophy as well as John Locke’s educational 
programme. 
Historians who have analysed late Early Modern English intellectual life have, for the 
most part, missed this deep-rooted concern with the cultivation of virtuous habits, habitual 
assent and habit itself, as well as how such habits crossed disciplinary boundaries and how 
they occupied a central place among the values that governed the human being’s life as an 
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individual, as a member of English society, and as a creature in relation to its deity.1 These 
have been largely overlooked by scholarship on early modern religion, for example, because 
of its fixation on doctrine and confessional identity which has meant that the distinction 
between belief and practice has not been fully examined.2 This, of course, is an important 
dimension to consider not least because the English church, particularly throughout the 
seventeenth-century, was a ‘state church’ that was in a perpetual state of doctrinal, 
ceremonial, and disciplinary chaos, yet insisted on exacting obedience from its members 
through a continuous stream of ambiguous and contradictory directives regarding acceptable 
form of worship. 
Some historians, however, such as Kevin Sharpe, have argued for the value of an 
interdisciplinary expansion of the body of materials that historians examine and has 
recommended a broadly based cultural-historical approach to religion in the early modern 
period: “The subject of religion in seventeenth-century culture and politics calls out for…an 
interdisciplinary approach.”3 Sharpe has insisted that, in the early modern period, “Religion 
was not just about doctrine, liturgy or ecclesiastical government; it was a language, an 
aesthetic, a structure of meaning, an identity, a politics.”4 Similarly, as Ken Jackson and 
Arthur F. Marotti have suggested, religion was also “a deeply psychological and emotional 
experience, a core moral commitment, a personally and socially crucial way of transvaluing 
human experience and desire, a reality both within and beyond the phenomenal world.”5 With 
these observations in mind, this thesis will focus on the very psychology of belief, and 
                                                             
1 See, for example, Barbara Shapiro, “Early Modern Intellectual Life: Humanism, Religion and Science in 
Seventeenth Century England,” History of Science, 29, (1991): pp. 45-71. 
2 For more insight into this, see Ken Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti, “The Turn to Religion in Early Modern 
English Studies,” Criticism, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Winter 2004): pp. 167-190, p. 169. 
3 Kevin Sharpe, Remapping Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 389. 
4 Ibid., p. 12. 
5 Ken Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti, “The Turn to Religion in Early Modern English Studies,” p. 169. 
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particularly, the relationship of habitual assent and practice to a well-exercised and grounded 
faith. 
It is important to note that the seventeenth-century English concern with the nature 
and influence of habit has not gone altogether unnoticed. John P. Wright’s article on habit in 
early modern philosophy, for example, makes passing reference to Rene Descartes’s and John 
Locke’s use of habit while also acknowledging that there were “no single full-length thematic 
studies of habit during the Early Modern period, though it was discussed in relation to many 
other topics.”6 More in-depth studies have been carried out by Paul K. Akon and Paul Cefalu, 
who have both observed the recurring theme of the preoccupation with habit in Restoration 
English theology. Whilst their work should rightly be considered seminal regarding the role 
of habit during the period, it does not exhaust the subject in its slightest. Akon, for example, 
focuses predominantly on habit in an eighteenth-century context with only passing references 
to individuals such as Robert South and John Tillotson, while Cefalu’s work is centred on the 
notion of ethical habituation in a general early modern Protestant context.7 Similarly, Joanna 
Picciotto has recently suggested that in post-Reformation England, “intense pressures on 
belief produced sophisticated theorizations of habitual assent”, but her analysis does not really 
extend beyond that statement.8  
Thus, the larger aim of this thesis is to historicise the late-Early Modern English 
conception of habit as well as highlight its importance in English intellectual thought. A 
proper historicisation of late Early Modern English approaches to, and uses of habit will help 
us see that not only was habit viewed favourably, but that it was also a crucial part of 
                                                             
6 John P. Wright ‘Ideas of Habit and Custom in Early Modern Philosophy,’ Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, Vol. 42, No. 1, (January 2011): pp. 18-32, p. 18. 
7 Paul K. Akon, “Robert South, William Low, and Samuel Johnson,” SEL: Studies in English Literature, 1500-
1900 6 (1966): 499-528; Paul Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern English Literature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
8 Joanna Picciotto, “Implicit Faith and Reformations of Habit,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 
Vol. 46, No. 3: pp. 513-543. 
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intellectual life and could provide a safeguard against a multitude of pressing intellectual, 
religious, and civil problems. In short, the main objective of this thesis is to convey how much 
interest in habit and habitual dispositions permeated English intellectual culture throughout 
the late early modern period. Once this has been established, it can offer us a view of English 
intellectual thought that makes sense of a common theme of notions of habit across different 
forms of disciplines such as religion, natural philosophy, and Lockean education. 
My investigations, especially chapter three, primarily intersect with the innovative 
work of Sorana Corneanu who has highlighted early modern English experimental 
philosophers’ views about the cure and perfecting of the human mind and how such views 
were fundamental to their epistemological and methodological projects.9 Her work leaves no 
doubt that ‘virtues’ of the mind and the notion of ‘habit’ were important conceptual categories 
for early modern English natural philosophy. Building upon Corneanu’s work, this thesis 
takes a much broader and in-depth examination of the mid-to late Early Modern English 
landscape by addressing this theme of habitual virtues in a variety of intellectual contexts. 
This advance is important because it will enhance our understanding, regarding the nature 
and configuration of intellectual life in late early modern England. Whereas, Corneanu’s work 
has revealed how there was a culture of clearing the human of perturbation deeply embedded 
within English natural philosophy, this thesis will demonstrate that this was common across 
a range of disciplines. In short, habit and the acquisition of habitual dispositions exercised a 
profound influence over many aspects of intellectual life. 
More generally, it has long been recognised that there was a connection between 
arguments for the toleration of religion and arguments for the prosecution of immorality. It 
                                                             
9 See S. Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, Locke, and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Knowledge, Selves, Virtues: Cross-Disciplinary 
Studies in Early Modern Literature, Philosophy and Science (Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 
2014). 
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can hardly be a coincidence, for example, that the great statutory campaign known as the 
Reformation of Manners was closely associated with the success of the Revolution of 1688-
9 and the passage of the so-called ‘Toleration Act.’10 More broadly, Blair Worden has argued 
that post-Restoration England experiences a “shift of emphasis from faith to conduct”, a 
“retreat of theology, and the concomitant shift of Protestantism from a religion of faith 
towards a religion of works.”11 What has not been fully fleshed-out even in these excellent 
studies, however, is the actual underpinning operations of this process - of how this 
preoccupation with ‘behaviour’ rather than ‘belief’ actually operated. This thesis seeks to 
remedy this gap by examining the concept of habit though various intellectual discourses in 
England in the late early modern period within the context that Christianity was becoming 
more about conduct rather than doctrine. This was reflective of a broad movement in the post-
Restoration era, forwarded in England and Scotland by Latitudinarians and Moderates, 
respectively. It emphasised the actions of the good Christian rather than what they may have 
believed. In so doing, it made morality more fundamental to Christianity while also lessening 
the importance of traditional grounds of confessional difference.12 It was precisely in this 
context that ‘habit’ and ‘habituation’ took on a degree of significance: the minds of 
Restoration society had to be cultivated and nurtured into the habit of acting virtuously. This 
was a necessary process to correct the unruly conscience and put the individual on a path to 
the eventual acquisition of true faith and God’s grace. 
But while part of this thesis is about religion and habitual virtues, other parts also 
concern the significance of habitual virtues across the new experimental philosophy as well 
                                                             
10 See Dudley Bahlman, The Moral Revolution of 1688 (New Haven, 1957); Tony Claydon, William III and the 
Godly Revolution (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 110–21; Shelley Burtt, Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in 
England 1688–1740 (Cambridge, 1992); Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language 
of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660–1780 (Cambridge, 2 vols., 1991–2000), I. 
11 Blair Worden, ‘The Question of Secularisation’, in Alan Houston and Steve Pincus (eds.), A Nation 
Transformed: England after the Restoration (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 38– 40. 
12 See, for example, Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace and Sentiment, esp. Vol I; See also John Coffey, Persecution 
and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689 (London: Pearson Education, 2000), esp. ch. 5. 
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as the fashioning process of the ideal Lockean citizen. Much work, for example, has been 
done on the moderate epistemological methodology of the Early Royal Society. Such studies 
have interpreted the moderate epistemology of the Early Royal Society as: firstly, a response 
to the epistemological problem based on the justification of knowledge; secondly, a cultural 
approach to epistemology, one that emphasises shared values and characteristics and the 
appropriation of methods from English theology into English natural philosophy; thirdly, a 
social history of knowledge, for epistemological methods and solutions were informed by 
social discourses; lastly, a response to the underlying problem of the capacities of human 
nature informed by Augustinian anthropology.13 Yet, despite much excellent scholarly work, 
historians examining the early Royal Society’s epistemological approach have not yet fully 
explored the importance of a deep-seated concern with how habit formed a crucial part of the 
experimental life. In effect, how it governed the mind of the impartial enquirer. As a result, 
this thesis shows how the moderate epistemological methodology of the early Royal Society 
was shaped by an appreciation of the importance of habituating the mind toward mental self-
control. Accordingly, the mitigated scepticism and emphasis on the probability of knowledge 
advocated by its fellows was informed, in part, by self-fashioning mental exercises that 
disciplined the intellectual activity of the mind. In this interpretation, as we will see, the 
experimental philosophy comes across not only as a method which expounded the values of 
moderation, regimentation, and temperance, but also as an edifying programme which aided 
the experimenter’s mind in their search for knowledge and as a regimen for cultivating 
habitual virtues. 
                                                             
13 The major works are as follows: Henry G. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 1630-
1690 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963); Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Princeton University Press, 1983); John Henry, ‘The Scientific Revolution in England’ in Roy Porter and 
Mikulas Teich (eds.) The Scientific Revolution in National Context (Cambridge University Press, 1992); Steven 
Shapin, Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago, 1994); Peter 
Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
31404700 A Culture Of Habit  Words: 80,325 
7 
 
The final insight that this thesis makes is how a deeper investigation of ‘habit’ and 
‘habituation’ in late Early Modern English thought allows us to more fully understand not 
only John Locke’s works on education but also his idea of the individual and the foundation 
of civil society. I argue that by re-examining Locke’s idea of habituation, we find that Locke’s 
education did aim at freedom and autonomy, but that this freedom and autonomy required a 
strong will and a cultivated scepticism. I show that the habits which Locke asked parents to 
instil were aimed not at programming specific behaviour and opinions, but rather at training 
children to cross their desires to strengthen their wills against the impositions of nature, 
custom, and fashion, which Locke argued posed a far more serious threat to independent 
thought than parental discipline. In sum, Locke’s educational programme aimed to cultivate 
a sceptical mental disposition that permitted individuals to resist these other sources of habit 
and continually question and revise their own convictions. Lockean education, I argue, is thus 
more profitably read neither as the introduction of a form of panoptic control over the child 
that Foucauldian-disciplinarian scholars take it to be, nor as the straightforward programme 
of civic education which earlier generations of scholars saw in it, but rather as an 
individualistic training of the mind.14 This, of course, cannot be fully understood without first 
mapping out a deep-seated genealogy of habit in the first three chapters. 
The arguments sketched out above form the central claims of this current thesis. In its 
broadest sense, then, it demonstrates how the desire to be governed by habitual virtues was a 
salient feature of late Early Modern English intellectual life. Hence, as will be shown in the 
proceeding chapters, in a Protestant religious context, where original sin cast such a long 
                                                             
14 See, for example, James Axtell, The Educational Writings of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968); Peter Gay, John Locke on Education (New York, Teacher’s College Bureau of Publications 1964); 
John Yolton, John Locke and Education (New York: Random House, 1971); Alex Neil, “Locke on Habituation, 
Autonomy, and Education,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27,. No. 2 (1989): pp. 225-245; and compare 
with, Uday Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke’s Political Thought (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992) and John Baltes, The Empire of Habit: John Locke, Discipline, and the Origins 
of Liberalism (University of Rochester Press, 2016). 
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shadow upon human morality as well as the human mental faculties, habit was responding to, 
and addressing, a variety of intellectual problems that plagued English society throughout the 
period. It was responding to the wider problem of knowing what exactly ‘reason’ was and 
how one was to use their own ‘reason’ correctly; it was addressing the problem of religion 
and morality, principally the moral and spiritual state of the people.15 The Christian life, as 
we will see, was a life of active endeavour to be habitually virtuous; analogously, in natural 
philosophy habituation also formed an important part of the experimental life - virtuous habits 
were intended to govern and order the operations of the mind, extracting the investigator from 
their private perspective.16 In essence, they allowed for the safest way to natural truths; and 
finally, for the purpose of Locke’s educational programme, the inculcation of good habits 
was a solution to guide conduct and replace the conscience that was seen as both too radical 
and too submissive.17 
Altogether, then, this thesis attempts to provide a lens through which we can view a 
particular facet of late Early Modern English intellectual life should one choose to do so. This 
lens, broadly stated, was a late Early Modern English preoccupation with habit. More 
specifically, the power of habit to govern conduct and having the right people to implant the 
disposition to judge well and behave virtuously. Such a preoccupation can be framed, in many 
ways, as a response to the sectarian violence of the English Civil War as well as the disruption 
of the Interregnum shortly afterwards.18 Religion and morality were at the centre of the 
conflict not just because salvation was at stake, but because one’s beliefs might invite 
                                                             
15 For an excellent local case study of this, see Mark Goldie and John Spurr, “Politics and the Restoration Parish: 
Edward Fowler and the Struggle for St. Giles Cipplegate,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 432 
(Jun., 1994): pp. 572-596. 
16 For an excellent analysis on the broader context of the active Christian life see, G. A. J. Rogers, “The Basis 
of Belief: Philosophy, Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England, History of European Ideas, Vol. 
6, No. 1, 1985, pp. 19-39. 
17 For more information on this, see James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 6. 
18For an excellent framing of Restoration intellectual life in the context of the civil war, see Graham Parry, The 
Seventeenth Century: The Intellectual and Cultural Context of English Literature, 1603-1700 (Longman: 
London and New York, 1989), ch. 5. 
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persecution or demand armed evangelism.19 In response to this period of bloodshed and 
disorder, it was necessary to fashion a ‘reasonable’ society which could enact civil practices 
and self-govern. The goal, therefore, was the formation of a mind that could suspend the 
execution and satisfaction of desires and one that willed in conformity with the virtue that 
supported the pleasures of civil society, faith, and natural truths about God’s creation. 
This thesis comprises four chapters. Each chapter contains its own engagement with, 
and review of relevant scholarship and so can be read on its own terms. There is, however, a 
fairly consistent chronological arrangement of each chapter and I hope that the deeper unity 
of the thesis may thus become apparent as one makes one’s way through each section. 
Collectively, the question that they attempt to answer is less one about how late Early Modern 
English intellectuals attempted to construct and mould society and more about how they 
thought that society could be fashioned to worship God correctly, pursue its vocations, control 
its passions, and conduct itself accordingly. In many ways, their common concern is with the 
formation of the self-regulating subject through discipline, subjects governed by habitual 
dispositions that enabled the proper use of human reason, aided the religious life and the 
experimental life, and, as we will see, made Lockean civil society possible.     
The first chapter offers a new examination of the concept of ‘right reason’ - a faculty 
that purportedly allowed mankind to share in the rational nature of the divine mind, and 
thereby gifting man with the capacity to know God and discern God’s will. By examining the 
concept in the works of two Restoration divines, Henry More and John Wilkins, it 
demonstrates how historians have missed the fact that they advanced different conceptions, 
an innate one and a habitual one, which were underpinned by disparate epistemological 
(rationalism and empiricism) and theological traditions (intellectualism and voluntarism). 
                                                             
19 For a great overview of this, see Jonathan Scott, “Radicalism and Restoration: The Shape of the Stuart 
Experience,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 31, Issue 2, (June 1988): pp. 453-467. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to show how the concept of ‘habit’ fitted into the broader 
problem of deciding what human reason was as well as how it operated – as a consequence 
of living in a fallen world. A lengthy consideration is thus given to the role of ‘reason’ as a 
moral faculty, which, it was thought, had been durably impaired by humanity’s fall from 
paradise. In an ideal world, Man’s natural right reason could discern the Laws of Nature and 
function as a reliable moral guide. In a fallen world, however, this guide had to be 
supplemented. As we will see in the case of John Wilkins, habit formed an important part of 
this supplementation. As a whole, then, this first chapter is an attempt to show how in the 
philosophical context of right reason, Natural Law, and innatism was starting to become 
despiritualised on behalf of a more practical approach to morality, one that emphasised the 
importance of the development of virtuous habits. Such an approach was far less 
philosophically minded and much more adjusted to convincing English society of the 
importance of acting morally. 
Building upon Wilkins’s notion of right reason as habit, the second chapter broadens 
the frame of analysis by examining how a group of ‘moderate divines’ attempted to develop 
and cultivate a religion founded on habitually acquired moral beliefs and dispositions. In the 
wake of the English Civil War and Interregnum, with religious tension still running high, they 
sought a solution that would allay controversies and disputes, and at the heart of this solution 
lay a deep-seated desire for religious and social stability. They rejected all manner of 
polemicizing about unprovable fundamentals of revealed religion and their sermons focused 
instead on a reformation of manners and reasonable and practical means by which 
congregants could be disciplined into participating in a comprehensive English church. Their 
solution was an increased emphasis on the power of habit to govern conduct and to combat 
the perceived moral laxity of English society in service of God’s commands. In their view, it 
was the only way to ensure society behaved properly and subscribed to the correct behaviour 
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in relation to God. The ideal Christian in Restoration England, then, as we will see, was to be 
a disciplined subject - free while constrained, self-reflective while governed by habit. With 
that in mind, this chapter forms part of an emerging literature that tries to show how notions 
such as ‘moderation’ and ‘toleration’ could ultimately be coercive.20 It attempts, for example, 
to supplement Shagan’s argument that ‘moderation was an act of control’ by teasing out 
another important element that was at the heart of the ideology of control in late early modern 
England – the power of habit. This chapter also highlights how Church of England clergyman 
and sympathetic nonconformists could find a common ground when it came to the subject of 
holy living and virtuous behaviour. 
Having examined how the concepts of ‘habit’ and ‘habituation’ addressed the 
problems associated with right reason and religion, the third chapter switches the focus to see 
how they were deployed in the epistemological context of the new experimental philosophy 
that was practised by the early Royal Society. It shows how the rhetoric and stylistic norms 
advertised by the Society and its members were actually shaped in part out of a concern for 
‘habit.’ Its focus is on those practitioners of the new natural philosophy who argued that the 
new experimental approach constituted a special kind of mental training which inculcated the 
mind with good habits of examination, observation, and personal piety. Its primary purpose 
is to highlight the ways in which the new philosophy was presented as a practice that could 
contribute to the moral and religious formation of the natural philosopher, and the 
transformation of the mind through habituation.21 In the context of other changes in 
developments of religious epistemology, it should become clear that the development of the 
                                                             
20 See Ethan Shagan, “Beyond Good and Evil: Thinking with Moderates in Early Modern England,” Journal of 
British Studies 49 (July 2010): pp. 488-513; The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion and the Politics of 
Restraint in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For toleration as coercive 
see Richard Ashcraft, “Latitudinarianism and Toleration: Historical Myth versus Political History,” in R. Kroll, 
R. Ashcraft and P. Zagorin (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England, 1640-1700 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
21 See S. Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind; See also Dana Jablobeanu, The Art of Experimental Natural History: 
Francis Bacon in Context (Zeta Books: Bucharest, 2015). 
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polite, gentlemanly, non-contentious modes of discourse of the virtuosi was at least in part 
based upon their preoccupation with the epistemological implications of the new philosophy 
as a regimen of self-discipline rather than by their social position or aspiration. Furthermore, 
in my analysis of Robert Boyle, I show how religion could provide the natural philosopher 
with appropriate epistemological behaviour that allows us to consider a different way of 
understanding the complex relationship between English religion and natural philosophy 
during this period. 
Then, in light of this genealogy of habit that has been teased-out in the preceding 
chapters, the fourth and final chapter offers an important re-reading of Locke’s work on 
education. Through a close examination of Locke’s Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) 
as well as his Conduct of the Understanding (1706), it shows how the Lockean subject was 
to be formed and normed by gradual habituation before taking their place in civil society. 
Contrary to the recent Foucauldian-disciplinary readings of Locke which have interpreted the 
ideal Lockean subject as being shaped by distinctively modern techniques of power before 
rational choice was available, it argues that Locke’s education can best be read as an 
individualistic training of the mind, a safeguard against all the other sources of habituation to 
which the child would inevitably be subjected. In this reading, the pedagogy that emerges 
from Locke’s educational writings is one that inclined the human mind toward a kind of 
habitual scepticism that bestowed modesty, flexibility and civility. The conclusion provides 
a summary as well as suggests possible future directions for research by briefly touching on 
the work of Max Weber, Michel Foucault, and Norbert Elias. 
One final thing remains to be explicitly stated – the extent to which this thesis tells us 
something about contemporary Restoration English culture.  Scholars such as Jonathan Scott, 
John Morrill, Jonathan Clark, for example, have stressed the element of continuity in 
seventeenth-century British history, with Clark arguing that “the pattern of an ancien regime 
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State…remained vital until at least 1828-32.”22 However, a number of scholars such as Alan 
Houston and Steve Pincus have argued that late seventeenth-century England underwent a 
substantial transformation: English life and thought in the decades after 1660 were 
transformed in ways that render untenable the notion of an ancien regime that lasted into the 
early nineteenth century. This thesis attempts to unpack an important shift in Restoration 
English culture that was predicated on an increased preoccupation with habitual assent as well 
as habitually acquired patterns of behaviour which elevated a person’s moral esteem. Thus, 
just as Barbara Shapiro has advised us to think in terms of a ‘culture of fact’ and the role of 
‘fact’ in English intellectual and cultural development during the late early modern period: 
that the concept of fact permeated a range of disciplines and genres and that legal modes of 
judging testimony played a large but unduly neglected role in the development of practices 
for establishing the truth in early modern England and how “the language of the law, and the 
analogy to legal processes and criteria of truth…was constantly in the mouths of the 
[Restoration] virtuosi.” 23 This thesis is intended to suggest that we must also think in terms 
of a ‘culture of habit’ and the role that ‘habit and ‘habituation’ played in late Early Modern 
English intellectual thought; that habit – in the form of habitually acquired  dispositions – 
made its way into the broader intellectual culture of late early modern England. Chapter 3, 
for example, much like Shapiro’s suggestion that the concept of fact was an important part of 
the truth criterion in the new experimental philosophy, will demonstrate how inculcated 
habitual dispositions were also an important part of establishing the truths of nature for the 
Early Royal Society. 
                                                             
22 Jonathan Clark, English Society, 1688-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 6-7. See 
also Jonathan Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991); England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); John Morrill (ed.), Revolution and Restoration: England in the 1650s 
(London: Collins and Brown, 1992). 
23 See Barbara Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 
p. 141. 
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Thinking in this way allows us to further examine, and understand several important 
intellectual changes during the period that Houston and Pincus have taken to be a 
‘transformation.’ In the first instance, using the case study of right reason, we can see more 
broadly the changing intellectual process of reason that took place during the period. Wilkin’s 
interpretation of right reason as an habitually-acquired disposition, for example, not only 
foreshadowed Locke’s assault on innate ideas in his Essay, but also demonstrates the 
changing nature of reason – away from being a process that was grounded in some kind of 
transcendental supra-human power that was owing to God, to something that had to be 
instilled in the individual. Again, as we will see in chapter four, the changing nature of reason 
also paralleled much of what we find in Locke’s educational programme – that the 
individual’s own reason had to be guided correctly. It had to be implanted not by God at 
inception, but rather by early training in childhood, or in Wilkins’s case, through the didactic 
sermons of Restoration clergy. 
It also allows us to more fully understand how English religion became a practical 
Christianity wherein moral reformation took the place of doctrinal conflict. A religion, 
essentially, of habitual-virtue, sociability, and happiness which, in many ways, represented 
the Arminian rejection of the Calvinist insistence on the depravity of human nature and God’s 
arbitrary use of grace.24 And also how it began to locate ethical power within human nature, 
independently of grace. In this way, the argument presented in this thesis supports the process 
so well described by Isabel Rivers whereby grace became almost synonymous with virtue.25 
The stress was on religion as civilising, not saving; ethics began to outweigh soteriology. 
                                                             
24 For an excellent overview of eighteenth century developments, see Ashley Walsh, “Civil Religion in Britain, 
1707 – c. 1800.” PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2018). 
25 See Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace and Sentiment, pp. 74-5, 76-6. 
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Thus, as Blair Worden has argued, religion was not declining during this period, but rather 
changing its character.26 
Furthermore, we can also observe a subtle parallel development in works of the Early 
Royal Society which allows us to not only rethink how we understand English experimental 
natural philosophy, but also reorient it within a broader tradition that focused not just on 
epistemological and methodological pursuits but on the way natural philosophy was thought 
to contribute to one’s intellectual and spiritual health as well as its crucial ethical and 
theological dimensions. This potential new understanding also supports recent scholarship by 
Sorana Corneanu whose work has demonstrated that there was an anthropological- 
therapeutic core to the English experimental philosophers’ approach to the problem of 
knowledge as well as Peter Harrison’s who has recently suggested that experimental 
philosophy “served the goal of moral and religious formation.”27 
Lastly, if we accept the prevalence of a deep-seated ‘culture of habit’ in late Early 
Modern English intellectual thought, then we can also, as I argue in chapter four, re-assess 
not only John Locke’s educational curriculum, but also more fully understand his idea of the 
individual. I show that the Lockean individual (and indeed liberal) was deeply disciplined 
and thoroughly normalized, and as a result, governed just as much by habitual virtues as by 
rational reflection or autonomous calculation. This thesis therefore contributes to recent 
Locke scholarship that has called for a reassessment of liberalism by demonstrating how 
Lockean liberalism should no longer be seen to revolve exclusively around the atomistic, 
rights-bearing subject of social-contract theory but also be perceived to develop a nuanced 
                                                             
26 See Blair Worden, ‘The Question of Secularisation.’ 
27 See Sorana Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind; Peter Harrison, “Sentiments of Devotion and Experimental 
Philosophy in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 44, no. 1 (2014): 
pp. 113-33, p. 116. 
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account of a socially embedded subject, the product of early training in the family.28 The 
remainder of this introductory chapter provides an overview of the relevant intellectual and 
religious contexts. 
The Intellectual and Religious Context 
This section offers a succinct summary of the intellectual and religious changes that 
underpinned the late-Early Modern English context in order to show how the tensions in a 
Christian account of habit form the basis of its application that this thesis examines. As such, 
it beats a particular path, mapping territory and key thinkers along the way, but inevitably 
leaving a great deal unexplored. It begins with a discussion of Aristotelian ethics and ends 
with Richard Hooker’s views on moral habituation. Its primary aim is to demonstrate that by 
tracing habit from Aquinas to Calvin and then to Hooker, we find a particular type of habit 
dealing with the problems of depravity emerging which is the same kind of struggle and mix 
of components we then see being applied by English intellectuals in the period under study. 
This brief tracing exercise will show that they drew upon a notion of habit that was essentially 
a hybrid of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy mixed with the depravity associated with 
Calvinist theology as well as building upon Hooker’s practical moral theory and notion of 
habitual sanctification.   
The social and intellectual elite of early modern England often advocated Aristotle’s 
definition, most fully developed in his Nicomachean Ethics, of ethical virtues as habits that 
preserved a mean between excess and deficiency in actions and emotions. Throughout the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as in the medieval period, Aristotle’s work remained the 
                                                             
28 See, for example, Timothy Stanton, “John Locke and the Fable of Liberalism,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 
61, 3 (2018): pp. 597-622, p. 600, 621 
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core of the university curriculum. Accompanied by various medieval and early modern 
commentaries, the Nicomachean Ethics was the major text in ethics.29 
Aristotle’s discussion of the connection between virtue and habits is therefore a good 
starting point because his conception of habit as an active and ontologically significant 
principle was still employed in the writings of seventeenth-century English theologians, not 
least in the writings of those which concern this thesis. Aristotle’s term for habit was hexis, 
derived from the verb “to have.” Whilst the meaning of the term allowed for a wide-ranging 
use of the term, Aristotle gave the term a set of specific and philosophical meanings.30 In the 
first instance, hexis was an active tendency to behaviour of a specific kind. Aristotle wrote, 
“Habit means a disposition according to which that which is disposed is well or ill 
disposed.”31 Habit as hexis then was not merely custom but a propensity toward a certain kind 
of behaviour. Second, habit was also “a kind of existent thing.”32 Aristotle, it seems, believed 
that habits had an abiding reality apart from the actual behaviour that is their manifestation. 
Habits, for Aristotle, were therefore more permanent than disposition and were a “second 
nature.”33 
“Habit” as hexis, as W.F.R. Hardie has pointed out, could also be translated as a “state 
of character,” a phrase which reveals that, for Aristotle, habits did not violate the integrity of 
the rational capacities of a person but rather function as their “character” or the overall 
direction of the self – that is, so to speak, the natural powers of the self.34 Habit, in Aristotelian 
                                                             
29 See, for example, William T. Costello, S.J., The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century 
Cambridge (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 64–69; Harris Francis Fletcher, The Intellectual Development of John 
Milton, 2 vols. (Urbana, Ill., 1961), 1:157–165; and Mordechai Feingold, “The Humanities,” in The History of 
the University of Oxford, vol 4, Seventeenth-Century Oxford, ed. Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford, 1997), 313, 321–
326. 
30 For a more in-depth discussion of habit in Aristotle’s ethics, see Burnyeat (2002); Sherman (1989: pp. 157-
99); Garver (1989)l Barracchi (2008: pp. 66-73, 90-1, 112-22). 
31 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 94. 
32 W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) p. 108. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 103. 
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philosophy, was primarily a principle of operation and not a principle of being – as a result, 
Aristotle dealt with habit mainly as the intellectual and moral virtues; the developed states of 
the capacities to know and to act. Lastly, habit, for Aristotle, was primarily an acquired 
propensity toward a determinate kind of behaviour. In other words, habit referred to a 
tendency that had received a specific direction and facility through the repetition of a certain 
type of action. 
Thomas Aquinas accepted all the salient aspects of Aristotle’s concept of habit, but 
he also gave a greater systematisation and introduced some further developments which 
reflected his efforts to synthesise Christian theology and pagan – especially Aristotelian – 
philosophy.35 On the question of habit, this meant reconciling a classical tradition in which 
habit was foundational and constitutive for the good life, with a Christian tradition that had 
largely a negative view of the role of habit. The most influential thinker within this tradition 
was Augustine, who had criticised the classical account of virtue as habit for two reasons. 
First, Augustine thought that virtues acquired by the person’s own efforts would always lead 
to pride in this accomplishment, and thus would be inherently sinful even though they 
appeared, superficially, to be virtuous. His own view was that genuine virtue was dependent 
on divine grace, since all virtues are forms of God’s love for humanity, given as a divine gift. 
In The City of God Against the Pagans, Augustine argued that classical philosophers such as 
Cicero displayed a “wondrous vanity” in seeking “to achieve blessedness by their own 
efforts.”36 Second, from a psychological perspective, Augustine regarded habit as a bondage 
of the will, a force by which old desires still persisted even after the radical changes brought 
                                                             
35 For an extended scholarly account of the concept of habit in the thought of Aquinas, see B. Kent, “Habits and 
Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 49-70) in S. J. Pope, The Ethics of Aquinas (Georgetown University Press: Washington, 
D.C., 2002). 
36 Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), p. 919 
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about through conversion and repentance – processes which, for Augustine, required the aid 
of divine grace themselves.37 
According to Augustine, then, habit represented not the form of the good life, but, on 
the contrary, an obstacle to the kind of virtue to which Christians aspired. Augustine, in sum, 
envisaged a psychological battle between ‘two wills,’ two forces of desire – one of the flesh 
and the other of the spirit.38 Aquinas retained Augustine’s insistence that, for every Christian, 
the good was dependent on divine grace, and he followed Augustine in assigning the central 
role to the God-given virtue of charity. However, Aquinas also retained the classical concept 
of habit, albeit in a slightly modified form. In the Summa theologiae, Aquinas’s discussion of 
virtue was prefaced by a discussion of habit.39 Here, in defining habit, Aquinas made a very 
strong link between habit and will: “a disposition (habitus) is something which a man can 
exercise in action at will.”40 There is, of course, continuity here with Aristotle’s definition of 
virtue as a habit of choosing in the right way, but whereas Aristotle made reference to choice 
in order to invoke a certain kind or class of habits, Aquinas qualified the concept of habit as 
such with reference to the will. This made habit a specifically human category.  
Having insisted that habit – and consequently, virtue – was essentially related to the 
human will, Aquinas then went on to emphasise that the kind of virtue to which Christians 
ought to aspire was dependent on a habit that was bestowed by God. This was known as an 
‘infused habit,’ as opposed to the acquired virtue’ of which the pagan philosophers wrote. In 
defining virtue, Aquinas appealed not to Aristotle’s Ethics, but to Peter Lombard’s Sentences, 
then the standard textbook of Christian theology: “Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by 
                                                             
37 See, for example, Augustine, Confessions, trans. H. Chadiwck (London: Penguin, 1961), p. 164. 
38 See Bonnie Kent, “Augustine’s Ethics,” in E. Stump and Kretzmann (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
39 See ‘The Treatise on Habit’ in Aquinas, Summe theologiae. 
40 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, vol. 22 (1964), pp. 16-17. 
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which we live rightly, of which no one makes bad use, which God works in us without us.”41 
But having cited with approval this Augustinian formulation, Aquinas indicated that it would 
be more appropriate to replace ‘quality’ with ‘habit’.42 
In sum, Aquinas amplified Aristotle’s conception of habit by designating the 
sanctifying grace as an entitative habit, that is, a habit that functioned on the level of being. 
The important point here is that habit served an important religio-theological function that 
had the potential to direct humankind to their final spiritual end. In other words, whilst 
Augustine invoked the concept of habit to attribute sinfulness to human freedom, Aquinas 
invoked it to secure the link between virtue and freedom. In attempting to understand 
Christian virtue in terms of habit, Aquinas was reconciling two ideas that were in tension: the 
preservation of human freedom, on the one hand, and the denial of human self-sufficiency, 
on the other. By attributing habit to grace and, in so doing, radically transforming the pagan 
notion of habit as a ‘second nature’ acquired through an individual’s own actions and efforts 
– Aquinas maintained a delicate balance between these two aspects of Christian doctrine. In 
retaining something of the classical conception of ‘second nature’, then, Aquinas strove 
to secure some continuity between the natural and supernatural orders – between 
nature and grace. This was an important feature of his theology and his use of the 
concept of habit was foundational here - as Simon Oliver has elaborated: 
If God were simply to move humanity to the beatific vision, this would constitute a violent motion 
because humanity would be destined for an end for which its nature was not prepared…In addition to 
God moving humanity to its appropriate end, grace is also given as what Aquinas calls an ‘habitual 
gift’, namely a form or nature by which humanity can move and be moved to the supernatural end 
appointed by God. Just as God provides for creatures not only by moving them to their appropriate 
                                                             
41 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, vol. 23 (1969), p. 11. 
42 See G Emery and M. Levering (eds.), Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2015), p. 107. 
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ends, but also in bestowing forms and powers by which they make that motion their own, so too God 
provides his grace by which humanity may make its motion to beatitude its own.43 
 
Aquinas thus stayed close to Aristotle in emphasising the importance of making man truly 
virtuous. Robert Boyle’s Aretology (1645-7) usefully encapsulated this process in the 
equestrian imagery that was characteristic of the Renaissance language of governance: 
 
 we cannot deny, but by the Influence of the Vertus of the Will, the Sensitiue Appetite may…acquire 
good Inclinations and laudable Habitudes: and so may be called Vertuus by Participation: as in the Art 
of Riding…the Habitude of Horsmanship is…principally in the Rider; but yet may be som sort said to 
be in the Hors, in Respect of his being Drest.44  
 
Again, as with Aristotle, this habituation could only be achieved in practice through 
reiteration, as the cumulative effect of repeated instances of right willing, right sense 
appetition, and right feeling. Habituation was thus, for Aquinas, an effective way of defeating 
sin, making it a fruitful source of hope and success in his account of Christian spiritual life. 
As we will see, especially in chapters one and two, aspects of this Aristotelian-Thomist 
tradition were to find favour in England from the 1660s onwards.45  
The Protestant Reformation transformed the Roman Catholic doctrine of salvation 
through good works into the radicalised Protestant doctrine of salvation through faith 
expressed in good work. Reformation theology, beginning with Luther’s anti-perfectionism 
challenged such theories of habituation. For Luther, although divine grace was certainly given 
and received, it did not thereby become a person’s own in the same way as for Aquinas. In 
rejecting the scholastic theologians’ adoption of the Aristotelian concept of habit, Luther 
                                                             
43 See Simon Oliver, “The Sweet Delight of Virtue and Grace in Aquinas’s Ethics,” International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 7, no. 1 (2005): 52–71, p. 63. 
44 Boyle, 1991, p.12. 
45 For more information on this Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, see Christopher Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph 
over Reason: A History of the Moral Imagination from Spenser to Rochester (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p. 30. 
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expressed both psychological and ontological concern, and, as a result, he proposed a new 
way of thinking about the processes involved in the Christian life.46 
Luther detected a problem in the interpretation of grace as a habit. Although a divinely 
infused habit was not acquired by a person’s own efforts, there was still a gap between the 
habit and the exercise, between the capacity and its realisation – and this gap opened up the 
possibility to a notion of merit: a person, therefore, only became righteous insofar as they 
actualised their habit through good works.47 In this way, for Luther, the scholastic doctrine of 
grace permitted a connection between works and justification that would lead to a similar 
problem that Augustine had identified several centuries earlier: the danger of pride infecting 
virtue, and thereby corrupting the Christian life at its very core. Whereas Aquinas explained 
the exercise of a divinely infused habit by an appeal to a natural desire for the good which, 
when reinforced by grace, facilitated the Christian life, Luther put forward a much stronger 
dichotomy between grace and nature, whereby even the desire for God did not come from 
oneself: “Those who seek God, do good freely and gladly, purely for the sake of God 
alone…But this is the work not of our nature but of grace.”48 Our righteousness, according to 
Luther, “comes completely from the outside” and was “foreign” to our nature: “God does not 
redeem us through our own, but through external, righteousness and wisdom; not through one 
that comes from us and grows in us, but through one that comes to us from the outside.”49 
At the core of Luther’s thought, then, was the idea that, once the process of 
justification had been completely separated from works and merit, the love that flowed from 
God through human beings remained pure: a person was free to love without this becoming 
ensnared in a self-interested striving for reward, nor becoming tainted by pride. The gift of 
                                                             
46 See Bernhard Loshe, Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development (Minneapolis, 
1999), pp. 59-60. 
47 Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), pp. 70-1. 
48 Luther, 1972, p. 136. 
49 Ibid., p. 136 
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grace was most purely a gift when it was detached from any notion of merit. This was no easy 
gift to receive because, for Luther, the “whole life” of faith was “nothing else but prayer, 
seeking and begging…always seeking and striving to be made righteous…never standing 
still, never possessing.”50 
Eschewing the orthodox tradition of quotidian virtue that was monkish and ascetic, 
Luther and especially Calvin demanded direct and forceful engagement in the world through 
sweat, labour, and industry.51 It was not that martyrdom or sainthood were devalued per se, 
but that the democratic and egalitarian impulse of the Reformation constructed a new relation 
of the mundane to the sacred, extending the reach of discipline from the monastery and its 
adherence to the Rule of Benedict to daily life and obedience to Reform.52 The Reformation 
translated the practices of monastic obedience and discipline into vocation and demanded that 
individuals answered the call of God, not in the abstract or through monkish piety, but rather 
in direct and universal obedience to labour. As John Dunn has observed: “In social terms, the 
dominant characteristic of the calling was its egalitarianism…Men were equal as Christians. 
However unequal they might be as members of societies.”53 Everyone, not just the ecclesiast, 
therefore, were called to labour for God as “the manifest purpose for man.”54 Thus, the 
Reformation magnified the significance of everydayness, diffusing discipline by demanding 
that each attend to themselves as a site and source of power. Christopher Hill traced the effect 
of the sanctification of daily life through the elevation of vocation and labour: “No action can 
be casual or perfunctory: the most trivial detail of our daily life should be performed for the 
                                                             
50 Ibid., pp. 251-2. 
51 Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints (New York: Antheneum, 1976), p. 28. See also Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 239-
40. 
52 The Rule of Benedict disciplined the lives of monks by ordering time, space, and activity, providing a 
hierarchical power structure, and encouraging self-discipline through habits and practices suffusing daily life. 
53 John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the “Two 
Treatises of Government” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 225-26. 
54 Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 187. 
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glory of God, should be illuminated by a conscious cooperation with God’s purposes.”55 In 
other words, God commanded each individual, in each moment, to glorify him. Work became 
prayer, labour became sanctified, the mundane was exalted, and the physical was 
spiritualised. 
This theological tradition of discipline reached its apogee in John Calvin’s Geneva, 
the Protestant disciplinary state brought to fullest fruition. As is well known, the driving 
refrain of Calvin’s Institutes, reflected too in the work of the English Calvinists who shaped 
theological sensibility in late Elizabethan England, was that there was nothing but depravity 
within the body and soul of regenerate man.56 Calvin was convinced of the corruption of 
humanity, its wilful error, and its capacity for destruction, and thus he courted a public system 
of discipline that instantiated rigid self-control.57 Recognising that efficient, dispersed, 
individuated discipline depended on the willingness and ability of each individual to ‘watch’ 
themselves, Calvin envisioned a system of social and political surveillance. For him, each 
sheep in his flock had to be engaged in this project of social normalisation; that is, each 
believer had to be refigured as a labourer: a disciplined, obedient subject expressing their 
faith in action and their obedience in toil. Subjected to a rigid programme of habituation, the 
proper habits of work as faith would become second nature, “natural,” “normal.”58 
For Calvin, one had to labour because God commanded it. Adam’s disobedience had 
sentenced humanity to reap only what one sowed. As his congregants understood, God had 
                                                             
55 Christopher Hill, Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), p. 86. 
56 There is an extensive literature on English Calvinism. See, for example, R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English 
Calvinism to 1649 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of 
English Arminianism c. 1590-1640 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Peter Lake, “Calvinism and the 
English Church 1570-1635,” Past & Present, No. 114 (Feb., 1987): pp. 32-76; Marcus K. Harmes, “Calvin and 
the English Episcopate, 1580-1610,” Anglican and Episcopal History, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 2012): pp. 22-46.  
57 See Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, p. 28. See also, Christopher Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre-
revolutionary England (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), pp. 228-29. 
58 Interestingly, John Locke echoed Calvin in his discussion of habit formation in his Thoughts Concerning 
Education and On the Conduct of the Understanding. 
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chastised Adam as he cast him out of Eden: “Cursed is the ground because of you; In toil you 
will eat of it; All the days of your life…By the sweat of your face…You will eat bread.59 
According to Calvin, the individual had to labour dutifully because they had faith, because 
they believed themselves to be unworthy, and because they felt assured of their obedience to 
God only when drenched in sweat and reeling from exhaustion. To labour in obedience to 
God, was to repudiate Adam’s wilfulness, and thus they would exchange their present 
responsibility for his past transgression. Taxing labour exemplified godliness for the elect – 
in a word, “Puritans discovered in work the primary and elemental form of social discipline, 
the key to order, and the foundation of the future of morality…But work was something more 
than this obvious and inadequate form of domestic discipline; it was also the self-affirming 
activity of the godly.”60 
Critically, the Reformation also called on Christians to be their brother’s keepers.61 
Indeed, a common refrain of late Early Modern England is that individuals were called to 
husband the earth and their fellow men. “Stewards therefore we are,” declares the author of 
A Present Remedy for the Poor, “and not Proprietors of our Enjoyments; and the intent of our 
liberal Maker is, that we should convey what we have received from his bountiful Hand, to 
such Objects of Charity as we meet with in our mortal Race.”62 Though the poor were mostly 
rejected as full members of the Calvinist church, they were members enough to be subject to 
its discipline.63 To ensure the imposition of discipline to the wayward, Calvin instituted a 
system of observation and control intended to weld conscience to coercion where possible, 
and compel with punishment where necessary.64 Dutiful or not, labour was the command of 
God, and the Reformed sought to extend it even – especially – to those who shirked. Early 
                                                             
59 Genesis 3:17, 19. 
60 Dunn, Political Thought of John Locke, p. 221, 225. 
61 See for example, Peter Chamberlen, The Poor Man’s Advocate; or, England’s Samaritan (London, 1649).  
62 M. D., Present Remedy for the Poor, p. 4. 
63 See Christopher Hill, “Puritans and the Poor,” Past & Present, No, 2 (1952): pp. 32-50. 
64 See Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, pp. 42-47. 
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Modern English society in general, then, had to be shaped in to their dispositions, educated 
and habituated in to their proper role as labourers in God’s divine plan. One had to come to 
understand their labour as their obligation to their creator. Discipline had to be ensured for 
each individual, each labour, and each instant as an expression of God’s will and man’s 
obedience. The individual had to be forced to be free against the inclinations of the flesh, 
forced if necessary to accept God’s will for themselves and against their own desire to usurp 
their role as the director of their own lives.65 Such discipline had to be diffused, thorough, 
and absolute. 
The Protestant emphasis on the ordinary, its diffusion of discipline from monastic 
isolation to society at large, allowed an increase in the efficiency of the economy of power. 
Decentralising ecclesiastical authority by emphasising the individual’s relationship to God, it 
demanded ordinary Christians to attend to their salvation rather than to be attended to 
exclusively by the intercession of the clergy.66 To the extent that this attention was 
synonymous with disciplinary intervention, to the degree that each individual assumed a 
disciplinary role previously reserved for the clerical hierarchy, the efficiency and diffusion of 
this Christian disciplinary regime was truly novel. In practice, however, it may not have 
captured each and all in a system of power in which the subject subjected themselves, but it 
attempted to nonetheless. For rather than isolated, localised, interrupted, and irregularly 
present loci of authority, the Reformation pursued uniform, uninterrupted, continuous 
discipline by multiplying the sites of disciplinary power and internalising its imposition. It 
placed the concept of God at the centre of a panoptic complex of correction and social control 
by instilling the habits of goodliness and virtue. Rather than discipline through vertical 
                                                             
65 For a broad overview, see Milan Zafirovski, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Authoritarianism: 
Puritanism, Democracy, and Society (New York: Springer, 2007). See also, Carmen Luke, Pedagogy, Printing 
and Protestantism: The Discourse on Childhood (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), esp. 
chapters 4-6. 
66 For an excellent overview, see Euan Cameron, The European Reformation, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).  
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imposition, discipline was applied horizontally, normalising the always abnormal, ineluctably 
sinful subject. This was, to use Foucauldian terminology, a movement from theatrical 
punishment to modern discipline, from pain to correction, a step in the direction of the soul 
as prison for the body. Through this diffusion of disciplinary practice, each became their 
brother’s keeper, and each internalised the habits of devotion to God’s will and service. In 
other words, every individual was expected to acquire the habits of right living as well as 
discipline one another in order to enforce right behaviour. Thus, while martyrs and saints 
remained the holiest of the holy, and pronouncements still rang from the pulpit, ordinary 
labours assumed a new place in the work of glorifying God and disciplining idleness. With 
such pride of place came responsibility, and the activity of ordinary labourers took on new 
significance in the play of faith, work, and salvation. Personal conscience, therefore, trumped 
priestly edict. Humble work obviated the need for pomp and pageantry. But the price, 
however, for the average person was to feel the weight of salvation as a palpable burden. 
Faith demanded that every moment, every labour, every person be disciplined and habituated 
so as to glorify God. 
The point to highlight here is that Luther and particularly Calvin rejected the 
Thomistic view of habitual grace. Whereas Aquinas argued that grace perfected nature which 
meant that nature was understood in fundamental continuity with grace, the Protestant version 
of this axiom, based on the conviction that the fall had not merely damaged but destroyed 
original nature, was that God’s grace overcame sinful human nature. Since Aquinas believed 
that nature was perfected by grace, he taught a distinction between operating and cooperating 
grace. Cooperating grace was a gift of God infused by God into the soul (the doctrine of 
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justification) which became habitual grace (the doctrine of sanctification), which was the 
principle of meritorious work.67 
Calvin explicitly rejected Aquinas’s optimistic view of a comfortable cooperation 
between God’s gracious gift and the necessary human response to it since “It has not yet been 
demonstrated whether man has been wholly deprived of all power to do good, or still has 
some power, though meagre and weak; a power, indeed, that can do nothing of itself, but with 
the help of grace also does its part.” Calvin rejected the conclusion that “doing our part” 
meant that “we cooperate with the assisting grace of God, because it is our right either to 
render it effectual by spurning the first grace, or to confirm it by obediently following it.”68 
Whereas Aquinas understood God’s grace infused in humankind as becoming a habitual 
grace, Calvin rejected the concepts of both infused grace and habitual grace. He likewise 
rejected the category of merit, congruent and condign, as opposed to a proper understanding 
of grace alone. Human beings came before God in the grace revealed in Jesus Christ and with 
no merit of their own. Grace was entirely God’s gift and did not depend on human 
cooperation. Since Protestants believed that grace overcame nature instead of perfecting it, 
they generally understand God’s grace to replace rather than merely restore fallen nature. 
However, the distinction between sin damaging or destroying our original nature was not 
absolute. Calvin insisted that something of reason and will remained undestroyed in 
humankind.69 From this affirmation, one could infer a natural human capacity to think and to 
choose, which God’s grace having created and preserved employed without infusing, or – 
more precisely – reinfusing. 
                                                             
67 For more information, see Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (London, 1971); Joseph P. Wawrykow, God’s Grace and Human Action: ‘Merit’ in the 
Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Jeremy D. Wilkins, 
“Grace and Growth: Aquinas Longeran, and the Problematic of Habitual Grace,” Theological Studies 72 No. 4 
(December 2011): pp. 723 – 749. 
68 John Calvin Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles 
(Philadelphia, 1960), II .2.6 
69 Ibid., II. 2.12. 
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After the interlude of Catholic Restoration under Queen Mary and during the reign of 
Elizabeth I, Reformed theology was the prevailing outlook of the Church of England. It is 
generally conceded that this Calvinist hegemony persisted until challenged by King Charles 
I and Archbishop of Canterbury William Laud, whose programme for the Church of England 
sought to supplant Calvinism with a more conservative Protestantism that had much in 
common with Lutheranism, especially in its focus on the sacraments and downplaying of such 
tenets of Calvinism as unconditional predestination.70 By analogy with the Dutch movement, 
this was called ‘Arminianism’ by Calvinist opponents. 
Another important development to consider, therefore, is the work of Dutch Reformed 
theologian Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), whose teachings formed the basis of 
Arminianism. Arminius’ definition of faith was similar to that of his contemporaries.71 He 
identified knowledge as the foundation of faith and its “antecedent.” The formal act of faith 
was assent and the immediate “consequent” of faith was confidence or trust.72 Arminius 
argued that this faith was the direct result of the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit. The 
assent that constituted the formal act of faith was “infused above the order of nature.”73 Its 
“author” was the Holy Spirit who proposed truth to the understanding and “there works a 
persuasion” which was a supernatural, internal working of the Spirit.74 Arminius regarded the 
absence of an “internal grace” as the mark of Pelagianism because it did away with the 
importance of divine aid, and so his definition of faith did not include works.75 Faith could 
grow by external works, but such works did not constitute faith. Thus, faith, according to 
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71 See Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649, p. 142 
72 Jacob Arminius, “Private Disputations,” in XLIV, ii, v, in The Writings of Jacob Arminius, 3 vols., trans. 
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73 XLIV. V, Writings, II: 110. 
74 Arminius, “Private Disputations,” XLIV. Vi, in Writings, II:110. 
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Arminius, was assent to what was known by the understanding – this assent was the work of 
the Spirit and existed separately from works. 
It was in this light that Arminius insisted that faith was both a gift of God and a 
condition of salvation which involved a human response. According to Arminius, 
Faith is the gracious and gratuitous gift of God, bestowed accordingly to the administration of the 
means necessary to conduce to the end, that is, according to such an administration as the justice of 
God requires, either towards the side of mercy or towards that of severity. It is a gift which is not 
bestowed according to an absolute will of saving some particular men; for it is a condition required in 
the object to be saved, and it is in fact a condition before it is the means for obtaining salvation.76 
 
Faith was a gift in the sense that it was the effect of God’s prevenient grace. It was a human 
response in the sense that it was a condition for receiving justifying grace. But no one could 
come to the Father except those drawn by the prevenient grace of God. Humankind’s will to 
believe, as we have seen above, was the direct result of God’s grace. Consequently, faith was 
fundamentally God’s gift since no man could believe unless God had first given them the gift 
of grace, that is, the will to believe.77 
However, faith, for Arminius, was also a human act. It was an act of believing as well 
as an act of assent. Importantly, Arminius distinguished between the “quality of habit” of 
faith and the “act” of faith. Habitual faith was the capacity, the will to believe, which God 
infused into humankind. However, actual faith was that which God required for the 
imputation of righteousness.78 Consequently, the habit of faith was the gift – it was the 
operative grace, but the act of faith was the result of cooperative grace in which man 
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submitted to the movement of God’s grace. In the reception of habitual faith, man was 
passive, but in the act of faith, he was both active and passive. 
The passivity of faith was seen in two respects. First, the act of faith never arose out 
of the human subject alone. According to Arminius, God did not give man habitual faith and 
then cease his activity in some deistic sense. Rather, the gracious work of the Spirit was 
constant, and at every point he was working to bring humankind to the act of faith. The flow 
of grace did not stop, but it continued as it brought humankind to the act of faith. The grace 
of God not only preceded, but also accompanied and followed any good that an individual 
accomplished. Second, the passivity of faith was seen in the absence of merit. Faith was not 
to be considered a work, but was rather an act of reception. It was not a work of righteousness 
because then it could not be imputed, as Arminius explained: “Faith is not righteousness itself, 
but is graciously accounted for righteousness.”79 Faith, therefore, was not the ground of 
justification and Arminius made this abundantly clear: 
Christ has not obtained by his merits that we should be justified by the worthiness and merit of faith 
and much less that we should be justified by the merit of works: But the merit of Christ is opposed to 
justification by works; and in the Scriptures, faith and merit are placed in opposition to each other.80 
 
In other words, Christ’s obedience was the merit of justification. Faith had no part in that 
merit except that it received it. Faith and Christ’s death did not stand in the same relation to 
salvation. The believer was saved by merit, but not a merit that derived from faith, but a merit 
that was earned by Christ. As a result, salvation, according to Arminius, was not a lessening 
of the rigor of the law but the fulfilment of it in Christ by the imputation of his righteousness. 
However, Arminius did argue that the will of man had an important active role in the 
coming to faith. Humankind had to cooperate with the grace of God. This cooperation, 
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however, was not a co-earning, but was an active reception of a gift, that is, the gift of Christ’s 
merit. Nevertheless, faith remained an act on the part of man (but not without the assistance 
of grace). In the words of Arminius, “faith is the requirement of God and the act of the believer 
when he answers the requirement.”81 However, it was an act which was of the nature of 
“acceptance or apprehension.”82 It was, therefore, an act only as it was an instrument of 
justification, that is, the means by which Christ was made ours in cooperation with the Spirit 
of God. This constituted the “agreement and concurrence” between divine grace and free 
will.83 Carl Bangs has summarised Arminius’ relation between passive and active aspects of 
the will: “salvation being in Christ, it is not dependent upon free will, but free will is active 
in salvation.”84 In sum, then, for Arminius, free will did not act autonomously or 
meritoriously but it did act to receive what God offered. Unlike the will-full, self-seeking, 
and extreme Augustinian God as well as the God of early English Calvinists such as William 
Perkins whose God chose to condemn the majority of humankind before the creation of the 
world, Arminius’s God genuinely wished to save every human being. He offered grace to 
everyone. He offered enough grace, in fact, that every human being actually had the capacity 
to respond to God’s offer with faith, the capacity to cooperate with grace and be saved. It was 
because of his emphasis on faith as a human response, however, that Arminius drew criticism 
and was accused of denying that faith was the instrument of justification.85  
The important point to highlight at this stage, however, is that Arminius, by arguing 
that God allowed a degree of free will so that man could respond and accept redemption, was 
also suggesting that man had a greater capacity of free will as well. As we will see, 
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particularly in chapter 2, it was in this blurred region between man’s free will and acceptance 
of God’s grace that the notion of habit operated. Restoration divines believed that English 
society could be habituated to faith and to performing their religious duties; that English 
subjects could be brought into alignment with the English church through habituation into 
sociable dispositions and manners. In other words, habit could prepare humankind enough to 
accept redemption and God’s saving grace. It’s important to note that Calvin would have 
outright rejected such an approach. Since habit would enable the individual to perform actions 
they would otherwise either could not do at all or could only accomplish with great difficulty 
such as prepare for God’s saving grace, this would, in Calvin’s eyes, have eroded the special 
efficacy of grace. Grace in its primary sense remained in God; properly speaking the 
individual was not given grace or prepared for it, but received by God into His grace and 
favour was the object of God’s good will. Thus, Calvin would never have permitted the notion 
of habituation to accept God’s grace. 
The final part of this section will now briefly focus on the role of habit and virtue in 
Richard Hooker’s soteriology. In Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance, Deborah 
Shruger suggested that early modern “Anglican” churchman marginalised ethical inquiry in 
their sermons and theological treatises. In the work of Richard Hooker and Lancelot 
Andrewes, Shruger argued that “both ethical and theoretical concerns are subordinate to the 
need for intimate contact with God. There is this little emphasis on morality or natural 
theology.”86 According to Shuger, such works were preoccupied with affective inwardness, 
spiritual psychology and “theological emotionalism” rather than matters of external conduct: 
“our account of spiritual psychology in Hooker…has disclosed a pervasive concern with 
affective inwardness, with the experiences of desire, confusion, fear, and so forth – as 
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opposed to a concern with sin and morality, which seems to have been more typical in the 
period.”87 Shuger’s equation of morality with outward duty and action is similar to C.F 
Allison’s The Rise of Moralism, which argued that Anglican morality or ‘holy living’ 
theology only properly began in the mid-seventeenth-century, with the emphasis in Jeremy 
Taylor’s sermons on rule-following and the belief that sin required practical amelioration 
through social controls and moral training.88 
If ‘morality’ is taken in its most restrictive usage to mean favourable external conduct, 
then Shuger and Allison were correct to note a neglect of morality in the writings of Anglican 
orthodoxy. However, considering the richness of the moral vocabularies articulated during 
the early modern period, and considering how central moral philosophy, if not moral conduct, 
was to mainstream Anglicanism, the identification of morality with external behaviour was 
an under-theorised affiliation. Moral philosophy, for example, is the focal point of Books 1 
and 5 of Hooker’s Lawes, where Hooker negotiated the tensions between classical virtue 
theory and Protestant anti-perfectionism. 
Hooker’s challenge was to account for the intimate relationship between justification 
and sanctification without arguing that one caused the other. If one argued that sanctification 
caused justification, then one supported a Pelagian doctrine, according to which meritorious 
works achieved grace. If one argued that justification causes sanctification, then one was still 
faced with adequately theorising the internal change of character that occurred during 
regeneration. While a discussion of Hooker’s ecclesiology is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
Hooker’s position, as we will see, was not that dissimilar to the practical morality and ethics 
that emerged in post-Restoration latitudinarian writings.89 Hooker’s discussion of the church 
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as a school of virtue, in a sense, demonstrated the extent to which polemical manoeuvring 
dictated the amount of attention given to sanctification. His concern to enhance the role of 
the sacraments and liturgical practices was influenced by his Erastianism as well as his desire 
to counter the Presbyterian exaltation of the invisible church. Hooker proposed a two-fold 
theory of ethics in which natural law theology was supplemented by a Neo-Scholastic theory 
of grace which operated within an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework.90  
Hooker made a distinction, not found in Luther’s or Cavlin’s theology, between two 
forms of sanctifying righteousness. Habitual sanctifying righteousness, for Hooker, 
functioned as the efficient cause of justification, from which actual sanctifying righteousness 
followed. Habitual sanctification, marked by an infusion of the theological virtues of faith, 
hope, and charity, established the ultimate ends, natural law, which primarily worked to 
enlighten and recondition the intellect, established the proximate ends. Hooker, in other 
words, advocated not a two-fold division between religion and morality, but a two-tiered 
system of morality. The training of the will was a constituent feature of sanctification, and 
the training of the intellect assisted the individual in apprehending the axiomatic rightness of 
natural laws, those which dictated worldly, rather than ultimate ends.91 
Hooker’s position on salvation borrowed much from Aquinas but remained in the 
spirit of the moderate English Calvinist position. Drawing implicitly both on the definition of 
habit as the condition of possibility of behaving in a certain way and on the traditional 
definition of the Christian virtues of faith, love and hope as “infused virtues,” he described 
inherent righteousness as a kind of “habituall holiness.” Moreover, because of its essentially 
habitual character, inherent righteousness was to be distinguished from “actual holiness,” the 
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latter being the sum of all the godly deeds that the individual was able to perform because of 
the presence of the habit of inherent righteousness within them.92  
Although Hooker wrote in the Learned Discourse that sanctifying righteousness 
marked an infusion of a habit of theological virtues, he noted in the Lawes that the process of 
receiving and realising such virtue was very much an ongoing one: “the habit of faith, which 
afterwards doth come with years, but a farther building up of the same edifice, the first 
foundation whereof was laid by the Sacrament of Baptism.”93 The infusion of virtue 
established a union with God, which involved a gradual improvement on the behalf of the 
justified sinner: “Baptism implieth a covenant or league between God and man wherein as 
God doth bestow presently remission and the Holy Ghost, binding also himself to add in 
process of time what grace soever shall be farther necessary for the attainment of everlasting 
life.”94 
Furthermore, Grace was given not solely through the sacraments, however, but also 
through worship and prayer; through holy action: 
 
magnifieth the holy meditations and actions of divine men . . . working in them whose hearts God 
inspireth with the due consideration thereof, an habit or disposition of mind whereby they are made fit 
vessels, both for receipt and for delivery of whatsoever spiritual perfection. What is there necessary for 
man to know, which the Psalms are not able to teach? They are to beginners an easy and familiar 
introduction, a mighty augmentation of all virtue and knowledge in such as are entered before, a strong 
confirmation to the most perfect amongst others.95 
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There are sections in the Lawes in which Hooker claimed that an accurate perception of and 
turning toward one’s union with God required not only a passive bestowal of supernatural 
virtue through the sacraments, but also a co-operative effort on the part of the individual to 
train their affections through prayer and church worship. Thus, when Hooker made reference 
to participation in festivals, he claimed “The constant habit of well doing is not gotten without 
the custom of doing well, neither can virtue be made perfect but by the manifold works of 
virtue often practised.”96 
Although feasts and holiday church services were intermittent, such participation was 
important because it helped maintain a disposition toward virtue that remained active even 
after the passing of such services: “So that although by their necessary short continuance they 
abridge the present exercise of piety in some kind, yet because by repetition they enlarge, 
strengthen and confirm the habits of all virtue, it remaineth, that we honour, observe, and 
keep them as ordinances…”97 Hooker chose his words carefully here in order to avoid any 
confusion of his rhetoric of habituation to virtue with a classicised regimen of moral 
perfectionism. He noted only that repetition and practice “confirms” virtue, not that it led to 
the acquisition or development of virtue.  
Hooker’s two-tiered moral system was thus notable for its appropriation of the 
rhetoric of moral habituation in relation to spiritual matters, without directly postulating that 
moral agents acquire through their own efforts, virtues as dispositions of character. Hooker 
constantly returned to the improvement of moral conditioning, hence the importance of 
Aristotelian behaviourism. One emerges from the first chapter of Book V of the Lawes, for 
example, with the idea of godliness or genuine piety as the highest human virtue and the 
source of other virtues in their purest forms. Godliness, for Hooker, was a virtue in Aristotle’s 
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sense, a habit of character, not a collection of good deeds or isolated religious experiences, 
but a reliable and self-conscious disposition to perform godly actions for their own sake, a 
disposition that could be cultivated: “That which the gospel of Christ requireth is the 
perpetuity of virtuous duties; not perpetuity of exercise or action, but disposition perpetual, 
and practice as oft as times and opportunities require.”98 While Hooker’s moral theory was 
derived, in part, from Aristotelian behaviourism the important idea here is that for Hooker 
moral conduct was not instrumental to justification but rather a key component of double 
grace, imputed by God and then continued and fully realised by the individual. Nevertheless, 
the performance of works, according to Hooker, was a requirement in the process of achieving 
one’s sanctification: “Salvation therefore by Christ is the foundation of Christianity: as for 
works, they are a thing subordinate, no otherwise necessary than because our sanctification 
cannot be accomplished without them.”99 
Again, the main point here is that Hooker emphasised the importance of moral training 
that led to an appreciation of the final end, union with God. In the pursuit of this final end, 
the individual had to undergo, as Peter Lake has pointed out, a step-wise process of moral 
training and education which involved a process of preparing the heart for the “receipt” and 
“delivery” of spiritual perfection.100 In sum, the process of turning the individual toward to 
the final end required not only a passive bestowal of supernatural virtue through an 
administration of the sacraments, but also a co-operative effort on the part of the justified 
sinner to train their affections through prayer and church worship. Thus, for Hooker, “the 
constant habit of well doing is not gotten without the custom of doing well, neither can virtue 
be made perfect but by the manifold works of virtue often practiced.”101 
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The intellectual sources that I have briefly sketched above, informed ideas of habit 
and habituation in the late Early Modern English period. Although earlier, the prevailing 
outlook of English Protestants, Calvin and Calvinism became for many objects of obloquy 
and hostility in the generations after 1660. David Field, for example, has described this 
rejection of Calvinism as “the single most important feature on the theological landscape of 
England in the later seventeenth century.”102 As we will see in the coming chapters, late Early 
Modern English intellectuals invoked a notion of habit that was essentially a hybrid of 
Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy mixed with the depravity associated Calvinist theology as 
well as building upon Hooker’s practical moral theory and notion of habitual sanctification. 
In other words, it attempts to examine what Margo Todd has astutely described as an 
“intellectual milieu which…combined humanist optimism with the Calvinist doctrine of 
human depravity.”103  
Furthermore, whilst the influence of Arminianism on the seventeenth-century English 
Church has been the subject of much debate, in Restoration England, there existed the distinct 
religious communities of the Church of England and dissent.104 With the purging of the 
Puritans by the Act of Uniformity, the Church presented a different profile, as a new 
Anglicanism was constructed.105 This identity, sharpened by the experience of being out of 
power during the Cromwellian Interregnum, was built on the foundations of Laud and the 
Caroline Divines, and resulted in a church, in the words of John Spurr, “with a distinct 
doctrinal, ecclesiological and spiritual identity.” This Anglicanism centred in liturgy and 
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Episcopal authority, and was increasingly Arminian and anti-Calvinist, though distinctly 
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Henry More, John Wilkins, and the 
concept of ‘Right Reason’ 
 
 
In his Ductor Dubitantium or the Rule of Conscience in all her generall measures (1660), the 
Anglican divine Jeremy Taylor complained about appeals to reason on the grounds that  
reason is such a box of quicksilver that it abides nowhere; it dwells in no settled mansion; it is like a 
dove’s neck, or a changeable taffata; it looks to me otherwise than to you, who do not stand in the same 
light that I do: and if we inquire after the law of nature by the rules of our reason, we shall be uncertain 
as the discourses of the people, or the dreams of disturbed fancies.107  
Taylor’s passage effectively sums up the issues that plagued reason throughout mid- to late 
seventeenth-century England; mainly that every man’s reason was highly unreliable and not 
to be trusted. And yet, Restoration England was an era captivated by reason and the search 
for a rational basis for religion.108 This first chapter, then, focuses on one form of reason that 
experienced a surge of popularity during the Restoration period – the concept known as ‘right 
reason,’ an instrument that was held to a true and solid judgement of things that covered both 
the sense of correct ratiocination in conformity with the truth of things and the sense of a 
perfecting action of the mind. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a new reading of the concept of right reason 
in mid-to late Early Modern England. Whilst much work has been carried out on the concept, 
there are several fundamental distinctions concerning its conception and application that have 
gone hitherto unnoticed by scholars. Through a comparative examination of the works of 
                                                             
107 Jeremy Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium (London, 1660), vol, I, p. 231. 
108 See, for example, John Spurr, ‘“Rational Religion” in Restoration England’ Journal of the History of Ideas, 
Vol. 49, No. 4 (Oct. – Dec., 1988): pp 563-585. 
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Henry More and John Wilkins, two thinkers whose views, superficially, were very similar, it 
will be shown that they subscribed to two very different interpretations of the concept – More, 
an innatist one; and Wilkins, a habitual one.   
This chapter, then, proceeds as follows; it begins by offering an improved definition 
of ‘right reason’ in seventeenth-century England – a more rigorous and accurate terminology 
and better differentiated appreciation of theological differences makes for a better framework 
in which to consider its usage. Second, by paying particular attention to the natural law 
tradition and the thorny issues raised by Thomas Hobbes, it will attempt to contextualise ‘right 
reason’ more carefully within a distinctively late Early Modern English setting. Third, by 
using two philosophical categories known as ‘empiricism’ and ‘rationalism’, it will be shown 
how there were two different conceptions of right reason in existence during the period. The 
first of these two conceptions was exemplified in the work of Henry More. It stressed the 
importance of innate ideas imprinted on the human mind and was heavily influenced by 
Platonic philosophy. The second, embodied in the writings of John Wilkins and consolidated 
in the work of John Locke, was much more open to evidence drawn from the senses, stressed 
the importance of ‘experience’ in the acquisition of natural truths and natural law, and was 
informed by classical theories of habit. The fourth section then explores the implications of 
these findings in a theological context. 
Most importantly, this chapter shows how Wilkins believed that the concept of habit 
could be used to solve the highly contestable nature of reason. In an ideal world, Man’s natural 
right reason could discern the Laws of Nature and function as a reliable moral guide. In a 
fallen world, however, it was felt to be insufficient. This was where habitually acquired 
patterns of behaviour could act as a potential vanguard against such moral backsliding. Since 
the majority of English society could not be relied upon to grasp the dictates of reason by 
themselves, they therefore had to be supervised and habituated by authorities. The dictates of 
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reason, in other words, had to be internalised through habituation. Thus, according to Wilkins, 
English society had to be habituated to internalise moral virtues and to govern their passions 
and actions so as to maintain and cultivate sociability. 
Defining ‘Right Reason’ 
While it must be acknowledged that ‘right reason’ was only an important tool for as long as 
religion was an all-pervasive aspect of social and private life, and for as long as man believed 
that the end product of all human action was to arrive at harmony with, and to share in, divine 
reason, it nevertheless appears to have fulfilled a useful intellectual function, which seems to 
account for its thorough development and elaboration from the Middle Ages right through to 
the later Early Modern period.  
The concept of ‘right reason’ originated in the writings of Cicero and owed its 
widespread diffusion in Christian thought to the influence of Aristotelianism.109 While it 
depended upon the faculty of reason, it varied in a number of important ways according to 
how actual human ‘reason’ was used and thought about. In the first instance, it was a faculty 
of perception that revealed the highest moral virtues: the light within all mankind that enabled 
them to judge truth from falsity, right from wrong, good from evil, and virtue from vice. In 
other words, it was reason used in the right way or reason in its perfect state, which, it was 
thought, allowed the human mind to transcend the boundaries of ordinary physical 
phenomena as well its strong selfish tendencies in order to share in the rational nature of the 
divine mind. ‘Right reason,’ therefore, gifted man with the capacity to know God and discern 
God’s will. In this way, it was also viewed as a faculty of understanding: it allowed man to 
know the divine law or natural laws that had been given by God which revealed the essential 
                                                             
109 For a short summary of the origin of ‘right reason’ see, Richard Arnold, Logic of the Fall (Peter Lang: New 
York, 2006), ch. 1. 
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order of creation. Joseph Glanvill summed this up well in 1676: “To be persuaded by God 
and right Reason, is one and the same thing.”110 
Metaphorically, ‘right reason’ was comprehended in several terms such as the ‘candle 
of the lord’ a ‘divine spark’, a ‘divine light’, or a ‘natural light’ that resided in the ‘hearts of 
all men’ which God himself had placed there - as Bishop Lancelot Andrewes wrote in 1611, 
“…when God created man according to his owne Image, he breathed into him life immortall, 
he gave him sparkes of knowledge, and inbued his soule with reason and understanding, in 
which regard it is called the candle of the lord”; Similarly, Nathaniel Culverwell (citing Hugo 
Grotius), wrote that “Right reason (saith he) is that fix’d, and unshaken Law, not writ in 
perishing-paper by the Hand, or Pen of  a Creature, nor graven like a dead letter upon 
livelesse, and decaying pillars; but written with the point of a Diamond, nay, with the finger 
of God himself in the heart of man.”111  
Lastly, ‘right reason’ functioned as a moral as well as an intellectual faculty. This 
meant that virtue and knowledge were intricately linked to one another and that the divine 
wisdom, which ‘right reason’ was alleged to discern, was dependent on satisfying a series of 
ethical conditions as well as following a prudent and sober intellectual method. It was, above 
all, a psychological process which articulated the force of moral obligation. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that seventeenth-century actors usually wrote and referred to ‘right reason’ 
as though everyone knew perfectly well what the concept involved, as though its directives 
were always plainly evident and represented something that was correct and requisite. 
 
 
                                                             
110 Joseph Glanvill, Essays on several important subjects in philosophy and religion (London, 1676). 
111 J. Bliss and J.P Wilson (eds.), Ninety-Six Sermons by Lancelot Andrewes (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 
1841), p. 366; Nathaniel Culverwell, An elegant and leaned discourse of the light of nature (Oxford, 1669), p. 
36. 




The concept of ‘right reason’ had had a long history by the time Henry More and John Wilkins 
were writing. It is not my purpose to review that history in any detail here; my aim in this 
brief section is to highlight the major seventeenth-century scholarship on ‘right reason’ and 
how my interpretation fits within that scholarship. 
Robert Hoopes in his Right Reason in the English Renaissance, for example, traces 
the concept of ‘right reason’ from its origins in classical antiquity, through selected authors 
of the medieval periods (notably St. Thomas Aquinas) to the English Renaissance 
culminating in the works of Hooker, Milton and the Cambridge Platonists. Hoopes’s 
monograph demonstrates the utility of ‘right reason’ by detailing the ease with which it was 
assimilated into the Christian humanist tradition.112 Similarly, Robert Greene has shown that, 
whilst ‘right reason’ was losing ground owing to the strict Protestant attack on human reason, 
it did survive due to a number of Christian humanist and liberal Protestant transformations of 
the idea, largely indebted to the Neostoic revival.113 
Lotte Mulligan has shown in several articles how ‘right reason’ was used extensively 
in Anglican apologetics and sermons to identify reasoning in religion which was held to be 
congenial with orthodox Christian teachings and revelation.114 In this assertion, Mulligan is 
essentially correct, although as we shall see later, she has neglected crucial ways in which 
                                                             
112 Robert Hoopes, Right Reason in the English Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). See also, Herschel 
Baker, The Wars of Truth: Studies in the Decay of Christian Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth Century 
(Gloucester, Mass., 1969), pp. 90-131. 
113 Robert A, Greene, “Syndersis, the Spark of Conscience, in the English Renaissance,” Journal of the History 
of Ideas, 52 (1991): pp. 195 - 219. 
114 Lotte Mulligan, “’Reason,’ ‘Right Reason,’ and ‘Right Reason,’ and ‘Revelation’ in Mid-Seventeenth-
Century England.” In Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, edited by Brian Vickers, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 375-401; “Robert Boyle, Right Reason and the Meaning of Metaphor.” Journal of 
the History of Ideas vol. 55, no. 2, (1994); “Robert Boyle, the Christian Virtuoso, and the Rhetoric of Reason.” 
In Religion, Reason, and Nature in Early Modern Europe, edited by Robert Crocker (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 
pp. 97-116. 
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various post-Restoration divines differed in their conceptions as to exactly how ‘right reason’ 
operated. 
An argument for the increased use of ‘right reason’ in the Restoration era has been 
made by John Spurr. Concerned with the problems that confronted the restored Church, he 
shows how it attempted to maintain its monopoly over rational religion in the midst of various 
challenges to its hegemony. It adapted its uses of ‘reason’ in order to meet challenges from 
enthusiasts, non-conformists, sceptics, Catholics, and deists who also claimed reason for 
themselves. The crux of the matter, for Spurr, was the necessity of the clergy to keep its 
authority and intellectual supremacy in the face of numerous attacks on the national Church. 
Among the English clergy, Spurr argues, the tradition of ‘right reason’ was a broken 
epistemological weapon which undermined the special status of the Church’s teachings by 
allowing ordinary people to bring dogma before the bar of the teachings of the Church of 
England.115 
This chapter does not seek to dispute any of the above scholarship. It does, however, 
aim to remedy a gap in our understanding of right reason. What all of these major works fail 
to address is how late early modern English intellectuals actually interpreted right reason and 
how they conceived of its operation as a faculty within the human mind. In an article on 
natural theology in the seventeenth-century Scott Mandelbrote, for example, has suggested 
that perhaps the key difference between individuals such as More and Wilkins was the 
former’s emphasis on “the ability of human beings to know God (which) depended critically 
on the innate presence of the idea of God” and the latter’s reliance on “sensory perception to 
the correct conclusions.”116 Taking on-board Mandelbrote’s observations, then, as well as 
drawing upon the philosophical approaches of ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism,’ this chapter 
                                                             
115 John Spurr, “‘Rational Religion’ in Restoration England.” Journal of the History of Ideas 49:563-85. 
116 Scott Mandelbrote, “The Uses of Natural Theology in Seventeenth-Century England,” Science in Context, 
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will put forward a new, more subtle reading of ‘right reason.’ This reading will show that 
whilst right reason may have been superficially a homogenous concept, it was, in fact, 
conceived differently by two key Restoration thinkers. 
Context 
The standard use of right reason, then, was that it supported, and did not challenge, orthodox 
religious teaching. In effect, it tended to be invoked primarily on the basis of the belief that 
man could transcend his postlapsarian state, which restrained him with imperfections and 
falsehoods, in order to arrive at a place where it was alleged that one could share in the divine 
knowledge of the creator. This process, of arriving at a place where man shared an intimate 
connection with the divine mind, was not simply a rhetorical tool. It was, in fact, highly 
important that man used his faculty of ‘right reason’ to arrive at infallible conclusions because 
the concept itself was bound up with highly complex and controversial issues ranging from 
the foundations of the natural law tradition, the obligatory force of the laws of nature, the 
source of man’s morality, and, not least, whether reason could demonstrate the existence of 
God and identify the fundamental truths of religion. 
In Restoration England these issues were of major concern to those devout clergy and 
laymen of the Church of England who were convinced that God’s existence and his moral 
laws were amenable to such rational proof. It became more crucial at this point in time after 
1660 for the Church of England to defend its official position against the various sects of 
dissenters and non-conformists that had gained prominence during the civil wars and the 
Interregnum. Such groups represented a challenge to the authority of the clergy and the 
church. Right reason, therefore, was a potentially useful tool which could be mustered to 
stamp out heterodoxy.117   
                                                             
117 See ibid. 
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Such arguments, however, relied not only on mankind being able to reason in a logical 
and methodical fashion, but also on the assumption that right reason was an infallible faculty 
that anyone could access once they had reasoned correctly. This, of course, raised a variety 
of awkward and tricky questions over the nature, application, and process of right reason: 
Glaring questions, such as how could one be sure that they had not thought confusedly or 
reasoned illogically, raised the issue of whether ‘right reason’ could ever be mistaken.  
The problem surrounding the highly debatable impartiality of right reason was 
cleverly exposed by Thomas Hobbes in one of his first major works De Cive in 1642 when 
he wrote that: 
By right reason in men’s natural state, I understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of 
reasoning, that is the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his…I 
call it peculiar, because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme, that is, the civil law, 
is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this civil government,…no man 
can know right reason from false.118 
 
Hobbes’s definition of right reason reveals the root of the problem which promulgators of the 
concept had to deal with. Right reason, as Hobbes shrewdly argued, was subjective; there was 
a startling absence of any objective criteria by which its fruits could be measured. This 
inevitably rendered the concept extremely untrustworthy. For an individual to suggest that 
right reason constituted some independent, disinterested and divinely sanctioned, standard of 
judgement, was an error ‘that hath cost thousands of men their lives. Was there ever a King 
that made a law which in right reason had been better unmade? And shall those laws therefore 
not be obeyed? Shall we rebel?”119 
Hobbes’s views expressed in De Cive clearly anticipate the themes of his more famous 
Leviathan (1651). In his magnum opus Hobbes presented a contribution to the religio-political 
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debate which was typically both disruptive and alarming. Out of the many heavy blows that 
Hobbes dealt to the accepted nature of man and civil society, perhaps his most devastating 
one was his contention that man’s natural reason was insufficient to identify God’s will. This 
powerful and sweeping proclamation carried with it a number of disturbing consequences: it 
called in to question the entirety of the natural law tradition, man’s primal instincts in the 
state of nature, as well as the nature of political, religious, and societal authority.  
The natural law tradition was viewed by many contemporaries as a possible solution 
to the religious and political strife which had plagued England throughout the course of the 
seventeenth century.120 As a tradition and a concept it presupposed the existence of common 
notions and values which could be gleaned from the nature of man regardless of his religious 
disposition, culture or nationality. Hobbes did use the language of natural law theory as the 
foundation for his political theory, but he purposely subverted it in several key areas. The 
major problem that dogged the natural tradition was the difficulty of demonstrating what was 
natural and how it could be shown to be obligatory. 
The traditional scholastic approach to natural law entailed that its contents were the 
dictates of right reason, and so this meant that such dictates were contingent on the virtue of 
the rationality that man shared with his creator. This standard account of natural law was 
adapted for a Protestant audience by Hugo Grotius in his De jure belli ac pacis of 1625. 
Grotius’s work was essentially an irenic project, which dealt with the problems of religious 
fanaticism as well as the political, religious and moral fragmentation that religious wars had 
produced in early seventeenth-century Europe. For the many intellectuals and clergyman who 
followed Grotius and attempted to develop his work, the major problem with this approach 
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to natural law was that it accorded human reason a considerable amount of authority as it 
necessitated that human reason could reveal God’s will and therefore our natural obligations.  
Human reason, of course, was held to have a highly ambivalent nature and thus had 
to be treated with scepticism. In Protestant theology at least, there was a deep-seated 
pessimistic estimation of man’s faculties as fallen and deficient. This was particularly so in 
England, where Calvinist understandings of the doctrine of original sin predominated. As a 
result, the narrative of the Fall and its consequences dominated the theological, social and 
intellectual discussions. The renewed attention on the Fall and original sin that is 
characteristic of the early modern period was occasioned by the religious upheavals of the 
sixteenth century. These events not only led to a crisis of confidence in the traditional sources 
of knowledge, but also coincided with a revival of an Augustinian outlook that emphasized 
the corruption of human nature and the limitations of the human mind.121 
In his De jure naturali (1640), John Selden suggested that God had somehow 
disseminated special knowledge of the laws of nature to Adam and then to Noah, 
commanding them to everlasting obedience, but his suggestion that these commands were 
primarily embodied in the Hebrew tradition was viewed as too much of mystical reliance 
which undermined the usefulness of his ideas. In a rather more orthodox approach, Jeremy 
Taylor argued that God’s command was simply given through scripture. Others wishing to 
preserve some aspects of the scholastic argument, such as the Cambridge don Nathaniel 
Culverwel, sought to find evidence that God had designed the natural world in such a way 
that the dictates of obligatory natural law could be derived from a careful empirical study of 
nature.122 
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Hobbes’s critical analysis of natural law theory, however, had a number of serious 
implications for those wishing to use it for irenic purposes. Although Hobbes wrote about 
natural law in conventional terms, his critical analysis shattered the conventional moral 
relationships between those terms. While he certainly did believe that God commanded over 
all things, he thought that using reason, or indeed Scripture, to identify God’s instructions 
was potentially misleading and precarious. Since Hobbes abolished the idea that natural law 
could bind individuals through reason, the only practical source of moral obligation which 
remained rested with the state and the magistrate. Moreover, Hobbes’s subjective base for 
moral theory also threw out the idea that there existed an objective, natural morality, beyond 
that which was determined by the state. 
Hobbes’s view of human reason and right reason followed a similar path; one that 
involved authorisation by an absolute sovereign: 
 
…no mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an 
account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And 
therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for 
right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their 
controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by 
Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soeover.123 
 
Reason and, more importantly, right reason had to be carefully controlled by the state. In the 
state of nature, which, according to Hobbes, lacked any kind of moral public compass 
determining right from wrong, every man would have had to act on their own reason in order 
to decide their actions. Thus one man’s right reason is simply another man’s special pleading. 
This, for Hobbes, is not congenial to a peaceable state – if every man were to follow their 
own right reason then the entire social structure would inevitably fall into chaos. This 
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therefore led Hobbes to conclude that since “right reason is not existent, the reason of some 
man or men must supply the place thereof,” and such men had to be civil magistrates who 
were vested with the sovereign power.124 
The civil authority, in Hobbes’s account, became the absolute standard for right 
reason. Peter Dear’s interesting analogy sums this up perfectly: “For Hobbes, notions of God 
could not by themselves be cashed; the brute force of civil authority necessarily played that 
role for Him. The king was both God’s banker and God’s trustee.”125 The crux of the issue 
for the Monster of Malmesbury was that an arbiter was required in order to tell individuals 
when their ‘right reason’ was, in fact, right! Right reason could not operate solely by way of 
its own virtue – it had to be guaranteed by the power of the absolute sovereign. 
This is not to say that Hobbes believed that a common standard for living the virtuous 
life did not exist, rather the problem lay in the fact that such a standard could never be freed 
from the subjective interpretation until human beings elected a civil magistrate to legislate on 
such matters. The search for a common standard and man’s ability to access such a standard 
through means of his own reason thus formed the bedrock of responses to Hobbes’s 
totalitarianism in seventeenth-century England. 
Historians have come to increasingly recognise that the discomfort caused by 
Hobbes’s writing was rooted in the fact that his radical ideas were based upon principles 
shared with contemporaries. This area of Hobbesian studies has been explored by Noel 
Malcolm and Jon Parkin, who have suggested that critical responses to Hobbes’s writings 
were based on an uneasy awareness that what Hobbes had advocated was not a far cry from 
the position of his critics.126 Such studies, particularly Parkin’s, have convincingly shown 
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how Hobbes’s influence can be found amongst his many critics who sought to tame and 
control his ideas, rather than rejecting them. This is a testament to Hobbes’s political and 
religious relevance since the very issues that the Leviathan had raised in the 1650s persisted 
throughout the Restoration. The heart of the matter was that he was “too useful to ignore, but 
too dangerous to leave unchallenged.”127 
Many Anglican divines throughout the period, such as Edward Stillingfleet and John 
Tillotson, appealed to an account of sovereign authority in political and religious matters 
which came very close to Hobbesian ideas, as their critics were more than happy to point 
out.128 Their projects sought to defend the natural basis of restored society by providing a 
more acceptable natural law foundation as well as reasserting the natural basis of sociability. 
Richard Cumberland’s De legibus naturae which was published in 1672 is a good example. 
Cumberland sought to demonstrate that the state of nature was bound by obligatory natural 
laws and that it was these laws which determined sovereign power and not the reverse. His 
primary goal was to show not only the content of natural law, but also its status as God’s 
obligatory law. 
The main problem that Cumberland faced was proving that sociable behaviour was a 
compulsory requirement which could be identified as the will of God. His solution was to 
argue that from a careful examination of nature it was possible to discover the laws of nature 
that God had laid down. It is important to note that this approach stemmed from Cumberland’s 
faith in the new natural philosophy The 1650s and 1660s had witnessed an outpouring of 
works which had suggested that the study of the natural world was an essential part of a 
natural theology that could reveal key characteristics about God’s will. This new style of 
philosophical religious literature incorporated and made use of the new experimental 
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philosophy and emerged primarily in response to the upheavals of the 1640s. This natural 
theology argued emphatically – with clear reference to reason – for the intelligibility of 
nature, and its logical dependence on the Christian God. This type of natural theology, linking 
nature, morality and religious doctrine became a hallmark of the religio-theological culture 
of the Anglican Church. It found its earliest expressions in works such as Edward 
Stillingfleet’s Origines sacrae (1662), John Tillotson’s The Rule of Faith (1666), John 
Wilkins’s Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675) and its most fullest defence 
in John Ray’s famous marriage between natural history and theology, The Wisdom of God 
manifested in the Works of Creation (1691).129 
Cumberland was convinced that any study of the human condition and morality could 
not be separated from the study of matter and motion. The laws of nature in the physical world 
were thus deeply connected to the divine moral laws that governed the world of men. The 
laws of nature and God’s will could therefore be revealed through a careful observation of 
creation. Morality was therefore inherent in nature and obligatory moral laws were 
discoverable to those who were willing to search for them properly.130 
Where did right reason fit into Cumberland’s solution? Cumberland, in fact, agreed 
with Hobbes that right reason could not be an infallible faculty. Nevertheless, Cumberland 
remained convinced that it could still be considered as a faculty “not false in the act of 
judging”.131 Reason, although not infallible, still functioned and drew its conclusion based on 
sensory information collected from the natural world. On these empirical premises, 
Cumberland contended that the ‘nature of things’ was uniform and, more importantly, 
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objective.132  Even though right reason was unable to glean conclusions by itself, it was able 
to ascertain objectively true conclusions from the evidence provided by nature. Thus, in reply 
to Hobbes, Cumberland claimed that the ‘nature of things’ provided a common standard 
which allowed all men to put their right reason to the test. In this way, one man’s right reason 
could be the same as everyone else’s (as long as it correctly understood the ‘nature of things’). 
For Cumberland, Hobbes’s main oversight was that he had neglected a fundamental truth: 
“that there was the same standard to all, by which the reason of everyone is to be tried, 
whether it be right or no; namely, the nature of things”.133 The cornerstone of Cumberland’s 
natural theory was that in a world governed by God, man is encouraged to investigate the 
hidden characteristics of the world. This in turn enabled him to realise that he was inherently 
a social being and that moral behaviour was in fact a natural phenomenon which could be 
observed in a similar way as to the behaviour of physical bodies. 
Cumberland’s novel natural law theory represented an important and influential anti-
Hobbesian manifesto. In 1692 James Tyrell, a close friend of John Locke, produced an 
English version of De Legibus Naturae in his Brief disquisition of the law of nature, which 
was written as a response to the accusations of Hobbism that had been brought against 
Locke’s Essay concerning human understanding in 1690. Such an example reveals the 
significance of Cumberland’s thesis – he had effectively shown how it was possible to 
discourse about natural obligation and at the same time avoid the spectre of Hobbism.134 
Henry More and John Wilkins 
In the last section we saw Hobbes’s representation of the social reality of right reason to be 
nothing more than a subjective means of judgement, and Cumberland’s subsequent attempt 
                                                             
132 Cumberland was by no means alone in making this argument – Edward Stillingfleet in his Origines sacrae, 
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to show how it did, in fact, reveal a set of common notions founded on a sufficient analysis 
of evidence from sensory experience. This now brings us to a consideration of how right 
reason was conceived as an applied working faculty by two seventeenth-century 
philosophers, Henry More and John Wilkins. 
In order to draw out the subtle, yet fundamental, differences between More’s and 
Wilkins’s conception of right reason, I will employ two opposing historical categories; the 
philosophical approaches of ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’. Rationalism gave human reason 
the primary role in knowing. A key figure in this school of thought, Rene Descartes’ dictum 
is famous, “Cogito ergo sum” – I think, therefore I am. Empiricism, in contrast, placed the 
emphasis on experience. John Locke, arguably the father of modern empiricism, gave strong 
force to the concept of the human mind being a tabula rasa at birth upon which experience 
and the reflection of such experience imprinted knowledge. 
While some historians would probably prefer a more taxonomic-sensitive framework 
when discussing seventeenth-century actors, I believe that such categories remain useful to 
the study of the early modern period, regardless of whether or not they were used by the 
historical actors. Always however they must be used with caution for it must be noted the 
lack of clarity in such a sharp dichotomy and the fact that two approaches tended to 
intermingle with one another. It is possible, for instance, to see Locke as almost in agreement 
with Descartes concerning the innate endowments of the mind.  
Locke’s famous assault against innatism in the Essay, whilst primarily directed 
against the Cartesian world-view, was also aimed at the Cambridge Platonists. It is important 
to point out, however, that reason’s central role in the attainment of knowledge was never up 
for debate. For the empiricist philosopher, ‘experience’ involved an interaction with nature as 
well as reflecting upon such interaction; reason formed an integral part of this reflection. As 
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Peter Dear puts it, “empiricism could not dispense with reason any more than rationalism 
could ignore the lessons of the senses.”135 
Henry More, of Christ’s College, was perhaps the most famous representative of the 
Cambridge Platonist school. The Cambridge Platonists were a loosely defined group of 
seventeenth-century English theologians and philosophers distinguished by their strong 
interest in the writings of Plato, their opposition to religious fanaticism and enthusiasm, and 
their preaching of a reasonable religion of holiness founded on a deep-seated irenicism. The 
practical consequences of this Platonic rationalism was a strong contempt for dispute in 
matters of religion. What mattered most was the revitalising spirit of God and the non-
contentious notions of holy living upon which all could agree. 
They tended to reject the world of sense in their attempt to recover moral and 
intellectual truths which were untainted by corporeality. For them, true knowledge came not 
from the external world, but from a mental world. Accordingly, the Cambridge Platonists 
came to reply upon the concept of ‘innate ideas’ – those a priori truths which every living 
man knew to be true if he were to reason correctly – which demanded universal assent. This 
approach can be viewed as a kind of mystical rationalism and must be considered when we 
come to understand Henry More’s conception of right reason.136 
In order to understand More’s right reason, we must first grasp what he thought was 
meant by the term ‘virtue’. In chapter three of his On the Nature and Principles of Ethics, 
More informs the reader that: 
Virtue is an intellectual power of the soul, by which it overrules the animal impressions or bodily 
passions; so as in every action it easily pursues what is absolutely and simply the best. Here it seems 
fit, in the definition, to call virtue rather a power than a habit. First, because the word virtue implies as 
much, and signifies the same thing as fortitude. And next because an habit is not essential to virtue…we 
                                                             
135 P. Dear, “Divine Illumination…” (1998), p. 352. 
136 Mystical rationalism is taken to mean a kind of altered state of consciousness or transcendence such as 
deep philosophical meditation or prayer etc. 
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term this a power intellectual…because it is always excited by some principle which is intellectual or 
rational.137 
Once we consider that More is working within the mystical rationalistic framework embraced 
by the Cambridge Platonists, it becomes clearer why he would consider virtue as an 
intellectual power. For him, virtue was not acquired via sense experience, it was an innate 
power that was placed in man at his inception. Hence virtue was not gained from any external 
causes but from the ‘internal, which make the essence of a thing.’138 
More’s internally-based virtue stemmed from his central belief that a state of spiritual 
perfection or illumination had been promised in the Gospel to every believer, and that this 
was the true end of living the ‘divine life’, as More put it. This perfected state, according to 
More, was possible to reach due to the ‘divine seed’ that God has planted in each soul at its 
conception. This meant that through a process of spiritual and moral cleansing, involving self-
reflection and a close identification with this ‘divine seed’ or inner principle, it was possible 
for man to reach a state of perfection in this life. As this view demonstrates, More rejected 
the Calvinistic belief that the soul was inherently sinful, replacing it with a more optimistic 
and positive view that placed the emphasis on the presence of an ‘inherent righteousness’ that 
had only been impaired by the Fall. 
In his “General Preface” (1679) More tells the reader how to arrive at such a state of 
perfection. He describes how he embarked on a period of ‘Holy Discipline and Conflict’, 
during which he slowly nurtured the ‘divine principle’ within him in order so that he could 
subdue and overcome his “animal nature”. This released him, he explains, from the 
“insatiable desire and Thirst…after the knowledge of things” which had consumed his early 
years.139 In order to attain harmony with their creator, human beings, according to More, 
                                                             
137 Henry More, Enchiridion Ethicum (London 1668), Book I, ch. 3, p. 11. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Cited in Robert Crocker, Henry More, 1614-1687 (Kluwer, 2003), p. 5. 
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could not just rely on the grace of Christ’s sacrifice, as the Calvinist tradition would say, but 
from the revival of an inner principle which was the “sole invincible Basis of all true 
Religion.”140 
It should come as no surprise, then, that More’s conception of right reason was 
inherently congenial with the idea of virtue as well as his belief in a deep inner principle:  
 
[Right reason] is that which by certain and necessary consequences is at length resolved into some 
intellectual principle which is immediately true.141 
 
More’s right reason is fully compatible with his ideas on virtue and fits nicely within his 
mystical rationalistic framework. For More it was not enough to simply remember or 
formulate a moral rule and act accordingly (like the mechanisms of a habit). Rather, More 
believed that the intellect had to judge a rule to be true in the here and now of the present 
situation, before the individual could explicitly recognise a moral obligation.  
In this sense, the functional meaning of right reason, for More, signified an act of 
judgement which asserted, for example, an obligation to act by assenting to normative 
principles or a ‘principle’ fact, or law which was undeniably true. Therefore, while this 
suggests that the technical meaning of right reason was that process which provided the 
immediate norm of morality and/or the truths of God’s creation, More ultimately viewed right 
reason as though it depended on a spiritual sense which bore its own certainty. A spiritual 
sense that conveyed wisdom which was confined to those who had undergone a spiritual 
reformation and mental purgation in order to seek divine illumination and turn away from 
their passions and corruption. Once one had completed such a process, according to More, 
access to right reason became a second nature and practically instinctual: “that whatsoever a 
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141 More, An Account of Virtue; or, Dr Henry More’s Abridgement of Morals, (1690). 
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Man so purg’d shall afterward imagine, must therefore be according to Right Reason, or Right 
Reason it self, merely because he thinks so.”142 
John Wilkins had much in common with his contemporary Henry More. He, like 
More, advocated a rational and reasonable religion based on common notions to which all 
men could assent. Both of them can be described broadly as irenicists – both men strove to 
curb civil, religious and political disputes which had plagued their country throughout the 
first half of the seventeenth century, by arguing for a doctrinally minimal, true religion.  Yet 
Wilkins was a member of a group of divines whose works would develop a common-sense 
empirical tradition which would prove to be profoundly critical of Platonist epistemology, 
particularly the reliance on the concept of innate ideas. 
It should be pointed out, however, that it was common to talk of ‘innate ideas’. Various 
clergyman, laymen, theologians and divines make constant references to ‘some innate idea’ 
of God in men’s souls, of the idea of God being ‘stamp’d on the minds of men’ or a ‘natural 
knowledge of God in the hearts of men.’143 This form of doctrine, nevertheless, was under 
attack during the Restoration, as John Yolton has shown, from the argument that the human 
mind, reflecting upon itself in isolation, as More advocated, was an insufficient mechanism 
for making the soul aware of an implicit knowledge of God. Self-reflection, it was believed, 
required the additional stimuli of our sense experience. The crux of the problem was if our 
knowledge of God was innate but unknown until we reflected upon our experiences from our 
sense data, how could it be separated from our senses and be shown to be innate? The concept 
of innate ideas was gradually becoming untenable, and it was Locke’s Essay concerning 
Human Understanding (1689) which more or less scrapped the concept all-together.144 
                                                             
142 More, Enchiridion Ethicum, p. 155. 
143 See Charles Wolseley, The Unreasonableness of Atheism (1669), p. 168; William Bates, Considerations of 
the Existence of God (London, 1676), pp. 82-83; William Annand, Fides Catholica (London, 1661), p.150. 
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The group to which Wilkins belonged, broadly speaking, came to be known as 
latitudinarianism, which was a distinctively English phenomenon – intellectual, social, 
political – and emerged during the Civil War and Interregnum. It came into its own after the 
Restoration, and became a powerful movement in the reign of William III. One of the fathers 
of the latitude movement was Benjamin Whichcote, whose philosophy clearly espouses the 
typical empirical approach which would later come to dominate British philosophy. 
Whichcote understood reason as the ‘Candle of the Lord’, a phrase taken from Proverbs 
xx.27, which became a common term of thinking about man’s God given rational faculty and 
of right reason, subsequently to be found in the work of Nathaniel Culverwel, Simon Patrick, 
and even John Locke.145 
The ‘Candle of the Lord’ concept had two important features which formed the 
foundation of Whichcote’s natural religion approach. First, it was ‘lit by God’ and therefore 
provided an essential means of revealing God’s will, an infallible faculty for perceiving right 
from wrong. However, the second characteristic was that it was unable to detect God’s will 
on its own. Reason by itself contained no innate knowledge; Whichcote argued that ‘the 
Understanding, as Aristotle observes, is rasa tabula’. In another work he wrote how men are 
born ‘a sheet of white paper whereon nothing is written.’146 The implication of this tabula 
rasa concept was that knowledge must be obtained empirically, from nature illuminated by 
reason. Whichcote’s empirical approach can be seen clearly throughout his work; as he wrote 
in the Aphorisms, ‘None of us are born knowing or Wise: but men become Wise, by 
consideration, observation, and experience.’ Thus, it was nature which provided man with the 
key to understanding God’s will: ‘Things themselves speak to us, and offer notions to our 
minds, and this is the voice of God.’147 
                                                             
145 See Robert A. Greene, “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct. – Dec., 1991): pp. 617-644. 
146 Benjamin Whichcote, Select Notions (London, 1685), p. 99. 
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This empirical epistemology is key to understanding Wilkins’s conception of right 
reason. In his thirteenth sermon, preached sometime in the 1660s, Wilkins told his 
congregation that: 
…we are directed and inclined to supply that right reason, which is not provided for in the words of 
the written Law. Because ‘tis not possible in the making of general Rules or Laws to foresee all such 
particular cases and circumstances as may happen. Therefore that habit whereby a man is enabled and 
inclined to deal according to the equitable sense of the Law, and to allow for such particular 
circumstances as may make a real difference in several Cases, this is styled…equity, which is a moral 
virtue placed betwixt the two extremes of…rigour; or sumum jus on the one hand, insisting too much 
upon the letter; and relaxatio nimia, remitting too much from the true sense of it, on the other hand. 
Now both these extremes, the excess and the defect being evidently vices, it must thence necessarily 
follow, that the medium betwixt them must be a virtue, and have in it the obligation of a duty.148 
 
It is immediately noticeable that Wilkins’s right reason is in stark contrast to the one 
advocated by More. His formulation of right reason as a ‘habit’ which would presumably 
have to be constructed via an interaction with the external senses, is clearly a long way from 
More’s Platonist and innate intellection. Once we consider the empirical tradition that Wilkins 
is working in, then the reason behind his conception of right reason as a habit becomes much 
clearer. In Discovery of a New World (1638), for example, Wilkins exhibited a strong 
empiricism by giving an important role to the senses. In his discussion of the nature of life on 
the moon, Wilkins subtly hinted at his belief in the human mind as a tabula rasa as espoused 
by Whichcote. He proposed but did not develop a thesis that all knowledge had to be gleaned 
from the senses: “Our understandings [are] capable only of such things as have entered by 
our Senses, or else such mixed Natures as may be composed from.”149 This is evidence that 
Wilkins subscribed to a theory of knowledge which emphasized the mind at birth as a tabula 
                                                             
148 Wilkins, Thirteenth Sermon in Sermons Preached upon Several Occasions (1682), p. 395. 
149 Cited in Henry G. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690 (The Hague, 
1963), p.60. See also Wilkins, Discovery of a New World (1638), p.146. 
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rasa, of sorts. Such a perspective would have profoundly influenced his conception of right 
reason; it would have to have been something that was acquired from nature and experience 
- a habit, in other words.  
Wilkins’s preoccupation with habit was drawn from Aristotelian notions of virtue and 
ethical conduct. In an article on the role of habit in late seventeenth and early eighteenth-
century theology, Paul Alkon argued for the influence of Aristotlelian moral habituation on 
Robert South, William Law and Samuel Johnson.150 Wilkins can be added to this list. His 
conception of right reason reveals how Aristotle’s familiar advice that moral virtue was 
acquired through practice and repetition could be constructed within a Christian context by 
stressing the benefits of actively developing virtuous habits. For Aristotle, prudence or 
practical wisdom, the product of ethical habituation, was an improvisational capability to act 
virtuously in contingent situations.151 Thus Wilkins’s right reason, read in this way, espoused 
a theory of ethical conduct in which a momentous rational choice guided the will to bind the 
moral agent to habitual action. It demanded a thinking action in order to attain spiritual ends 
and to guide ethical conduct. 
Habitual action, for Wilkins, was fundamental in setting conduct on a rightful path. 
Human beings, for example, throughout their lives learn right from wrong, truth from falsity 
as well as the fundamental tenets of religion. This process of becoming competently informed, 
or the ‘habit’ of learning the facts of life and making the right judgments, for instance, is, for 
Wilkins, what is meant by right reason. It was an indispensable habit which informed man on 
a variety of different matters, all of which fell under the umbrella of living virtuously. It was, 
first of all, the habit of living a moral life, in harmony with one’s neighbour and divine creator 
and of checking and restraining disreputable actions. It was also a habit which directed man 
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in the search of truth, judging effects by causes, as well as drawing certain inferences from 
undoubted premises and proper applications to particular cases. It was, above all, a habit of 
practical morality which could assist in maintaining unity; since it was not possible to make 
“Rules or Laws to foresee all such particular cases and circumstances as may happen” then 
right reason was necessary to derive all particular actions in such cases that were not 
adequately covered by statute.  
 
Intellectualism and Voluntarism  
The operation of right reason and its relationship to the mind represented important 
differences between Wilkins and More. These important differences in turn shaped the 
different styles of theological approaches to God’s creation of the world that they subscribed 
to. It is therefore worthwhile to consider in more detail the structure and conclusions of these 
differing approaches, namely voluntarist and intellectualist theology. 
In the historiography of seventeenth-century intellectual thought these two theologies 
have been linked to different epistemological approaches. The intellectualist emphasis upon 
God’s reason is seen to be congenial with rationalist philosophies. Since God followed the 
dictates of reason in creating the world, we can reconstruct God’s thought processes, and 
arrive a priori via a rational process at an understanding of the world and its laws. On the 
contrary, the voluntarist emphasis upon God’s freedom of operation, not restrained by the 
dictates of reason, is associated with a belief in the radical contingency of the natural world 
and the accompanying belief that we can only understand God’s creation a posteriori, by 
examining it and drawing empirically-based conclusion as to what he actually did, or as to 
what kind of world he created.152 
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Although intellectualism and voluntarism are appropriate terms for describing 
particular viewpoints, it must be pointed out that not every seventeenth-century actor fits 
neatly into one of the two camps. An historical actor may, for instance, have both 
intellectualist and voluntarist tendencies in different respects, or may consider the activities 
of intellect and will as so intertwined that these classifications become useless. Nevertheless, 
as with the case of the rationalist and empiricist dichotomy, I believe such historical categories 
remain useful in our analysis of More and Wilkins, revealing further important differences 
between the two men. 
Plainly stated, it is possible to view More and Wilkins as belonging to these two 
opposing Christian traditions and that this goes a long way to explaining why they differ in 
their conception of right reason. More’s theology was thoroughly intellectualist – God was 
held to rule by reason not by arbitrary will, and the rules of reasoning were unalterable, so 
that even God had to abide by them. He equated voluntarism with Calvinism, and rejected 
Calvinism because, according to More anyway, it denied the idea of absolute moral values 
by suggesting that anything God decreed was good, rather as More believed, that there were 
absolute values of goodness to which God had to comply. The supreme creator had to act in 
accordance with: 
 
mutual Respect and Relations eternal and immutable, and in order of Nature antecedent to any 
Understanding either created or uncreated.153 
 
A significant feature of intellectualist theology was the belief that there was nothing arbitrary 
in the universe. The “eternal and immutable” set of relations between all things is inherent in 
the nature of things themselves. As a result, the workings of creation could be attained by a 
purely rationalist approach. Furthermore, it was only by God using his own powers of reason 
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in order to arrive at an understanding of certain essential features inherent in the very nature 
of things that he was able to ascertain what kind of world to create. Such essentials were 
things such as absolute moral concepts of good and evil, truth and falsity etc. Once he had 
identified such essential principles, God, due to his own supreme goodness and righteousness, 
had to create the world in agreement with the moral demands placed upon Him by His own 
goodness and in agreement with the relationships inherent in the nature of things. 
It is More’s intellectualist theology that underpins his ardent rationalism and therefore 
dictates the nature of his right reason; an intellectual power which required a degree of 
complex and high-powered philosophizing in order to access a priori, innate ideas that were 
co-eternal with God was clearly developed by a philosopher working in an intellectualist 
framework. More’s right reason operated on the key intellectualist assumption that man 
could, in principle, use his reason in such a way as to ‘think God’s thoughts after him’ in 
order to arrive at a state of perfect knowledge, including the external world, man’s internal 
senses, and the nature of the divine.154 
Voluntarists, on the other hand, typically wished to deny a priori knowledge of the 
world, maintaining the belief that God could create arbitrarily, unconstrained by any 
supposedly eternal uncreated truths. They claimed, therefore, that it was impossible to 
reconstruct God’s thinking as he decided how to create the world. The crux of the matter was 
that God’s will was not constrained to choose between a particular kind of creation by pre-
existing absolute conceptions of what was good, or what was possible according to a certain 
philosophical position. 
The idea behind this supposed connection between voluntarism and empiricism is that 
it was not possible to reconstruct a priori God’s thinking as to how he decided to create the 
                                                             
154 Cited in John Henry, “Henry More versus Robert Boyle: the spirit of nature and the nature of providence”, 
in Sarah Hutton (ed.), Henry More (1614-1687): Tercentenary Studies (Kluwer: Dordecht, 1990), p. 64.  
31404700 A Culture Of Habit  Words: 80,325 
67 
 
world. Therefore, the only way that one could find out whether God had created void space 
was to see if one could show empirical evidence of a vacuum, or if one could actually make 
one. This was the only way you could settle such a matter since, according to the voluntarist, 
God could have gone either way on the issue. In sum, there was nothing in the nature or 
essence of matter per se which made it impossible for God to make it inherently active, for 
example. 
It is possible to place John Wilkins within the voluntarist tradition since an a posteriori 
view of knowledge is highly compatible with the concept of the human mind as a tabula rasa. 
Wilkins’s conception of right reason, as we have seen, operated on the assumption that man 
obtained a posteriori knowledge about the natural world through the senses. By this process 
man was able to learn a habit of right reason - a posteriori way of knowing truth from falsity, 
good from evil, justice from injustice, virtue from vice, religion from irreligion. His 
conception of right reason, therefore, was based on the fact that there was no absolute, innate 
moral values.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the notion of right reason had a variety of different conceptions 
in mid-to late Early Modern England that were underpinned by different theological and 
epistemological traditions. In the process it has been demonstrated that, although More and 
Wilkins shared superficially very similar positions, such positions had rather different 
philosophical underpinnings which, in turn, led them to different conclusions about the nature 
of religious belief and about what kind of knowledge human beings might acquire through 
the mind and through nature.  
Whilst we must be wary when invoking sharp and distinct categories such as 
‘empiricist’ and ‘rationalist’ or ‘voluntarist’ and ‘intellectualist’ when discussing seventeenth-
century actors, inviting the risk of imposing dichotomies upon the history of intellectual 
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thought when there was none at all, it is clear that we cannot completely discard them – for it 
appears that once they are carefully applied we notice that they reveal, as one would expect, 
important and subtle theological and epistemological differences between leading Restoration 
thinkers who appealed to the term ‘right reason’. 
This chapter has also paid close attention to John Wilkins’s emphasis on habit, 
particularly his belief that the individual had to be habituated in order to internalise moral 
virtue, to reason properly, and to govern their actions and behaviour in order to maintain civil 
society. Moreover, it was the role of reason to rule the human mind and right reason was thus 
understood to intuit transcendental values, grasping a divinely sanctioned, eternally present 
morality which could bind all of society. However, in a fallen world, particularly in a Calvinist 
outlook, reason was highly contested and was cast as the victim of the ineradicable corruption 
within. Habit, however, as we have seen in the case of Wilkins, could act as this binding agent 
in place of reason. Habituation was thus, for Wilkins, an effective way of not only correcting 
an individual’s ability to reason effectively, but also to replace reason with habitually acquired 
mental dispositions and patterns of behaviour. 
In the wider intellectual context, Wilkins’s approach was part of a much broader 
emphasis on habitually acquired beliefs, behaviour, and dispositions. For Wilkins, as well as 
his contemporaries, habituation was indispensable in guiding ethical conduct in order to 
ensure a peaceful coexistence among potentially self-destructive individuals. Wilkins’s belief 
that the dictates of reason had to be internalised through habituation was to be fully 
consolidated in the work of John Locke. In Some Thoughts concerning Education as well as 
his Of the Conduct of the Understanding, Locke was drawing upon a discourse of genealogy 
of habit that already existed, as we have seen with the case of John Wilkins’s conception of 
right reason. We will return to Locke in the final chapter. 
 




Habitually acquired Moral Beliefs and 
Dispositions in Restoration Religion 
 
The previous chapter showed how habit was an important part of John Wilkins’s approach to 
the problem of right reason and ensuring that English society could think and behave properly. 
The following chapter broadens the frame of analysis by examining how a group of moderate 
divines, Wilkins included, preached the importance of habitual moral beliefs and dispositions 
in matters of faith. Much was left uncertain in 1660 – political and religious questions had 
hardly been resolved – but the following moderate divines attempted to reshape religious life 
following the return of Charles II. The key to building a better, more secure society was to 
figure out how the English population might live together in peace and unity despite religious 
differences. Hobbes, as we saw in the previous chapter, had famously described one solution: 
the sovereign could arbitrarily determine religion for all his subjects. But the moderate divines 
presented another: they attempted to fashion a religion founded on habitually acquired moral 
beliefs and dispositions. They were not, however, attempting to replace religion with habit; 
they simply dealt less with the intricacies of faith than with the cultivation of those habits and 
habitual dispositions that might strengthen it. 
This chapter, then, attempts to offer a reasonably comprehensive discussion of habit 
in Restoration English religion by looking mostly at the sermons and works of a group of 
divines whose broad area of agreement, which eludes specific textual demonstration of 
influence, was their common concern for the power of habit, both for good and ill, in the 
economy of the moral and religious life. It shows how English divines such as John Wilkins, 
John Tillotson, Isaac Barrow, Richard Baxter, Edward and Fowler permitted conduct that was 
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habitual as long as such conduct involved a formative period of self-examination during 
which time one was developing one’s knowledge of doctrinal fundamentals as well as 
gradually firming up one’s belief in God’s teachings and virtuous character. This process, for 
them, as we will see, was the key component of religious life. 
Much excellent scholarly work has been done on how English religion was slowly 
transformed into a civilising rather than a saving force towards the close of the seventeenth-
century and how ethics began to slowly outweigh soteriology. Blair Worden, for example, 
has argued that the late seventeenth-century witnessed the retreat of theology as English 
divines shifted their emphasis from faith to conduct. As Worden make clear, this did not mean 
the growth of religious difference, but a recognition that moral reformation was of greater 
importance than theological issues.155 Likewise, Naomi Taback has recently shown how 
many of the late seventeenth-century religious reformers tended to look to shared manners 
and customs rather than shared religious beliefs and practices as the binding agents of English 
society. Her work has demonstrated how many religious divines during the period actually 
spoke in secular terms.156 
Similarly, Mark Knight has shown how discussions of ‘conscience’ moved 
increasingly onto secular ground in 1687 and 1688. James II’s declarations of indulgence, 
according to Knight, marked the Crown’s awareness that magistrates should not persecute 
religious consciences, and the Church of England began to accept the fact that persecution 
was not a justifiable weapon to use against dissent.157 Knight very much follows Worden’s 
line of argument in seeing not less religion after the indulgences, but religion differently 
conceived. Persecution became less interesting than pragmatism in a society still wrestling 
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with belief. Furthermore, in her magisterial study, Isabel Rivers has carefully shown how 
ethics gradually disentangled from theology and how the notion of grace became synonymous 
with virtue by the mid eighteenth-century.158 If there was one religious change above all, then, 
that characterised the mid-to late seventeenth-century, it was that the test of Christianity 
became one of conduct, rather than right belief. To the young, explains John Spurr, the “old-
fashioned” quarrels between Calvinists and Arminians were “fast becoming 
incomprehensible.”159 From the 1650s, both on the Puritan side, where Richard Baxter took 
the lead, and on the Anglican one, where Henry Hammond took it, there was ever more 
emphasis on practical Christianity.160 “When men confine religion to speculation,” observed 
Sir Charles Wolseley, “they turn divinity into metaphysics, where they dispute without end: 
to reduce it to practice, is to pursue its proper tendency, and to make it (as indeed it is) the 
great principle of union and peace.” To attain salvation, he wrote, we only need to “live a 
sober, righteous, religious life here, such as is rationally best for ourselves, and others, and 
be gradually preparing for those eternal fruitions that are to come.”161 
The arguments made in this current chapter complement and extend such existing 
work. Whilst much has been written about this transformation of belief to conduct, not enough 
work has been done to examine the actual underpinning operations of this process. This 
chapter intends to remedy that gap. It shows how by conduct, religious divines meant 
habitually acquired patterns of behaviour and dispositions. They meant a process of religious 
habituation which entailed a pragmatic model of ethical self-management according to which 
the individual would rationally commit themselves to act habitually and automatically as a 
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strategy in the pursuit of salvation. Habituation, for them, was indispensable for correcting 
the will, conquering sin, and accepting God’s grace. 
Furthermore, this chapter also supplements Ethan Shagan’s work on ‘moderation’ in 
early modern England. The core of Shagan’s recent arguments is the insight that claims to 
‘moderation’ were also assertions of authority – thus, far from being moderate, such 
discourses more than legitimated the application of state and local violence to communities 
and individuals. Irenic rhetoric, in other words, hid a violent state. Bridling the immoderate, 
executing the heretic, whipping the disorderly, civilising the savage – were all rhetorically 
‘moderate.’ The English via media was, then, not the gentle and reasonable Anglicanism that 
it has been commonly portrayed as, but a violent instrument of order, “written in blood.”162 
Shagan’s work is an important contribution to our understanding of the ways in which early 
modern thinkers, working within ecclesiological discourses, constructed the limits of 
conscience and how the notion of ‘moderation’ was an emerging ideology of power. 
However, whilst Shagan has suggested that the historian of the early modern period 
needs to take the issue of ‘moderation’ seriously, his work overlooks how habit and habitual 
dispositions could also act as a means of authorisation and self-restraint for late seventeenth-
century religious life. The purpose of this chapter is to show how leading religious divines 
emphasised the importance of cultivating internal habitual dispositions as a way to assert 
moderate authority and to ensure conformity in a fallen world. Members of Restoration 
English society were not expected to discover true faith, or to become virtuous by themselves; 
this was why a process of discipline through habituation was necessary. 
In a similar vein, Richard Ashcraft has shown that claims to moderation by so-called 
Latitudinarians were coded arguments that nonconformists could never be rational. 
According to Ashcraft, “Anglicans – including latitudinarians – denied that individuals were 
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rational in the sense of acting according to their consciences. Reliance upon individuals, they 
asserted, meant that individuals would “follow the wild enthusiasms of their own brains.”163 
There was, therefore, a reluctance amongst leading Restoration clergy to allow too much of 
a role to conscience throughout the period. Again, the broader point here is that leading 
Restoration clergy believed that the majority of humankind could not be expected to use their 
own reason effectively in order to act morally and acquire a working knowledge of true belief. 
As this chapter will show, when leading clergymen implored their readers and listeners to use 
their own reason in their sermons and other various works, what we really find are subtle 
methods of control and discipline through habit - a kind of modified and softer Hobbesian 
abandonment of individual conscience in favour of the commands of civil and religious 
authority.164 Thus, habituation, for the Restoration clergy, rendered reason – supposed to 
guide human lives – almost useless for the religious life and offered them a coherent language 
of control that could act as a useful tool to defend the hegemony of the English church. 
The following chapter, then, proceeds as follows: the first three sections establish the 
intellectual and religious context of the Restoration period. The first section is a brief 
examination of the increased emphasis on what I have termed ‘the emergence of moralism’ - 
which stressed ‘holy living’ in action and discourse rather than subtle theological controversy. 
The second section offers a concise summary of the Restoration settlement and the lasting 
impact it was to have on the rest of the period. The third section gives an extended overview 
of ‘latitudinarianism’ as well as how the concept of ‘habit’ fitted into their theology. Since a 
large proportion of the moderate divines that are under discussion in this chapter fall under 
the rubric of ‘latitudinarianism,’ an examination of its general tendencies, theology, as well 
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as how habit fitted into its intellectual system is necessary. The rest of the chapter is devoted 
to an examination of habit and habitual dispositions in the works of various moderate divines. 
The emergence of moralism  
In his monograph The Rise of Moralism (1966), C. F. Allison described the religious changes 
that occurred in Restoration as a “movement away from the Christian faith of the earlier 
divines towards a moralism masquerading as faith.”165 While Allison was correct in his 
assertion of an emergent culture of moralism, his idea of ‘masquerading’ serves to obscure 
what the moderate divines were actually attempting to achieve. They were not simply 
replacing English religion with a moral-ethical belief system, rather they were striving to 
develop a new model of Christianity in which the call to practical reform and holy living, 
based on shared virtuous habits, was conceived as the best way to engineer peace and 
harmony in a society still tending to the wounds caused by the mid-century upheaval. For the 
moderate divines, a moral and practical religion reinforced by nurtured and active good habits 
represented a practical approach to restoring the fabric of a living faith while avoiding the 
dogmatic introspective nature of strict Calvinism. 
Classical Calvinist doctrine, of course, held that God had chosen, from all time, those 
who were to be saved. Many Calvinists, though not all, held that God had also preordained 
those who were to be damned: the doctrine of double predestination. The election and 
reprobation were inscrutable and ineluctable. God alone determined the fate of mankind and 
there was nothing that man could do to purchase salvation. All human action was infected by 
sin and was inadequate to purchase the eternal bliss that God offered. However, God had 
offered mankind the possibility of salvation by sacrificing his own Son, who took upon 
himself the sins of the world, and it was by his death that sin was effaced. This was known as 
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the doctrine of atonement: the necessity of Christ’s suffering on the cross, by which justice 
was done. Any suggestion of mankind’s moral adequacy to purchase salvation deflected from 
the centrality of the atonement. None of this, however, entailed that godly people should not 
lead moral lives, but it did mean that a moral life was not efficacious: a moral life was not the 
cause of a person’s being chosen for salvation, it was simply evidence of the fact of being 
chosen. Nor was it sufficient evidence, for many people led good lives who were not chosen. 
The denial of the role of human moral effort explains why Calvinists often used the 
term ‘moralism’ with contempt and disapproval. At worst, a ‘moralist’ could be accused of 
Socinianism, the denial of the divinity of Christ, or at least of Christ’s special role in the 
atonement of mankind’s sins. Such a denial reduced Christ to being no more than a moral 
exemplar, a man whose goodness ought to be emulated. Not only was such a doctrine 
hubristic, it also nullified the special claims and status of Christianity, since being moral was 
something that even pagans could achieve. 
Socinianism – the word derived from the sixteenth-century Italian theologian Faustus 
Socinus – remained at the margins of Christian theological thinking until the eighteenth 
century. A much more substantial movement in the seventeenth-century, however, was 
Arminianism which took its name from the Dutchman Jacobus Arminius, who departed from 
Calvinist orthodoxy early in the seventeenth-century. Reacting against predestinarian dogma, 
Arminius offered a more merciful and rational vision of God’s saving grace in relation to 
human effort, and offered the possibility that salvation was potentially available to all 
mankind. While never denying the sufficiency of Christ’s suffering, the Arminians stressed 
that there was some limited efficacy in human righteousness: God did in fact recognise the 
efforts made by human beings to obey the moral law. This was a position that incorporated 
morality into the economy of salvation, while not conceding that our poor efforts were alone 
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sufficient.166 Strict Calvinists, however, were appalled. The disputes between Calvinists and 
Arminians split the Dutch Church, and by the late seventeenth-century there were two 
Churches, the Arminians being called Remonstrants who strove for a tolerant national 
territorial comprehension.167 
It is reflective of the changes within English religion and theology that by the late 
seventeenth-century a number of leading divines were on friendly terms with Remonstrant 
theologians such as Philip van Limborch at Amsterdam and Johann Graevius at Utrecht and 
were willing to send their pupils to be taught by them. John Locke, whose own theology was 
indebted to the Remonstrants and who would be accused of Socinianism, lived in Holland 
during his exile in 1683-9, where he formed close friendship with Limborch and Graevius. 
Evidently, the English Church had moved far away from classical Calvinism by the close of 
the seventeenth-century.168 
In the first half of the century, the Puritans had deplored the spread of Arminianism 
in England, believing that it was a crypto-Catholic deviation from Protestant orthodoxy. 
Nonetheless, in the second half of the seventeenth-century, Arminianism became something 
of a commonplace in England.169 Calvinist soteriology was dislodged. During the Restoration 
Dissenters protested that Calvinism was all but dead and lamented that they were its last 
upholders. Within the Church of England, the retreat from Calvinism was not only found 
amongst schools such as the Cambridge Platonists and the latitudinarians, but also among the 
                                                             
166 For a more in-depth analysis, see Willam den Boer, God’s Twofold Love: The Theology of Jacobus 
Arminius 1559-1609 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010). 
167 See T. Marius van Leeuwen, Keith D. Stanglin, and Marijke Tolsma (eds.), Arminius, Arminianism and 
Europe: Jacobis Arminius 1559/60-1609 (Leiden: Brill, 2009); M. Mulsow and J Rohls (eds.), Socinianism and 
Arminianism: Antitrinitarians, Calvinists, and Cultural Exchange in Seventeenth-Century Europe (Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, 2005). 
168 M. Mulsow and J. Rohls, Socinianism and Arminianism: Antitrinitarins, Calvinists and Cultural Exchange 
in Seventeenth-Century Europe (Ledien: Brill, 2005).  
169 See N Tyacke, ‘Armininaism and the Theology of the Restoration Church’, in Aspects of English 
Protestantism, c.1530-1700 (Manchester, 2001), pp. 320-39. 
31404700 A Culture Of Habit  Words: 80,325 
77 
 
dissenters themselves, and not least Richard Baxter.170 The key to understanding this retreat 
from strict Calvinism lies in acknowledging that, after 1640, the fear of Arminianism came 
to be replaced by the fear of the consequences of hyper-Calvinism. The moderate divines 
were driven by a pressing need to avoid a dire implication of Calvinist orthodoxy. They 
introduced a trend towards moralism which entailed freedom of will in sinners and their 
remedy for sin consisted largely of exhortations to lead a holy life.171  
This emphasis was epitomised in what became the definitive work of practical divinity 
for the episcopal church, The Practice of Christian Graces, or The Whole Duty of Man (1658), 
prefaced by Henry Hammond and almost certainly written by Richard Allestree.172 Its choice 
of biblical text was significant: “we should live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present 
world.” (Titus 2,12) ‘Sober’ was a key term – in reaction against the experimental and 
enthuastic religion of the Interregnum the emphasis was placed upon the common-sensical 
and the judicious. English religion, in a sense, gradually became a largely ethic-based belief 
system in which the only genuine significance attached to atonement was the moral example 
of Christ – one of the titles of Jeremy Taylor’s life of Christ was, appropriately, The Great 
Exemplar. Taylor’s friendships included William Chillingworth and Henry More, and such 
contacts were reflective of Taylor’s moderate and reasonable approach in matters of religion. 
He constantly reminded his audience that “Our Love to God consists not in any one 
determinate Degree, but hath such a latitude as best agrees with the condition of men, who 
are of variable natures, different affections and capacities, changeable abilities.”173 
Taylor’s work also devoted considerable time to the role of habit in matters of belief 
and in ethical conduct. In his Antiquitates Christianae, for example, he asserted that an 
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individual was only sanctified in the eyes of God when they had developed and constantly 
practised the “habits of a holy life.” For Taylor, there was no doubt that “vertue must be 
habitual.” Taylor also stressed the importance of a good education, particularly for children, 
for instilling good habits of behaviour: “For education can introduce a habit and a second 
nature, against which Children cannot kick, unless they do some violence to themselves and 
their inclinations.”174 In his The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living, Taylor suggested that 
parents had a key role in instilling such good habitual behaviour, exhorting them to: 
 
Bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, that is, secure their religion, season their 
younger years with prudent and pious principles, make them in love with vertue, and make them 
habitually so, before they come to choose or to discern good from evil, that their choice may be with 
lesse difficulty and danger.175 
 
Taylor’s Holy Living essentially functioned as a practical handbook designed to assist 
Christians in leading a godly life. It was written to provide the sort of detailed pastoral advice 
that parish clergy were prevented from dispensing to their flocks during the Puritan 
suppression of the Church of England. As a handbook of moral guidance, Holy Living 
articulated hundreds of rules for Christian living, which together comprised a method of 
pursuing holiness in all areas of life. Taylor’s main emphasis was on practical moral guidance 
rather than theological speculation with frequent appeals to the personal example of Jesus. 
The notion of habit figured prominently in Taylor’s programme, advising his readers to: 
 
fail not to secure a pious habitual intention, that is, that it be included within your general care, that no 
action have an ill end; and that it be comprehended in your general prayers, whereby you offer your 
self and all you do to Gods glory.176 
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Another individual closely related to the development of English moralism and the tradition 
of ‘holy living’ was Henry Hammond who, according to John W. Packer, was the principal 
transformer of Anglicanism.177 A leading divine of the Church of England when it was in 
exile during the Interregnum, the Independent John Owen remarked that he bore “the whole 
weight of the episcopal cause.”178 Hammond’s importance derived from a religious manual 
that he wrote for the young people of his parish, which summarised his understanding of the 
basic truths of Christianity. The manual, entitled A Practical Catechism, was first published 
in 1644 and focused Christianity as a practical endeavour consisting of personal piety and 
morality which flew in the face of the prevailing puritan emphasis on God’s grace and 
orthodox theology. In it, Hammond made reference to the importance of developing a “habit 
of faith”179 and in his other works as well, Hammond clarified the sum of the Christian life: 
“a continued habit of holy living, and frequent meditation upon Heaven and Heavenly things; 
particularly the great mercies of God in the Bloud of Jesus Christ.”180 
By 1650, the Catechisme had reached its seventh printing and it was no conventional 
work of Reformed, or even Protestant, piety, although it began in irenic vein. Hammond 
explained that it was designed for students who knew the basic principles of Christianity but 
wanted direction for the practice of their religion. The focus was, therefore, on those doctrines 
and scriptural texts which would encourage people to live in peace as good Christians. But 
Hammond felt that Christian living required the rejection of several Reformed ideas – notably 
predestination – and an understanding of salvation very different from Calvin’s. Christ had 
died for all men without exception, Hammond thought, and God would only exclude from 
the kingdom of heaven those who rejected his gracious offer of eternal life. Human beings 
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must, he felt, be persuaded that their salvation lay in their own hands and was conditional 
upon their obedience to the precepts of Christ. Only then would England see the practice of 
true Christianity. 
Of course, the effect of Hammond’s publications on public opinion is hard to estimate, 
but a passage from Gilbert Burnet’s History of his own Time (1724), is worth pondering: 
 
At the Restoration, Juxon…was promoted to Canterbury more out of decency than he was then capable 
to fill that post;…Sheldon was a very dextrous man in business…He seemed not to have a deep sense 
of religion, if any at all: And spoke of it most commonly as an engine of government, and a matter of 
policy…Morley…was a pious and charitable man, of very exemplary life, but extream passionate, and 
very obstinate. He was first made Bishop of Worcester. Doctor Hammond, for whom that See was 
designed, died a little before the Restoration which was an unspeakable loss to the Church; For he was 
a man of great learning, and of most eminent merit, he having been the person that during the bad times 
had maintained the cause of the Church in a very singular manner, so he was a very moderate man in 
his temper, tho’ with a high principle; and probably he would have fallen into healing counsels. He was 
also much set on reforming abuses, and for raising in the Clergy a due sense of the obligations they lay 
under.181 
 
Hammond’s death was clearly a great loss to the English Church and Burnet realised this. 
Even Richard Baxter lamented that he “took the death of Dr. Hammond…for a very great 
loss; for his piety and wisdom would sure have hindered much of the violence” of the 
Restoration period.182 Hammond was a key representative of English moralism and his model 
of Christianity loomed large in the minds of the Restoration moderate divines – In chapter 
two of his Of the Reasonableness of Christian Religion (1650) entitled ‘Concerning the use 
of reason in deciding controversies in religion’ stated that “the measure of man’s natural 
power of knowing or judging of things is his participating of those things, in some degree, 
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with God, in whom they are as in the fountain: so that man may find, and behold them in 
himself as truly, though not as eminently, or in the same degree, as they are in God.”183 The 
model of Christianity that the moderate divines espoused was drawn, in part, from 
Hammond’s and Taylor’s – an essentially practical brand of theology and morality which 
advocated a life of pious devotion, private prayer and privileged practical devotional acts over 
theological speculation. 
The Restoration Religious Settlement 
Even though the political and religious upheavals of the 1640s and 1650s seriously 
undermined the status and identity of the Church of England, it continued to enjoy widespread 
covert support throughout two decades of anarchy, bloodshed, and revolution.184 The return 
of Charles II in 1660 not only offered recovery from that trauma, but also the possibility of 
building a stable and relatively comprehensive Church. It was a principal concern of the 
English divines who took up office following the Restoration, notably Gilbert Sheldon, 
Bishop of London, and subsequently Archbishop of Canterbury, and Charles’ chief minister, 
the Earl of Clarendon, that the national Church should be restored along moderate lines. 
Charles II shared that concern and sought immediately to re-establish the Church, on as broad 
a footing as possible. The declaration of Breda that Charles had issued before his return to 
England in many ways epitomised the hope for a broad English Church whose doctrinal 
framework would accommodate tender consciences. The restoration of the English monarchy 
also meant the possibility of indulgence, or toleration, for the beliefs and practices of other 
Protestant sectaries. Procedures were undertaken upon the king’s return to carry out the 
promises that he had made in the hope of healing a nation collapsing under the weight of 
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religious and political disunion.185 In particular, a convocation was held to reconsider the 
doctrine and liturgy of the Church of England, the Thirty-Nine Articles and The Book of 
Common Prayer. 
Due to a variety of reasons, however, the prospects for a broad establishment quickly 
proved to be illusive. Nonconformists were divided amongst themselves, and only the 
demands of a few of their more moderate brethren appeared easy for conformist churchmen 
to countenance. The passing of the Act of Uniformity in 1662 proved to be the final nail in 
the broad church project. Convinced that any toleration of nonconformity was likely to lead 
to disorder, the majority of the members of the Cavalier Parliament refused to tolerate any 
dissent from, or diminution of, the episcopal ideal. Although a very considerable number of 
clergy felt unable to comply with the act and were forced to abandon their livings, the great 
majority of parish minister submitted and conformed, as the majority had done during the 
Interregnum. The decade ended with a concentrated press campaign to eradicate any initiative 
towards alleviating the proscription of dissent: Simon Patrick’s A Friendly Debate between a 
Conformist and a Nonconformist (1669), the Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie (1669) by 
Sheldon’s chaplain Samuel Parker, and William Assheton’s Toleration Disapprov’d and 
Condemn’d (Oxford, 1670) appeared in quick succession. The ever-ready Roger L’Estrange 
issued an enlarged edition of his Toleration Discussed to halt any resurgence of the threat he 
had dealt with in 1663. Yet, Puritan opinion was not excluded from the established church 
overnight. Though they might have been sharply divided over church order and ceremonies, 
there was no doctrinal division between conformists and nonconformists, or, at least, no 
difference any greater than could be found within either camp. They shared an equal 
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abhorrence both of Catholics and of fanatics, and in many conformists a Puritan temper 
remained. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that comprehensive and tolerationist schemes did 
in fact emerge in the Restoration period itself. Much has been made of this as the age of the 
‘great persecution’, but historians have concentrated too readily on the official policies, on 
the so-called Clarendon Code, and not on how problematic it could be to implement such 
statutes at the local level.186 Even Sheldon, who has been described as “the inexorable 
opponent of any compromise with dissenters”, was unable to achieve, and indeed did not 
attempt, a continual purge of nonconformists.187 
Despite the fact that a more aggressive outlook developed in response to the 
subversive behaviour of some dissenters, the Church authorities’ response to dissent was 
rarely monolithic; they were aware of the differences, both religious and political, between 
various groups, fearing the radical sects more than the moderate Presbyterian and Puritans. 
Moreover, the fear of extreme groups such as the Quakers had deeply disturbed many 
moderate nonconformists to the point that they opted to support the Restoration and conform 
to the Anglican Church, in the belief that the threat of the sectaries was far worse than the 
abuses of an unreformed Church.188 Overall, intolerance tended to be reserved for those who, 
it was feared, could potentially be a political and social, and therefore an ecclesiastical threat. 
The 1662/3 Returns for the Lathe of St Augustine, for example, recorded only the more 
extreme groups: the Independents, Anabaptists, and Quakers – it paid no attention to 
Presbyterians.189 Even Richard Baxter divided dissenting denominations into tolerable 
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(Presbyterians, Independents, and perhaps “honest Anabaptists”) and intolerable (“Quakers, 
Seekers, Ranters and infidels”).190 
In reality consensus was more useful than confrontation. Strategies of compromise 
and grudging approvals towards dissenting communities, whose members might attend 
Church services was one of the most enduring features of the Church of England’s position 
within local society and far more typical than the persecuting and monochrome uniformity 
model.191 In fact, the focus on persecution encourages a more fundamental misconception: 
that England was divided between two monolithic groups, ‘Church’ and ‘Dissent’. The 
Church of England had always been a broad church, with an ambivalent theology and 
ecclesiology: the Thirty Nine Articles “were a statement of what the Church held to be true 
doctrine, but they were not a confession of faith.”192 Restoration divines, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, pursued a practical theology which reconnected behaviour and salvation by 
persuading their congregations and readers, in the words of Richard Baxter, to cultivate an 
active “habit of faith,” whilst remaining ever mindful to avoid sliding into Catholic teaching 
on the efficacy of good works.193 
Latitudinarianism and Habit 
It is difficult to write about the late seventeenth-century English intellectual and religious 
landscape without a discussion of the so-called movement known as ‘Latitudinarianism.’ The 
latitudinarians, so the traditional story goes, frustrated at the backwardness and intolerance 
of traditional Calvinism, threw off the shackles of the past and, inspired by an enlightened 
liberal theology and the new philosophy, embraced instead a faith based upon reason and 
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toleration. Struggling against the residual intolerance during the Restoration, the increasingly 
powerful movement eventually triumphed in 1688 when, in combination with Newtonianism, 
it defined the Revolutionary church settlement and laid the lasting foundations for the rational 
Anglicanism of the eighteenth century.194  
The idea that Latitudinarianism was a significant and progressive movement invites 
the thought that it must have had deep philosophical roots which ought to be exposed to light. 
In reality, there are so many different ‘latitudinarianisms’ that the term has come to mean 
virtually nothing or everything, with scholars having their own interpretation of the 
concept.195 The difficulty of coming to an agreement about the tendencies and principles 
within the movement is aggravated by the confusion generated by scholars from different 
disciplines writing about it with different aims. Theologians, for example, have been at pains 
either to praise the Latitudinarians’ achievement or to simply decry it as being responsible 
for the dark age of the Church of England. Horton Davies described the movement as a 
“combination of eudaemonism, utilitarianism, and pelagianism, masquerading as 
Christianity.”196 Historians, by contrast, have attempted to demonstrate the “movement’s” 
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general grouping suggested by the present title.” For the problem of defining Latitudinarianism, see also 
Spellman, The Latitudinarians and the Church of England, p. 1: “As seventeenth-century labels go, 
‘Latitudinarianism’ is as broad and as problematic a term to define as ‘Puritanism.’” Sykes equally points out 
towards the difficulty of providing a satisfactory definition: “The term ‘Latitudinarian’ indeed covered a wide 
diversity of opinion and outlook.” (From Sheldon to Secker, p. 146). As early as 1950, Cragg maintained that 
“the boundaries of the group are ill-defined.” (From Puritanism to the Age of Reason: A Study of Changes in 
Religious Thought within the Church of England, 1600 to 1700 (Cambridge, 1950), p. 63. 
196 Horton Davies, Worship and Theology in England (Princeton, 1961), IV, p. 56. 
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scientific,197 political,198 and philosophical significance. Latitudinarianism occurred at a time 
which has proved to be problematic for the historian of ideas, a time when political and 
religious allegiances were unstable and intellectual developments unusually rapid. Many of 
the concepts that are frequently discussed in connection with Latitudinarianism such as 
‘toleration’ and ‘reason’ are equally ambivalent and elusive. To make matters even worse, 
the selective and partly arbitrary character of scholarly reading tends to distort judgements. 
Isaac Barrow’s theological output, for example, comprised nine copious volumes, and no less 
than two hundred and fifty-six of Tillotson’s sermons have survived. Thus, the multiplicity 
of perspectives and different methodological approaches as well as the difficultly and scope 
of the subject have all contributed, in a way, to the present confusion about what 
Latitudinarianism was or might have been. However, there is also considerable merit in recent 
scholarship inasmuch as it has revealed that any attempt to summarise a complex of ideas as 
variegated as Latitudinarianism has often led to misleading results, especially if the ‘system’ 
in question comprised a great variety of heterogeneous thinkers. This insight, however, must 
not lead us to overlook the existing similarities between Latitudinarian writers. It is a fact 
that, although scholarship about Latitudinarianism seems to have become as enigmatic as the 
movement itself, the term is still used widely, and often with (too) great assurance. 
The last couple of decades have seen numerous attempts to pin down the major 
characteristics of Latitudinarianism. Acknowledging the existence of a group that can be 
labelled “Latitudinarian,” these attempts vacillate between two extremes. On the one hand, 
there is a minimalist tendency, associating Latitudinarianism with a few general tenets, such 
                                                             
197 See, for example, Shapiro, Probability and Certainty; James R. Jacob and Margaret C. Jacob, “The Anglican 
Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of the Whig Constitution,” Isis 71, no. 2 (Jun., 
1980), pp. 251-267; See as well, Margaret C. Jacob, The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1976), esp. ch. 1. 
198 See especially John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of Enlightenment: Science, Religion and Politics from 
the Restoration to the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); See also F. G. James, 
“The Bishop in Politics, 1688-1714,” in W.A. Aiken and B. D. Henning (eds.) Conflict in Stuart England: 
Essays in Honour of Wallace Notestein (London, 1960), pp. 227-57. 
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as that for the “latitude-men religion is two things, reason and morality.”199 Another view 
sees “Latitudinarianism as a natural culmination of the tendency within the Anglican Church 
toward moderation and sweet reasonableness.”200 A third, earlier, position attempted to 
reconcile these two accounts: “We have found the three outstanding elements in latitudinarian 
thought to be a conviction of the reasonableness of religion, a sober acceptance of the 
principle of limited toleration, and a conviction that religion must not stand apart from 
morality.”201 The problem inherent in such narrow definitions is clear: a complex system of 
thought is treated reductively. On the other hand, there are attempts at comprehensive and 
precise definitions. In a more recent study of Samuel Clarke’s Trinitarian thought, Thomas 
Pfizenmair distinguished between “orthodox” and “heterodox” Latitudinarians and identified 
five focal points around which their thought was claimed to have revolved.202 Elsewhere, 
seven or eight positions are rather enigmatically thought to be typical of a Latitudinarian: “It 
is…the combination, steady and almost without exception, of all these characteristics taken 
together, that provides a basis by which the norms and standard of seventeenth-century 
Latitudinarianism may be distinguished.”203 Conversely, however, such definitions can also 
                                                             
199 Isabel Rivers, “Grace, Holiness, and the Pursuit of Happiness: Bunyan and Restoration Latitudinarianism” 
in N. H. Keeble (ed.), John Bunyan: Conventicle and Parnassus (Oxford, 1988), p. 69. Rivers also provides an 
extensive study of Latitudinarianism in her magisterial book published a few later, bur conclusion largely 
remains the same: “The central tenets of latitudinarian Christianity are the rational basis of religion and 
happiness of the moral life.” (See Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, vol. I, p. 87. 
200 Thomas H. Fujimura, “Dryden’s Religio Laici: An Anglican Poem,” PMLA, 76 (1961), p. 216. 
201 Joseph Cope, Joseph Glanvill: Anglican Apologist (St. Louis, 1956), p. 85. 
202 Thomas C. Pfzizenmaier, The Trinitarian Theology of Dr. Samuel Clarke (1675-1729): Contexts, Sources, 
and Controversy (Leiden, New York, Koln, 1997), pp. 43-75; especially pp. 46 and 61. According to 
Pfizenmaier, the five foci are (1.) the relationship between faith and reason, (2.) the importance of moral virtue 
in religion, (3.) toleration, (4.) a bias against mystery, and (5.) a special perspective on the role of tradition in 
doctrinal formulation (see p. 61). Among Orthodox Latitudinarians he saw Edward Stillingfleet and Thomas 
Sherlock, while Benjamin Hoadly and John Locke were regarded as heterodox. Such a division was clearly 
inspired by Martin Griffin, Latitudinarianism in the Seventeenth-Century Church of England, p. 46: “Orthodoxy 
was genuinely a hallmark of the norm and standard of seventeenth-century Latitudinarianism. But it was not, 
however, of the Latitudinarianism of the eighteenth-century.” 
203 Martin Griffin, Latitudinarianism in the Seventeenth-Century Church of England (Leiden, New York, Koln, 
1992), p. 43. Note, however, the cautionary interpolation “almost without exception.” The characteristics are 
(1.) orthodoxy, (2.) a reasonable religion, (3.) a common doctrine of justification, (4.) theological minimalism, 
(5.) the attitude towards church government and worship, (6.) the pre-eminence of personal morality, (7.), 
moderation in terms of points indifferent and, conditionally, (8.) the adherence to the new philosophy (see p. 
43). A similar themed monograph by William Spellman concentrates on the Latitudinarians’ interpretation of 
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blur the distinction between Latitudinarianism and other groups within or outside the 
Restoration Church of England. In response, John Spurr, in the course of his study of the 
Restoration Church, claimed that “no specifically ‘latitudinarian’ party or outlook can be 
distinguished among the Restoration churchmen.”204 Spurr’s contention that 
“‘Latitudinarianism’ will never be pinned down” is most certainly correct.205 However, to 
regard it as merely a “chimera” and to suggest that “‘Latitudinarian was their opponents’ 
words” in order to demonstrate that there was no Latitudinarian movement is an evasion of 
the problem at hand.206 Furthermore, if one were to accept the implications of Spurr’s 
scepticism, then almost all labels would have to be abolished. Under such circumstances, a 
methodological via media seems called for. It is neither necessary nor possible to 
circumscribe Latitudinarianism exactly. What is possible, however, is a description of general 
tendencies which were bundled up by the Latitudinarians, and which culminated in a 
distinctive theological spirit.207 
Latitudinarians and their theology were made up of inherent tensions. They were 
formed by their time, out of insecurity and intellectual strife. Their moral theology was 
informed by one overriding objective: the moral reformation of the English people in the 
interest of civil peace as well as political and religious stability. The Latitudinarians 
emphasised the social significance of the Gospel and a moral education stood at the centre of 
their thought. Their educational views were shaped by the forces oscillating between their 
ideal, the Christian ethics of duty postulating the harmony of the universe and assuming the 
                                                             
human nature as shaped by original sin and on their soteriology (see The Latitudinarians and the Church of 
England, pp. 4-5. 
204 John Spurr, ‘Latitudinarianism and the Restoration Church,’ Historical Journal vol. 31 (1988): pp. 61-82, p. 
82. See also the comments in his The Restoration Church of England (1991). 
205 Ibid., p. 82. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Gerald Cragg ingeniously noted that Latitudinarianism “stood for a temper rather than a creed.” See his 
Puritanism to the Age of Reason, p. 81. 
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inherent goodness of the Deity, and their experience of the social reality in England, tainted 
by the picture of human depravity in God’s chosen country. 
There was a considerable tension between the ethical ideals of the Latitudinarians and 
their everyday experience, which reflected the traditional conflict between Is and Ought, and 
they witnessed every day that their projected Ought clashed with a disillusioning Is. In other 
words, whilst the rational individual ought to discern their obligation through the dictates of 
right reason, in reality fallible human beings were more easily persuaded by their passions. 
Almost every single aspect of their moral theology, ranging from their anthropology to their 
soteriology, has to be read against the backdrop of this tension. For the Latitudinarians, the 
ideals they postulated had to stand the test of Restoration England reality, and that is why the 
theology of these divines was influenced by social experience to such an extraordinary 
degree. Yet, coming to terms with this experience always necessitated promoting the cause 
of virtue, so that the life individuals led had a salutary effect on their future condition: 
This is then is the grand design of Christianity, to make men happy in another world, by making them 
good and vertuous in this: It came to reform this world that it might people another; so to purifie the 
souls of men, as to make them meet to enjoy the happiness designed for them.208 
In a true Christian, according to the latitudinarians, there was a strong interconnection 
between their religious faith and them being virtuous. They therefore paid special attention 
to the acquisition of virtuous habits. Humankind being a creature of habit, customary conduct 
became a strong focus of latitudinarian educational theory. Not only did humankind have to 
understand the nature and propriety of virtue; this insight also had to be followed up by the 
acquisition and recollection of virtuous habits. Temptations were everywhere, and so the 
fragile plant of virtue required constant nurturing, that was, a continuous endeavour to train 
oneself into the habit of acting virtuously. This process of self-inspection supposed the 
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individual’s awareness of responsibility for their actions: the moral doctrine of the Gospel 
was plain and open to all, and thus there could be no excuse for transgressing its requirements. 
Such an Aristotelian conception of virtue as habit emphasised the procedural character of 
virtuous behaviour. Analogously, habitual vice was counted among the principal reasons for 
the dissemination of immorality. Thus, the education of those most susceptible to the salutary 
influence of Christian doctrine became a valued mean of checking the progress of vice. By 
contrast, the force of evil habit aggravated the plight of fallen man: 
And now besides the original depravities of our Natures, we have contracted many vitious habits by 
corrupt and evil usages; which we were drawn into at first by pleasure and vanity in our young and 
inconsiderate years, while we were lead by the doctrines of sense: These, by frequent acts, grow at last 
into habits; which though in their beginning they were tender as a Plant…yet time and use hardens 
them into the firmness of an Oak, that braves the Weather, and can endure the stroak of the Ax and a 
strong Arm.209 
Tillotson aligned habit with the Augustinian conception of second nature: “It is an acquired 
and a sort of Second Nature, and next to Nature it self a principle of greatest power. Custom 
bears a huge sway in all Human Actions.”210 This distinction between humankind’s first 
(inborn) and second (acquired) nature served Tillotson to highlight the value of education, by 
which the principles of religion and virtue left the first external imprints on the human mind, 
Gradually, these imprints would wax into pious and virtuous habits. In terms of the Christian 
view of human nature such teaching was significant – the latitudinarian concept of second 
nature qualified Man’s natural depravity as a result of original sin. Unlike Augustine’s harsh 
anthropology which revolved around the concept of each individual’s sin engendered by 
concupiscentia carnalis, second nature was not necessarily aligned with mala consuetudo and 
                                                             
209 Joseph Glanvill, “The Way of Happiness,” Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains (1681), pp. 12-13. See 
also Benjamin Whichcote, “The Miserable Degeneracy of Men Through their Affection of Atheism, and Practice 
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“a corruption of God-given first nature.”211 According to the latitudinarians, it involved the 
possibility of amelioration: humankind’s natural propensity to evil could be checked by the 
power of education.  
In this context, it is important to keep in mind the latitudinarians’ innatism, according 
to which God endowed humankind with common moral notions. The natural difference 
between good and evil was imprinted on the hearts of every individual, and however blurred 
one’s insight into these notions might be, a residue always remained.212 The main point to 
stress here is that the latitudinarians believed that humankind was not utterly depraved, but 
that they carried the seeds of virtue in themselves. Their first nature was split into the 
corruption consequent of the Fall and the inherent seeds of morality that constituted a 
remainder of prelapsarian purity. Thus, it was not custom that was the source of morality, but 
humankind’s own (first) nature.213 Thus, the habits that education inculcated could bring forth 
what was best in human nature without eradicating the fact of human depravity. Yet, as 
William Spellman astutely reminds us: “Education would never serve as a universal palliative 
to a problem whose roots were coterminous with the historic Fall of Adam.”214 However, 
humankind could also attain a moderate degree of virtue by habit. The latitudinarians, then, 
not only differentiated between human nature before and after the fall, as Isabel Rivers has 
correctly shown, but also between humankind’s two natures in the aftermath of the fall. 
Humankind’s first nature was stable, and so this was why concentration on moulding their 
second nature so as to make it averse to vice and sin and inclined to virtue was so important. 
Humankind’s second nature, their custom as shaped by education, was malleable, being a 
                                                             
211 Mischa Gubeljic, Simone Link, Patrick Muller, and Gunther Osburg, “Nature and Second Nature in 
McDowell’s Mind and World,” in Marcus Willaschek (ed.), John McDowell: Reason and Nature – Lecture and 
Colloquium in Munster 1999 (Hamburg, London, 2000). 
212 See William M. Spellman, The Latitudinarians and the Church of England (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1993), p. 81. 
213 See Patrick Muller, Latitudinarianism and Didacticism in Eighteenth-Century Literature: Moral Theology 
in Fielding, Sterne, and Goldsmith (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), p. 98 
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superstructure erected upon first nature. Consequently, it was possible for the latitudinarians 
to maintain that humankind could return, to a certain degree at least, to the divine image 
implanted in them. It was in the power of education to extenuate humankind’s original 
corruption – according to Joseph Glanvill, “custom is very powerful; and as it makes a kind 
of Nature, so, many times it masters and subdues it.”215 
Education, then, had a considerable influence on whether a human being’s natural 
vice would reign supreme or whether they would be held in check by Christian principles. As 
we will see in chapter 4, it was the power of education that made Lockean subjects and 
Lockean liberal society possible. John Tillotson thought that children could be educated so 
as to practise virtue habitually and that even accustomed sinners could be reclaimed for the 
cause of religion. However, the malleability of humankind also had potential pitfalls. As Isaac 
Barrow pointed out, a reverse effect, namely that “vice by custom may pass into nature, and 
prove so congenial, as if it were born with us,” could occur.216 Since moral tenets were only 
capable of moral certainty, a good religious education did not necessarily yield proper fruits, 
but, as Tillotson argued with Aristotle, it probably would more likely than not.217 In sum, for 
the latitudinarians, good habits instilled by education were the surest way of anchoring 
morally certain principles of virtue firmly in the human mind. 
Habit in Restoration Religion  
In the introduction, we saw how Richard Hooker inherited the English Calvinist challenge of 
not only clearly distinguishing justification from sanctification, but also of incorporating a 
theory of practical morality into the order of salvation. Similarly, we have also observed how 
leading divines such as Henry Hammond and Jeremy Taylor focused Christianity on morality, 
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duty, and personal piety rather than theological speculation. Restoration doctrinal and textual 
positions on the relationship between grace and morality marked a fundamental departure 
from the Reformed theories of morality of Luther and co. In the interests of consolidating the 
English church as well as society after the divisive civil war years, moderate churchmen – 
John Wilkins, John Tillotson, Isaac Barrow, Richard Baxter, Robert South, Edward Fowler, 
and others – rejected all manner of polemicizing about unprovable fundamentals of revealed 
religion.218 
These moderate churchmen were critical of excessive self-scrutiny as a means of 
personal assurance. Affective individualism was described in their sermons as an over-
scrupulous devotional exercise that bred only frustration and religious despair rather than 
dutiful expressions of practical piety. Their sermons, particularly the latitudinarians, focused 
instead on a reformation of behaviour and manners as well as the reasonable and practical 
means by which congregants might be disciplined into participating in a comprehensive 
English church. For their interest in practical rather than dogmatic theology, the approach of 
the following moderate divines was aptly described as “holy living” theology.219  
Regarding moral and religious education, the moderate divines were more willing 
than their English Calvinist predecessors to incorporate a system of behavioural and moral 
conditioning into the scheme of salvation – a theory of ethical habituation which, they hoped, 
would foster a religion of virtuous behaviour based on acquired and regulated habits. In their 
desire to introduce a process of moral habituation into the order of salvation, the moderate 
divines eased away from the Calvinist hostility toward developmental virtue based on the 
Aristotelian ethic of habituation – they presented an English religion that was as much a 
process through which moral apprentices gradually acquire discrete moral virtues and 
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practical wisdom, as it was a belief system; a process that encouraged the English subject to 
make a series of rational choices, based on a sense of temporal and heavenly rewards in 
conjunction with the regulation of behaviour according to the protocols of shared habits. The 
moderate divines thus attempted to circumvent many of the soteriological problems faced by 
earlier theologians and writers by effectively working a measure of self-interest and moral 
progress into an acceptable Calvinist scheme of salvation. This is not to argue that they 
advocated a Christianity divorced from dogma and hardly more than ethical in content. 
Rather, they believed their faith to be at least continuous with the historic mainstream of 
Protestant English belief. Moreover, as already stressed in this chapter’s opening comments, 
they were not somehow less religious than their predecessors, rather they were more 
concerned with the habits that would in turn strengthen that religion. 
 
The increased emphasis upon the importance of habitual dispositions in matters of 
religion was not consigned to any particular religious group or position. As a result, 
identifying a given Restoration divine within this habitual-religious discourse is not meant to 
pinpoint their precise theological position, or to confine individuality and originality of their 
thoughts and works within a rigid systematic cage, like placing a specimen into a box, but 
rather to express their kinship with other thinkers, whose theology was similar at certain 
significant points, even if it is not necessarily identical in all aspects.220 In other words, 
identifying an individual within this tradition does not mean that they held all and only those 
theological views that were held by others as well as their predecessors within the tradition. 
The divines that are the focus of this chapter were a loose group of clergymen whose theology 
adapted to new insights and circumstances, adopting and engaging with new patterns of 
thought and controversies as they emerged. In many ways, the organic development of this 
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theology which was based on an interplay of reason, habit, and faith during the period can be 
understood as one example of the way in which the Christian Protestant intellectual tradition 
was able to maintain useful forms, methods, and doctrinal ideas while at the same time 
incorporating the changing approaches to exegetical and theological investigation and 
epistemology. Collectively, the moderate divines attempted to develop a religion founded on 
habitually acquired moral beliefs and dispositions whereby a rational choice, or a series of 
rational choices, guided by an habitual awareness of the benefits of acting one way rather 
than another in the pursuit of salvation. In other words, habit mediated an initiating rational 
choice and the eventual acquisition of right action and religious truth. 
If one examines John Wilkins’s systematic discussion of habits together with the 
comments of other moderate divines on this subject, and if one assumes that their views are 
sufficiently representative, it is possible then to unpack the main issues in seventeenth-century 
English appeals to the role of habit in the religious and moral life. Regarding the general 
nature and effects of habit, there was agreement on the following assumptions: (1) Repetition 
of any particular thought or action makes it habitual; (2) Habits may either be mental or 
physical, both: that is, they may take root in, and affect, either the mind or the body – as 
Tillotson put it: “by virtue of a habit a man’s mind or body becomes pliable and inclined to 
such kinds of actions as it is accustomed to”; (3) Habits of thoughts had the potential to dictate 
conduct; (4) Firmly developed habits had the potential to affect humankind so powerfully that 
they became a kind of second nature, and their affects considered as important as those 
dispositions which all humankind naturally inherit by virtue of their common humanity. 
Acquired traits, therefore, were viewed as significant, if not more so, than inherited ones.221 
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These assumptions equally applied to both good and bad habits, but there were several 
assumptions about bad habits that were broadly held: (1) bad habits, because human nature is 
corrupted by original sin, are more easily acquired than good habits; (2) bad habits had the 
potential to diminish one’s light of reason and judgement, unbalancing the mind by impairing 
the rational powers and thus making it difficult to act rationally and hence virtuously; (3) bad 
habits made one retreat from the kind of self-examination which was crucial to the carrying 
out of one’s religious duty and acquiring God’s grace. Furthermore, it was believed that good 
habits, though possibly more difficult and arduous to acquire than bad habits, would help 
sustain the light of reason in the mind as well as encourage one to undertake self-examination. 
Good habits, when finally acquired, could generate their own rewards in this temporal life. 
Deliberately cultivating virtuous habits was viewed as not only a means, but the most 
important, if not the only means, of developing a virtuous character – as John Wilkins phrased 
this key Aristotelian concept with a typical Christian spin: “An habitual frame of mind, 
whereby we are fitted for vertuous actions, and more especially for the Duties of Religion.”222 
The moderate divines as well as a variety of their predecessors and contemporaries 
held that habit was indispensable in guiding ethical conduct as well as matters of belief. 
Various Reformed and Puritan divines, for example, used the idea of habit in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic sense, primarily in their discussions of regeneration, grace, and virtue. Their 
interest was the meaning of the term “habit” as used in their doctrinal formulations. The habit 
of grace, infused into a person by God, for example, was said to be an active propensity: “a 
disposition active and inclining,” and not just a “remote power,” according to John Owen 
(1616-1683).223 William Ames, in his Marrow of Theology, suggested that a “virtuous habit 
moves the faculty, which otherwise would not be so moved, toward good.”224 Habits are 
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“active and living powers,” taught John Flavel (c.1627-1691), which are “to a course of action 
as fountains or springs to the streams and rivers that flow from them.”225 The habit of grace 
was also a “state of character” that enhanced and perfected the life of the whole person. Ames 
spoke of habit as “a state of mind of various perfection.” Habits of grace bestowed upon the 
individual a newly acquired ability and propensity “to do well.” The habit of grace as a “state 
of character,” furthermore, was also an abiding, real principle. It constituted a “new life of 
the soul,” a “second nature.”226 
A survey of John Wilkins’s sermons and his numerous works reveal that he advanced 
a model of faith that entailed a systematic procedure of rationally committing oneself to act 
habitually as a strategy in the pursuit of salvation as well as for everyday life. In the last 
chapter, we saw how Wilkins’s conception of right reason was constructed on the mechanics 
of Aristotelian habituation, yet this was not the only area of Wilkin’s approach that utilised 
the idea of habit. Wilkins’s Ecclesiastes (1646), for example, a popular preaching manual that 
would have eight editions by 1704 gives us a glimpse into Wilkins’s views on faith and habit. 
In the 1669 version of the text, Wilkins identified the basis of Christian belief: 
Religion may be described to be, That general habit of reverence towards the Divine Nature, whereby 
we are enabled and enclined to worship and serve God after such a manner as we conceive most 
agreeable to his will, so as to procure his favour and blessing. The Doctrine which delivers the Rules 
of this, is stiled THEOLOGY, or Divinity.227 
Religion, for Wilkins, was practice whilst theology was the theoretical principles that 
underpinned and directed it. He advocated a religion of ‘habit of reverence towards the Divine 
Nature’ whose duties were established, and regulated, on the principles of a natural theology 
that brought the characteristics of the divine within the bounds of human understanding. What 
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did Wilkins mean by the term ‘habit’? A comprehensive definition was provided in his Essay 
Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (London, 1668) in which he gave 
the concept its fullest expression. Habits, according to Wilkins, were: 
SUch superinduced Qualities, whether infused or acquired, whereby the natural Faculties 
are perfected, and rendred more ready and vigorous in the exercise of their several Acts, according to 
the more or less perfect Degrees of them, are styled by the name of 
 HABIT, Endowment, enure, qualifie, Gift, Talent. 
 DISPOSITION, Propensity, Proclivity, Promptitude, Proneness, 
Inclination, readiness, given to, addiction, fitness, aptitude. 
To the more general consideration of Habit may appertain 
 Those States or Conditions of life which either reward or enable men for 
vertuous Actions; comprehending the 
 ENDS OR REWARD OF VERTUE. I. 
 INSTRUMENTS OF VERTUE. II. 
 Those Qualifications, which, though they are not properly Vertues, yet do 
prepare for, and dispose unto, and, in other respects, circumstantiate Vertue it self, both in 
the Habit and Operations of it, and are therefore styled AFFECTIONS OF VERTUE, either 
 INTELLECTUAL. III. 
 MORAL. IV. 
 The Kinds of vertuous Habits, whether 
 INFUSED· [...]th Intellectual and Moral. V. 
 ACQUIR[...] INTELLECTUAL. VI.228 
 
There are a number of observations that can be drawn from Wilkins’s exposition of habit. 
First, the term habit and disposition were synonymous with each other. Wilkins was certainly 
not alone in taking this position. Richard Baxter (1615-91) in his Two Disputations on 
Original Sin (1675), for example, alluded to the idea of the Christian virtue of charity as being 
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either a “habit or disposition,” as well as the notion of “Virtue in habit or disposition.229 
Second, it is clear that habits were intimately connected with virtuous dispositions and traits 
of character, or as means-to-an-end strategies which individuals engaged in order to acquire 
virtue. Third, according to Wilkins, there existed two kinds of virtuous habits: those that were 
infused and those that were acquired. Wilkins was not alone in formulating this dichotomy. 
Robert Ferguson (d. 1714) in A Sober Inquiry (1673), for example, made reference to 
those “acquired habits which are in unregenerate men, and the infused habits which are in 
believers.”230 Meanwhile John Owen (1616-1683) made the same division, arguing that 
“Habits both acquired, and infused, are increased and strengthened by frequent acts.”231 
Regarding infused habits, Wilkins described them as those “to which the Divine 
favour and assistance is required after a more especial manner; which are therefore styled by 
the general name of GRACE.”232 They involved, as previously stated, the development of 
“An habitual frame of mind, whereby we are fitted for vertuous actions, and more especially 
for the Duties of Religion.”233 Wilkins position here is not too dissimilar to Hooker’s idea of 
‘habitual sanctification’ – that faith was a habit that required the help of God’s given grace. 
This was a position that was shared by a variety of Wilkins’s contemporaries across the 
denominational divide: in a funeral sermon given in 1663, Edmund Calamy the Elder (1600-
1666), for example, spoke of the “habit of Grace” as “a planting of holiness in a man, and 
making him a partaker of the Divine Nature.”234 Similarly, Baxter wrote of that “Habit of 
grace” which was given to mankind through God’s “superadded sustentation.”235 
Additionally, John Wallis (1616-1703) in his sermon on regeneration described how the 
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“Habit of Grace” was worked “in us” by God “whereby we are inclined to Love and Delight 
in Good, as, by the habitual Corruption of our Nature, we are inclined to Evil.”236 Robert 
Ferguson held a similar position, arguing that grace was “a quality impressed on the minds 
and souls of men, whereby they became habitually disposed for God.”237 For William 
Sherlock (1639-1707), the “Habit of Grace” was akin to “the very nature of God.”238 The 
more conservative Robert South (1634-1716), argued that “the Habit of Holiness…must 
needs to be produced by supernatural Infusion, and consequently proceed, not from 
Acquisition, but gift.”239 
On the subject of acquired habits, Wilkins described them as those “which may be 
gotten by Industry, and tend to the perfecting of the Mind or Understanding.”240 Wilkins 
placed virtues such as ‘wisdom’ and ‘prudence’ within the realm those habits that had to be 
acquired. The notion of ‘wisdom’ is important for our understanding of Wilkins’s approach 
and how the concept of ‘habit’ fitted into his efforts on guiding the ethical conduct and 
religious beliefs of congregations and readers. Wisdom, according to Wilkins, was “so 
essential to Religion” and consisted in “an ability and inclination, to make choice of the right 
Means in the prosecution of our true End.”241 There is a clear theme of moral responsibility 
here – of observing a median in one’s actions. In his seventh sermon, Wilkins elucidated 
further on the idea of wisdom and how it functioned in a religious context: 
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Christian Wisdom may be defined to be that habit of mind whereby a man is inabled to propose the 
true end of eternal blessedness, and to judge aright concerning such means as may be most fit for the 
attaining of this end, conforming his life and carriage accordingly.
242
 
Wilkins’s remark gives us an insight into his theological position regarding grace and human 
effort in relation to salvation, demonstrating the key reciprocity in Wilkin’s thinking between 
acquired and infused habits - God’s grace was necessary for habitual good works, but the 
proper way of inviting such ‘infused habits’ was to acquire a habit of holiness by acting 
virtuously until they became almost second nature – as Wilkins explained: “Infused habits 
are usually wrought in us after the same manner as acquired; that is, gradually, and not 
without humane endeavour and cooperation.”243 John Tillotson, Wilkins’s son-in-law was in 
full agreement with his father-in-law that “habits of every Grace and Virtue…are afterwards 
attained by the frequent practice of them.”244 Likewise, the nonconformist minister Oliver 
Heywood (1630-1702) asserted that “Habits of grace are no otherwise known but by their 
acts.”245 The main point here is that Wilkins regarded habits as vital to setting the English 
subject’s conduct and religious faith on the rightful path. Such habits had to be carefully 
nurtured, developed, and practised by the individual. 
Isaac Barrow (1630-1677), a contemporary of Wilkins, whom he befriended during 
his time at Cambridge and whom Wilkins helped become geometry professor at Gresham 
College in 1662, also advocated the centrality of habits in the formation of good Christian 
virtues and conduct. According to Barrow, it was “the habit that qualifies and denominates a 
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man such or such in any kind or degree of morality.”246 In order to describe the perfect moral 
Christian, Barrow turned to Scripture 
A good man is in Scripture frequently compared to a Tree bringing forth fruit in due season; and the 
root thereof is this habitual disposition, which being nourished by the dew of Heaven, and quickned by 
the benign influence of Divine Grace, sprouts forth opportunely, and yields a plentiful increase of good 
fruit.247 
Barrow’s concept of habit echoed that of Wilkins’s. Like Wilkins, he advocated an habitual 
approach that occupied a middle way between grace on one side and good works on the other 
– an habitual inclination that could only be developed through “constant exercise” on the 
behalf of the individual with the assistance of God’s grace.248 Barrow was primarily 
concerned with how men might be guided into truth and right living, emphasising that true 
faith must issue in right action – which could only come from good habits of mind. It was 
therefore crucial that the proper Christian developed “An habitual skill or faculty of judging 
aright about matters of practice, and chusing according to that right judgment, and conforming 
the actions to such good choice.”249 Such an habitual inclination was not only important in 
developing a virtuous character, it was also foundational to the performance of the duties of 
religion and the carrying out of God’s commandments which required “an habitual 
disposition of mind, in a constant tenour of practice.”250 
Matthew Hale (1609-1676), one of the most intellectual lawyers of the early 
Restoration, also wrote profusely on the role of habit and his perspective is worth a brief 
examination. A prolific writer, although a reluctant publisher; several of his key tracts were 
printed only posthumously. Hale’s irenicism manifested itself in the Restoration period in 
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familiarity with moderate Anglicans such as Barrow, Tillotson, Stillingfleet, and Wilkins, as 
well as moderate nonconformists such as Richard Baxter. He sent manuscript versions of his 
Contemplations moral and divine (1676) and The Primitive origination of mankind (1677) to 
Wilkins who showed them to John Tillotson251 while his Discourse of the Knowledge of God 
and of ourselves, was published by Richard Baxter in 1688 and was written, Baxter tells us, 
when Hale was about thirty or thirty-one (1639-41).252 Baxter had read the manuscript while 
Hale was still alive, and he discussed the contents with its author, admiring the knowledge of 
the schoolmen it displayed.253 
Hale’s writings were intended to encourage piety, and he viewed theological 
speculations as a dangerous distraction. The mark of true religion, he believed, was the way 
that it transfigured the duties of everyday life: “this is the great art of Christian chymistry, to 
convert those acts that are materially natural or civil into acts truly and formally religious; 
whereby the whole course of this life is both truly and interpretatively a service to Almighty 
God, and an uninterrupted state of religion…”254 Hale’s Discourse was divided into two parts 
– an extensive treatment of nature before grace and of reason before scripture’s revelation. 
He devoted chapter twenty-nine to a discussion of the role of habit regarding man’s 
sanctification and the rule of righteousness. He began with a definition of habit: 
The Habit it self: it is a frame and temper of Mind arising from the Love of God, to give every Man his 
due, according to the Will of God. The great Duty that the Creature owes to his Creator, is Love: Thou 
shalt love the Lord with all thy Heart: and this as hath been shewn, is the first and great Commandment, 
and the first and most natural Duty and Bond that can be: the Consequence of this Love, is the doing 
all the good we can unto him, and for him, from whom we receive our Being: now all the good we can 
do him, is but to please him, to be conformable to his Will; for it is impossible, that any thing can 
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contribute any thing to him, that is infinitely full: all the good we can do him therefore, and all the 
expressions of our Love, consists in this…255 
Hale then moved on to a discussion of the “Rule of Righteousness,” which, according to him, 
formed the basis of man’s sanctification and the notion of habit assumed an important role. 
Hale described righteousness as an “habitual Righteousness” whose “foundation” was “Love 
to God.”256  Furthermore, in order to ascertain such righteousness, mankind had to regulate 
their behaviour. Thus, the Christian’s duty, according to Hale, did not merely consist of “that 
external Conformity to the Divine Law.” God also required mankind to develop an “habitual 
frame of Mind and Life in all Vertue.” In order to attain this, Hale, in the same vein as Edward 
Fowler, pointed to the “Example of Christ” whose life offered a “Pattern of Holiness towards 
God, and Righteousness towards Man.” Hale recommended that his readers turned “the  
practice of his Life into Precepts, and concluding what we ought to be, by observing what he 
was and did.”257 
The Discourse was not the only work of Hale’s which advocated the importance of 
habit and habitual dispositions in forming religious and ethical conduct. In his 
Contemplations moral and divine, he stressed the importance of “a habit of Religion towards 
God in his Son Jesus Christ; which is the magnum oportet, the one thing necessary, and over-
weighs all the rest.”258 What did this habit of religion consist of? For Hale, it was a “habit of 
piety” whereby the “whole course” of a man’s life was directed to “truly and interpretatively 
a Service to Almighty God, and an uninterrupted state of Religion, which is the best, and 
noblest, and most universal redemption of his Time.”259 Like Wilkins, Hale also wrote of the 
“habit of Wisdom” which aided man in his knowledge of God’s commandments, essentially 
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functioning as a deterrent against irreligious and sinful actions by instilling in man a “fear of 
God” thereby directing him to the “exercise of the Duties of his Relations” and enabling him 
to bring “forth the glory, and excellency, and goodness of God”260 
Another important habit, for Hale, was patience. He lamented that a: 
great cause of folly in the World is Inadvertence, Inconsiderateness, Precipitancy, and over-hastiness 
in speeches or actions. If men had but the patience many times to pause but so long in actions and 
speeches of moment as might serve to repeat but the Creed or Lord's Prayer, many follies in the World 
would be avoided that do very much mischief both to the parties themselves and others…261 
Patience bestowed upon man the ability to give “pause and deliberation” in their “duty to 
God” as well as the “ingredients of wisdom and prudence requisite to the choice of actions 
and words, and the manner of doing them.” Therefore, according to Hale, it worked to 
“mightily advanceth and improveth the worth and excellency of most Humane actions in the 
World” because it “habituates the mind to a temper of caution, and advertence, and 
consideration in matters as well of smaller as of greater moment, and so make a wise, 
attentive, and considerate man.”262  
Hale’s “habit of religion” was essentially an instrument that set the Christian on a 
rightful path. To use Paul F. Cefalu’s terminology, it advocated a form of “personalized 
deism,” whereby the English subject was modelled as a well-running mechanism who did not 
have to be directed once the habit had taken root and programmed the them to act ethically 
and responsibly in English society.263 The “habit of religion,” once acquired through 
habitually rightful conduct had the ability to govern the subject, directing them toward 
virtuous actions as well as buttressing their faith: 
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Whatever you do, be very careful to retain in your heart a habit of Religion, that may be always about 
you, and keep your heart, and your life always as in his presence, and tending towards him. This will 
be continually with you, and put it self into acts, even although you are not in a solemn posture of 
Religious worship, and will lend you multitudes of Religious Applications to Almighty God, upon all 
occasions and interventions, which will not at all hinder you in any measure in your secular occasions, 
but better and further you; it will make you faithful in your Calling, even upon the account of an actual 
reflexion of your mind upon the presence and command of the God you fear and love.264 
Wilkins’s treatment of habit along with Barrow’s remarks and Hale’s ‘habit of religion’ raises 
questions concerning the philosophic and operative role of habit. Aristotelian thought, for 
example, held that habit played an important philosophic role, essentially as a dynamic 
principle that perfected the operations of human beings.265 In Restoration England, a period 
in which the Aristotelian world-view was coming under increased pressure by the new 
epistemological approaches in natural philosophy, habit was understood as the rational 
capacity of the mind rather than a mere ancillary principle to the rational capacity – to use the 
term ‘rational’ in a broad sense to mean the mind’s ability to apprehend the structure of 
reality. It was much more than mere custom or the usual way something was done or the 
regular way something happened. It was, rather, an active tendency that governed and brought 
about certain types of actions and behaviour. “…virtuous habits,” wrote Wilkins, “will enable 
a man for worthy designs and actions.”266 Likewise, Tillotson asserted that “Habits of Virtue, 
like new Cloathes upon a young and comely Body, sit very gracefully upon a straight and 
well shap'd Mind, and do mightly become it.”267  For Baxter, the “habitual understanding” 
had to be “active, so as to keep a man from erring, and from turning back.”268 Habit, then, 
was conceived as an element of facility giving specific direction and worked to enhance the 
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rational capacity of the mind. It was an active tendency which issued forth in certain types of 
events – in the sense that it governed the type of actions or behaviour and the type of context 
upon which those actions or behaviour would become actual. 
Richard Baxter’s practical works provide a good example of this position. In the 
Christian Directory (1673), Baxter expounded a systematic programme in which the role of 
habit in ethical and religious affairs was given extended treatment. Baxter viewed ‘habits’ as 
fundamental in forming good conduct and conditioning the individual to act morally: 
The intending of God’s glory or our spiritual good, cannot be distinctly and sensibly re-acted in every 
particular pleasure we take…but a sincere, habitual intention well laid at first in the heart, will serve to 
the right use of many particular means. As a man purpose at his first setting out to what place he 
meaneth to go, and afterwards goeth on, though at every step he think not sensibly of his end; so he 
that devoteth himself to God…will carry on small particulars to that end, by a secret, unobserved action 
of the soul, performed at the same time with other actions, which only are observed…As the 
accustomed hand of a musician can play a lesion on his lute, while he thinks of something else: so can 
a resolved Christian faithfully do such accustomed things as…labouring in his calling, to the good ends 
which he (first actually, and still habitually) resolved on, without a distinct remembrance and 
observable intention of that end.269 
A habit, for Baxter, was a faculty which, when developed properly, could positively condition 
the actions of an individual – it was a controlling faculty, which after being developed 
properly, could command the actions of the individual. Furthermore, the ideal Christian was 
so proficient in their habits of faith that Baxter compared them to an expert labourer whose 
proficiency in a craft permitted them the freedom to contemplate worthy objects and ideas 
while they worked: “A weaver, a tailor, and some other tradesmen, and day-labourers, may 
do their work well, and yet have their thoughts free for better things, a great part of the day: 
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these must contrive an ordinary way of employment for their thoughts; when their work doth 
not require them…”270 
Whilst Baxter aligned himself with non-conformity, it is clear that his views on moral 
conduct and reliance on good habits to foster social unity takes him into territory that is similar 
to that which was headed under the banner of latitudinarianism. In his autobiography, for 
example, showed a strong appreciation for the writings of moderate conformists such as 
Wilkins, Tillotson, Stillingfleet, whose sermons he attended and valued in the 1660s: 
“Ordinarily I went to some parish church, where I heard a learned minister that had not 
obtruded himself upon the people, but was chosen by them, and preached well (as Dr. 
Wilkins, Dr. Tillotson, Mr. Nest, etc.), and I joined them in the common prayers of the 
church.”271 According to Isabel Rivers “The respect in which Baxter was held by moderate 
Anglicans is evidenced by the fact that in 1660, when a moderate church policy for a short 
time seemed possible, Charles II made him one of his chaplains…And his respect for the 
latitudinarians especially Wilkins (‘a love of mankind, and of honesty, peace and Impartiality 
and Justice’), Tillotson, Whichcote, and Stillingfleet, emerges at several points in his 
autobiography.”272 
Baxter and his latitudinarian contemporaries shared the conviction that orthodox 
Calvinism underestimated the role of moral training and holy living in the acquisition and 
promulgation of faith. The latitudinarian position, embraced by Edward Stillingfleet, Robert 
South, Isaac Barrow, and John Tillotson among others, held that Scripture contained only a 
few self-evident principles, and that in place of an undue concern with mystery, revelation 
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and doctrinal purity, the English nation should focus on matters of pastoral discipline and 
congenial behaviour.273  
Tillotson like Baxter, advocated the notion of habitual conduct not just as an important 
factor in guiding human action, but also as a crucial part of one’s salvation: 
Not that we are obliged always actually to think upon [salvation]; but to have it frequently in our minds, 
and habitually to intend and design it, so as to make it the scope of all our endeavours and actions, and 
that everything we do be either directly in order to it, or some way or other subservient to this 
design…like the term and end of a man’s journey, towards which the traveler is continually tending, 
and hath it always habitually in his intention, tho’ he doth not always think of it every step that he takes, 
and tho’ he be not always directly advancing and moving towards it, yet he never knowingly goes out 
of the way…if our mind be once fixed and resolved, that will determine and govern all our motions, 
and inspire us with diligence, and zeal, and perseverance in the prosecution of our end.”274 
For Tillotson and Baxter, these moral habits once developed and implemented required 
constant management in order to remain operative and self-governing. And this emphasis on 
the formulation of moral habits made up a large part of Baxter’s moderate theological 
position. Whilst he did not attribute salvation solely to the benefice of the human will, he was 
convinced that exclusive reliance upon unmerited free grace was antithetical not only to the 
moral life but to all civil and religious order. For Baxter, uncompromising predestinarianism 
such as that espoused by John Owen, came dangerously close to permitting ungodliness since 
discussion of guaranteed election, unconditional and complete justification, the unmerited 
free gift of grace, the repudiation of the Mosaic law and the necessary perseverance of the 
elect too easily detached the life of faith from the challenge of the moral effort: 
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I doubt it is the undoing of many to imagine, that if once they are sanctified, they are so unsure in the 
hands of Christ, that they have no more care to take, nor no more danger to be afraid of, and at last 
think that they have no more to do, as of necessity to Salvation: and thus prove that indeed they were 
never sanctified.275 
For Baxter, “much of the Work of your Salvation is yet to do, when you are Converted. You 
have happily begun; but you have not finished. You have hit of the right way, but you have 
your Journey yet to go.”276 Christ 
never intended to justifie or sanctifie us perfectly at furst…but to carry on both proportionably and by 
degrees, that we have daily use for his daily mediation, and may daily pray, Forgive us our 
trespasses.277 
In the same vein as Wilkins, Baxter argued that a continuing effort toward personal 
improvement was an integral part of Christianity: “your Conversion is not sound if you are 
not heartily desirous to increase. Grace is not true, if there be not a desire after more.”278 By 
wedding morality to the process of salvation, his soteriology guaranteed that the pursuit of 
the holy life would be disregarded and placed a kind of accountability and obligation on the 
individual who would have to lead a moral and pious life in order to be saved. A religion 
which promoted good habitual behaviour thus offered a viable and practical solution to the 
misconduct and immorality of English society. 
Tillotson was in full agreement with his non-conformist fellow and in a sermon 
entitled, “Of the difficulty of reforming vicious habits” he stressed the importance of good 
habitual behaviour. He began with an exploration of the nature of habits: “the farther we 
proceed the more we are confirmed in them: and that which at first we did voluntarily, by 
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degrees becomes so natural and necessary that it is almost impossible for us to do otherwise. 
This is plainly seen in the experience of every day, in things good and bad, both in lesser and 
greater matters.” According to Tillotson, individuals “who have been deeply engaged in 
vicious habits and long accustomed to them,” had lost touch and forgotten their true duties 
and interests, but went to great pains to stress that their reformation and redemption was not 
unfeasible – “The result of my discourse will be not to discourage any, how bad soever, from 
attempting this change, but to put them upon it, and to perswade them to it.”279 Furthermore, 
it was important to identify bad habits and rectify them because they had a considerable effect 
on man’s faculties and condition: 
The perfection of any habit whether good, or bad, induceth a kind of necessity of acting accordingly. 
A rooted habit becomes a governing Principle, and bears almost an equal sway in us with that which is 
natural. It is a kind of new nature superinduced, and even as hard to be expelled as some things which 
are Primitively and Originally natural.280 
Good habits were possible, however. According to Tillotson, “let a man but habituate himself 
to a religious and vertuous life, and the trouble will go off by degrees.”281 Virtue and 
saintliness was second-nature for those who practised it: “When a man hath once engag’d 
himself Religious course, and is habituated to piety and holiness, all the exercises of Religion 
and devotion, all acts of goodness and virtue are delightfull to him.”282 Religious duties, 
therefore, had to be constantly practised and repeated for them to become good life habits. 
For Tillotson, they formed the basis for an active and living faith; the governing body of 
Restoration English society’s religious and moral stability: 
A strong and vigorous faith is the principle and root of all graces and virtues, and may have such a 
powerful influence upon the resolutions of our minds, and the government of our actions, that from this 
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principle all graces and virtues may spring and grow up by degrees into habits…I doubt not but that 
the habits of several graves and virtues are afterwards attained by the frequent practice of them.283 
Such moral habits represented a distinctive theory of ethical conduct: a series of rational 
choices, guided by an awareness of the utilities and benefits in acting one way rather than 
another – as a measure in pursuit of salvation as well as moral obedience. 
Furthermore, a focus on shared habits, for Tillotson, was not only a way in which 
individuals could find common ground, it was also the best means of preserving unity in 
English society: “We have the same notions of right and wrong; we are all obnoxious to one 
another, and may be beneficial to one another; we all love ourselves and study the 
advancement of our interest and happiness.”284 A subsidiary development of such an approach 
was also the construction of a Church of England that would not only present a united front 
against the Romanist menace, but also express a stable and certain institution where 
moderation and morality were the standard. Such stability was inherently reliant on man’s 
ability to acquire moral virtue through habitual practice and repetition – in Tillotson’s own 
words: to “conform our selves to the holy God; endeavour to be habitually holy, which is our 
conformity to the Nature of God.”285 
Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699), was another member of the latitude men who 
employed the concept of habit. Considered by many historians as the leading theologian and 
apologist of the Church of England, his work fell into three phases.286 Up to the revolution of 
1688 he wrote on issues which were of paramount importance to the Church of England in 
positioning it in relation to a broader Protestantism and to Rome. During the early years of 
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his episcopate he wrote at slightly less length on more immediately practical concerns; for 
his last three years he returned to major theological controversies prompted by what he felt 
were attacks on, or dangers to, the fundamentals of Christianity. 
Whilst Stillingfleet’s sermons, much like Tillotson’s, made reference to the “common 
Principles of Religion” that helped foster “good Impressions on the Mind” as well as an 
“Habitual Temper and Disposition,” the majority of his employment of ‘habit’ was spent 
alerting his congregations to the potential dangers of evil habits287 Like his other fellow 
Restoration divines, Stillingfleet viewed habit as an active and controlling faculty, and was 
ever mindful of the problems that evil habits posed to the Christian’s religious duty: 
There is no doubt in Mankind, considered in it self, a Power of acting according to Reason, which is 
the truest Freedom, (for a Power of acting otherwise is Weakness and Folly,) but what through the 
Natural Propensity to Evil; what through the Power of bad Examples; what through the violence of 
some Tempers and Passions; what through the Cloudiness of some Understandings, from bodily 
Distempers; what through the strength of evil Habits, and corrupt Dispositions, there is scarce such a 
thing as Freedom of Will left, especially as to Matters of Salvation.288 
Habits, then, whether good or bad, assumed a vital role in the attainment of salvation. Like 
Tillotson, Stillingfleet was also adamant that such bad habits could be reformed. He advised 
his audience that once “such evils Habits prevail” the individual had to “repent, and search, 
and examine themselves in order to a particular Repentance.”289 Such a repentance, according 
to Stillingfleet, was no easy task and involved “a thorough Change of a Man's Mind, and the 
Course of his Life… like the taking violent Physick in some Diseases, where the Humour 
must be purged out.”290 It could also not be achieved by human effort alone. In the same vein 
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as Wilkins, Stillingfleet claimed that “a higher Principle of Divine Grace” was necessary” to 
enable us to break through all these Difficulties.”291 The main duty of the Christian, for 
Stillingfleet, therefore, was to develop “an habitual Temper and Disposition of Mind towards 
God. This is that which is commonly called the Love of God; and is opposed to the Love of 
Sin.” This “habitual love,” Stillingfleet argued, was “our chief end.”292 and attaining such a 
habit was a dual process that involved not only improving one’s behaviour but also one’s 
general religious nature: 
But certainly the Love of God must go deeper, and rise higher, or else it will never come up to the great 
Design of Religion; which is, not only to do those outward Acts of Service which he commands and 
expects from us; but to bring our Souls nearer to him, to make him our chief End; and to direct the 
Course of our Lives and the Acts of our Obedience in order to it.293  
 
Stillingfleet also used the notion of ‘habit’ in his defence of the reasonableness of Christianity. 
In his Origines Sacrae, or a Rational Account of the Grounds of Natural and Reveal’d 
Religion (1662), Stillingfleet set out to continue the explorations of William Chillingworth 
(1602-1644) into the limits of knowledge and the proper basis of belief, exemplifying the 
approach taken by all the Anglicans who engaged in the controversy. Genuine faith, according 
to Stillingfleet, could be based only on rational assent to proper evidence, but to demand the 
wrong sort of evidence – say, mathematical certainty or concrete sense experience – for 
proving matters of fact was to distort God’s requirements for mankind. Matters of faith may 
not be so “clear to us as demonstrations,” argued Stillingfleet, but “God doth not require us 
to believe any thing without sufficient grounds for our believing it, and those grounds do bear 
a proportionable evidence to the nature of that assent which he requires.”294 Stillingfleet, 
along with his latitudinarian counterparts, shared the conviction that the principles of religion, 
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of natural religion in particular, were only capable of moral certainty, those, according to 
Wilkins, “yet may they be so plain, that every man whose judgement is free from prejudice 
will consent unto them.”295  
The building of a firm belief in God’s power and providence was a “discursive act of 
mind,” declared Stillingfleet: “By Faith we understand a rational and discursive Act of the 
Mind. For Faith being an assent upon Evidence or Reason inducing the Mind to assent, it 
must be a rational and discursive Act.”296 Thus, as David Foster has argued, Stillingfleet and 
other Anglican divines “constructed a rhetoric of assent by contextualising reason as a flexible 
instrument capable of developing conviction on the basis of the probable”297 In building such 
assent, they argued that the mind moved from visible evidence to an inward conviction which 
was “morally certain” and “unquestionable.”298 
Furthermore, throughout Stillingfleet’s defence of Christianity there was a constant 
appeal to the “Man of Common Sense and Reason.” Now, when Stillingfleet appealed to this 
man of common-sense, he was not implying that any human being – however young, or 
irreligious – would immediately assent to a reasonable argument upon hearing it. If one could 
not understand the meaning of the terms in which the argument appeared, one could not be 
expected to give a reasonable assent to it. But if one understood the meaning of the argument, 
then, one would assent to it if (1) it was a reasonable argument, and (2) one was a reasonable 
person. For Stillingfleet, any man of common sense would approve that position and assent 
to that which best seemed to be indicted by the facts of experience. 
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But what about the actual process of assent? What was the epistemology underlying 
it? In his The Council of Trent examin'd and disprov'd (1688), Stillingfleet hinted at the 
process. Paraphrasing one of the chief medieval canonists - William Durand the Elder 
(c.1230-1296), bishop of Mende’s thoughts on the principles of theology - Stillingfleet laid 
out the central tenets of the Protestant faith: 
1. For a habit whereby we assent to those things which are contained in Scripture, as they are there 
delivered. 2. For a habit whereby those things are defended and declared which are delivered in 
Scripture. 3. For a habit of those things which are deduced out of Articles of Faith; and so it is all one 
with the holy Scripture.299 
Stillingfleet’s paraphrasing of Durand – assenting as a habitual process or an habitual frame 
of mind – demonstrates the close interplay between reason, habit and faith during this period. 
Richard Baxter advanced a similar position. In his Certainty of Christianity without Popery 
(1672), Baxter, also with reference to Durand, defined the “Measure of faith” as “a habit by 
which we only or principally assent to those things, that are delivered in Scripture, and as 
they are there delivered.”300 Likewise, John Pearson (1613-1686), bishop of Chester, defined 
faith “as Assent unto truths credible upon the testimony of God delivered unto us in the 
writings of the Apostles and Prophets and a “habit of the intellectual part of man.”301 Habit, 
therefore, in this context, functioned with a kind of necessity in bringing about a certain type 
of mental operation – in the sense that it governed that process whereby the individual 
assimilated the tenets of faith and accepted the fundamental truths of religious doctrine as 
well as advancing one’s religious understanding. Thus, while Anglicans stressed the 
importance of reason in aiding the individual to make inferences and reach conclusions about 
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God and his providence, habit acted as the key intermediary in this process – it mediated 
between an initial rational choice and the acquisition of faith. 
Furthermore, Stillingfleet’s ‘habit of assent’ approach demonstrates how he 
considered faith as something that had to be instilled into the individual. Whist the doctrine 
of innate knowledge was still widespread in the seventeenth-century and considered to be 
essential for the stability of religion and morality, Stillingfleet and his moderate 
contemporaries had no illusions about the strength of innate ideas as a guide for behaviour 
and belief.302 Mankind, therefore, had to be trained towards the Christian faith; they had to 
learn to conduct themselves as a proper Christian; learn how to apprehend God’s everlasting 
truths and carry out one’s Christian duty. Stillingfleet, in this sense, viewed religion as an 
active faith built upon the habitual assent of believers. Faith, in his interpretation, was not a 
passive and unthinking faith – rather, it was one that entailed full assent and constant practice; 
one that gave the English subject an active role in their salvation. 
Robert South, despite occupying a position more conservative than his latitudinarian 
contemporaries on doctrinal points, dedicated large sections of his sermons to the crucial 
issues of how good and bad habits affected the individual as well as the proper use of habits 
in forming and maintaining a virtuous character. South emphasised the fact that, because of 
original sin, “there is in every man naturally (Nature now stands) a sensual Principle 
disposing him to Evil.” This disposition meant that mankind was naturally more prone to 
acquiring bad habits rather than good habits, as South asserted in his discourse on the 
education of youth: “this principle will be sure…if not hinder’d, to produce vicious Habits 
and Customs…this ill principle is controulable and conquerable only by Discipline, and the 
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infusion of good and contrary Principle into the mind.”303 South, owing much to his 
conservative approach in religion, was less inclined than Baxter, Tillotson, and Wilkins to 
stress the temporal rewards of good habits. In his sermon on ‘The Recompence of the 
Reward,’ preached at Christ-Church, Oxford in 1698, for example, South argued at length 
against what he considered the dangerous doctrine that virtue was its own reward and 
therefore was not to be practised primarily in order to gain the joys of heaven.304 
On the important subject of the proper use of good habits, however, South was even 
more emphatic than Tillotson and Wilkins in recommending the Aristotelian method of 
instilling virtue. In a sermon performed in 1661 which addressed the nature of salvation, for 
example, South stressed the necessity of active virtue rather than mere faith, good intentions, 
or membership in a particular church, arguing first and foremost that “Practice or Obedience 
is the best and surest Foundation (still supposing it bottomed upon the Merits of Christ) for 
a Man to build his Designs for Heaven and the Hopes of Salvation upon”: 
…there is an universal Stain and Depravation upon Man’s Nature, that does incapacitate him for the 
Fruition, and infinitely pure converse of God. The Removal of which cannot be effected but by 
introducing the contrary Habit of Holiness, which shall by Degrees expel, and purge out the other. And 
the only way to produce an Habit, is by the frequent Repetition of congenial Actions. Every pious 
Action leaves a Certain Tincture, or Disposition upon the Soul, which being seconded by Actions of 
the same Nature, whether by the Superaddition of new Degrees, or a more radicate Fixation of the 
same, grows at length into an Habit, or Quality, of the Force and Energy of a second Nature.305 
South, like Wilkins, then argues that God’s grace was necessary for habitual good works in 
order to remove the stain of original sin that resided in every man’s soul because “a Person 
in the State of Nature or Unregeneracy cannot by the sole Strength of his most improved 
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performances, acquire an Habit of true Grace or Holiness.”306 The main point of his sermon 
was that the proper way of inviting that “supernatural Infusion” of Grace was to acquire a 
“Habit of Holiness” by performing virtuous actions until they became “a second Nature,” as 
he explained: 
…in the Duties of a meer natural Man, there is sometimes an hidden, Divine Influence, that keeps Pace 
with those Actions, and together with each Performance, imprints a holy Disposition upon the 
Soul…We have an illustration of this, though not a parallel Instance, in natural Actions, which by 
frequency imprint an Habit, or permanent facility of acting, upon the Agent. Godliness is in some Sense 
an Art or Mystery, and we all know that it is Practice chiefly, that makes the Artist.
307
 
South was, in effect, invoking the Aristotelian notion that the moral and virtuous life was one 
of constant activity and applying it to the method of acquiring, not only a virtuous character, 
but a “holy Disposition” of the soul which, due in part to the assistance of God’s grace, 
liberated mankind from original sin. In this Christian context, the emancipation from original 
sin was a vital process in achieving a truly virtuous character in the temporal world as well 
as the promise of salvation in the next.  
Edward Fowler (1632-1714) shared South’s view on the importance of attaining a 
virtuous character. In his retreat from Calvinism, Fowler attempted to fashion a practical and 
living faith in which Jesus Christ was the moral exemplar, in the words of Isabel Rivers, “the 
model Anglican gentleman”308:  
His whole life was one Continued Lecture of the most Excellent Morals, the most Sublime and exact 
Vertue. For instance; He was a Person of the Greatest Freedom, Affability, and Courtesie, there was 
nothing in his Conversation that was at all Austere, Crabbed or Unpleasant. Though he was 
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always serious, yet was he never sowr, sullenly Grave, Morose or Cynical; but of a marvellously 
conversable, sociable and benign temper.309 
As William Spellman has pointed out, for Fowler the moral life was one of constant activity 
whereby “works were necessary for salvation.”310 Fowler believed that the essence of faith, a 
belief in the gospel’s truth that “includes a sincere resolution of Obedience unto all its 
Precepts,” was holiness: 
That the Business that brought the Blessed Jesus by the appointment of God the Father down from 
Heaven; and the End of His making us the Objects of such Rich and Transcendent Kindness, was the 
destroying of Sin in us, the Renewing of our depraved Natures, the Ennobling our Souls with Virtuous 
Qualities and Divine Dispositions and Tempers, and (in one word) the making us partakers of His 
Holiness.311 
Fowler defined holiness as follows: 
 
…Holiness is so excellent a Principle, or Habit...First, To perform all Good and Virtuous Actions, 
whensoever there is occasion and Opportunity; and ever Carefully to abstain from those that are of a 
Contrary Nature. Secondly, To do the one, and avoid the other, from truly generous Motives and 
Principles.312 
 
Fowler’s reference to holiness as a habit was not unlike that of South’s or Baxter’s; a practical 
habit that was necessary for the performance of one’s individual’s religious duties.313 Fowler 
perceived holiness ultimately as the restoration of human qualities: 
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a Divine or God-like Nature, causing an hearty approbation of, and an affectionate compliance with 
the Eternal Laws of Righteousness; and a behaviour agreeable to the Essential and Immutable 
differences of Good and Evil.
314
 
Fowler was resolute in the belief that “acquiring the habit of holiness” was “the very business” 
of religion, and that Christ was the perfect model for which the Christian could aspire to.315 
Like Hale, Fowler argued that Christ’s virtues and qualities were all perfectly imitable by 
human beings. It was therefore the duty of the Christian to do “their utmost endeavour to 
subdue their lusts, and to acquire vertuous habits.”316 Fowler’s definition of faith was such 
that holiness was not, as was the case for hard-line Calvinists, its consequence but its essential 
component. He regarded the doctrine of justification by faith alone as necessarily 
antinomian.317 Moreover, despite his insistence in chapter xiv of the Design of Christianity 
on the superiority of the gospel to classical ethics, there was little doubt that he was far more 
sympathetic to classical moralists, whom he repeatedly cited (the stoic philosopher Hierocles 
in particular), than to Reformation theologians (of his contemporaries he cited Simon Patrick 
and John Smith). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed the use of habit by various moderate divines in the Restoration 
period, observing how they recommended the cultivation of habitual beliefs and dispositions 
as the direct route to moral virtue, Christian piety, as well as true belief. The immediate 
intellectual and religious context was the memory of a bloody and destructive civil war that 
had devastated the English nation. Given the depths of human depravity coupled with a 
society that was seen as inherently self-destructive, standard religious discourse on doctrine 
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and beliefs was simply unequal to the task producing a virtuous society, so a process of 
habituation was necessary. 
The moderate divines believed that English society had to be habituated in order to 
accept the Christian life. They were not, however, somehow less religious or less concerned 
about faith than their predecessors were, they simply dealt less with the intricacies of faith 
than with the cultivation of those habits and habitual dispositions that might strengthen it. 
They drew on the notion of habituation as a potentially binding agent of English society – to 
habituate people to internalise moral virtues and to govern their passions and actions so as to 
maintain and cultivate sociability. In this reading, we can see that they believed that most 
individuals governed their behaviour and beliefs primarily through habitually-acquired 
mental dispositions rather than through conscientious internal motivations. 
This chapter has also extended the scholarship that has argued for an increased 
emphasis upon conduct rather than belief in late early modern England. It has shown how 
various moderate divines were interested in the very psychology of belief, and particularly, 
the relationship of habitual assent and practice to a well-exercised and grounded faith. We 
can see how this transformation of faith to conduct, described by Isabel River’s as grace 
becoming synonymous with virtue or by Mark Knight as secular rhetoric beginning to 
dominate religious discourse, was based on an increased emphasis on religious habits rather 
than religious doctrine.318 For the moderate divines, habituation was indispensable in guiding 
such religious conduct. 
Moreover, just as Ethan Shagan has shown how moderation could carry with it an 
authoritarian meaning, this chapter has demonstrated how the notion of habituation could also 
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represent assertions of authority, particularly religious authority. Whilst the moderate divines 
did not necessarily believe in compelling individuals to true beliefs and virtuous action 
through the threats of coercive penalties, they were adamant that most of society had to be 
habituated to adopt moral norms and ensure a peaceful coexistence. The result, as we have 
seen, was a religion founded on acquired habitual beliefs and dispositions as they attempted 
to bridle the excesses to which English society was inevitably prone. But at the same time, 
those assertions had to be irenic and restrained rather than excessive in order to be legitimate, 
not only producing but also proceeding from restraint and regulation. The consequence, in 
many ways, was that Restoration religion came to be authorised by its limitation – focusing 
more on the practical, than on the doctrinal. Therefore, whilst Restoration religion, read in 
this way, comes across as a discourse of peace, equanimity, reason and irenicism, this also 
disguised a degree of coercion within the language of habituation and habitual dispositions.  
The works of the divines that this chapter has examined thus reveals the maintenance 
of a peaceable yet subtly coercive social order in which habit facilitated the religious life. The 
conduct of English society was to be both reflective and unreflective, although not entirely 
mechanical - it was to be predictable, disciplined, and sufficiently routine. In this way, 
English religion slowly became a civilising rather than a saving force in late early modern 
England. As Blair Worden has argued, in the later seventeenth-century we find “a growing 
sense that religion should be what civilises us; that it should have less to say about salvation 
and more about integrity in our dealings with ourselves and others; that the test of a doctrine 
is not its truth but its usefulness to that human end.”319 A part of this civilising process 
required subtle notions of coercion, discipline, and self-control within the language of 
religious habituation. As we will see in chapter 4, John Locke was to not only consolidate 
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this religion based on habitual dispositions, but elevate it into an educational programme that 























Habit and the New Experimental 
Philosophy 
 
In his essay “The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion” (1676), Joseph Glanvill, the 
Anglican divine and vigorous apologist of the ‘new experimental philosophy’ of the early 
Royal Society argued that the new approach to the study of nature played an important role 
in the moral and intellectual formation of its practitioners: 
And I dare affirm, that the Free, Experimental Philosophy will do this to purpose, by giving the Mind 
another Tincture, and introducing a sounder Habit, which by degrees will repel and cast out all 
Malignities; and settle it in a strong and manly Temperament, that will master and put to flight all idle 
Dotages, and effeminate Fears.320 
Furthermore, according to Glanvill, such virtues were epitomised in the person of Robert 
Boyle: 
the greatest Strength and the Gentilest smoothness, the most generous Knowledge and the sweetest 
Modesty, the noblest Discoveries and the sincerest Relations, the greatest Self-denial and the greatest 
Love of Men, the profoundest insight into philosophy and Nature, and the most devout, affectionate 
Sense of God and of Religion.321 
Glanvill’s immediate aim in this text was to demonstrate how the new philosophy could be 
used as a remedy for the epidemics of enthusiasm, melancholy, and superstition which 
currently plagued English society, but his focus upon how it could shape the moral and 
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religious lives of those who practised it, imbuing them with disciplined habits of mind, is 
worth a consideration. In his Plus Ultra (1668), for example, Glanvill boldly claimed that: 
there is nothing tends more to the undermining and supplanting the humour of Disputing, than 
the Experimental and Free Philosophy. For this inlargeth the Mind, and gives it a prospect of 
the vastness of things, and the imperfections of our Knowledge, the Difficulties that are to be 
incountred in the search of Truth, and our liableness to deception, the stumbles of Confidence, the 
prejudices of Education, the shortness of our Senses, the precipitancy of our Understandings, and the 
malign influence of our Affections; I say, the Free and Real Philosophy makes men deeply sensible of 
the infirmities of humane Intellect, and our manifold hazards of mistaking, and so renders them wary 
and modest, diffident of the certainty of their Conceptions, and averse to the boldness of peremptory 
asserting.322 
Having shown in the first two chapters how the notions of habit and acquired habitual 
dispositions were used to address right reason and religion and their associated problems, this 
chapter examines how such notions were reshaped and redeployed in the new experimental 
philosophy which gave them a slightly different form, and which allowed for the earlier 
problems of reason and religion to also be addressed more fully. It will demonstrate how there 
was an analogous deep-seated preoccupation with habit in the writings of the practitioners of 
the early Royal Society. My focus will be on those practitioners of the new natural philosophy 
who argued that the new experimental approach constituted a special kind of mental training 
which inculcated the mind with good habits of examination, observation, and personal piety. 
My intention is to highlight the ways in which the new philosophy was presented as a practice 
that could contribute to the moral and religious formation of the natural philosopher. 
The following chapter, then, proceeds as follows: the first section gives a brief 
examination of the emergence of a new philosophical persona in the second half of the 
seventeenth-century; the second section offers a concise historiographical review of the 
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relevant literature how the arguments put forward in this chapter contribute to and critique 
this body of work; the third section examines some recent historiographical developments in 
the history of philosophy and the history of science, concentrating on the cultura animi 
tradition in early modern thought, particularly in the work of Francis Bacon. The main aim 
of this section is to show how the new experimental philosophy could also lead to moral 
improvements and was, concomitantly, a practice of virtue. The rest of the chapter is devoted 
to an examination of how apologists for the early Royal Society incorporated this notion of 
cultura animi into their experimental programmes, explicitly identifying how the concept of 
habit and the acquisition of habitual dispositions formed a crucial part of the experimental 
life. It focuses particularly on the works of Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, Thomas Sprat, and 
John Hartcliffe. The instillation of good habits of experimentalism, for example, forced the 
mind to measure its ideas against repeatedly observed realties. In effect, such habitual 
dispositions were intended to govern and order the operations of the mind, extracting the 
inquirers from their private perspective. Thus, as we will see, the search for truth about nature 
was at the same time a search for ways of rectifying and improving the mind. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to show that the new experimental philosophy had 
a clear moral dimension, and if we look back at the previous two chapters, taking into 
consideration the problems that plagued human reason and English religion, we can 
understand why this moral dimension was such a crucial part of experimental philosophy. 
The point that I am making here is that the experimental philosophy was also responding to 
the problems of reason and religion. The apologists of the early Royal Society, who are 
subject of this chapter, presented the experimental philosophy as a practice that could provide 
the basis for morality and religion. In other words, the kind of knowledge that that experiential 
philosophy yielded was the kind of knowledge that one needed for a good foundation of 
natural religion and hence of Christian ethics. Therefore, as this chapter will show, there was 
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another shift in late early modern English intellectual thought, this time in natural philosophy. 
There was an emerging vocabulary of habit and habitual dispositions and an examination of 
such notions allows us to see more clearly how the experimental philosophy was conductive 
to the restoration of some of the natural faculties and powers of the fallen mind, effecting a 
complete transformation of the human being and thus placing them in a better position to 
receive Divine grace. 
 The Perfect Virtuoso 
It is important to note that there was a double and paradoxical claim involved in the notions 
of habit and habitual dispositions that are examined in this chapter. The apologists that this 
chapter focuses on argued that in order to engage in the experimental philosophy, one had to 
be a virtuous and moral person, which involved cleansing the mind and taming the passions. 
At the same time, the experimental philosophy was viewed as a practice that was helpful in 
the process to become a moral person, providing the tools for cleansing the mind and taming 
the passions. As a result, the practice of the experimental philosophy was a complex practical 
discipline, similar to the ancient understandings of philosophy: a constant process of learning 
and “curing” oneself, always tending towards an idea of moral and cognitive excellence that 
was seldom achieved in this earthly life.323 Furthermore, experiments were intimately 
connected with the discipline of the mind: according to Sprat they were integral to “the 
management of the private motions and passions of our minds.”324 When the apologetic 
literature of the early Royal Society is read in this light, the experimental philosophy comes 
                                                             
323 For further details on this Dana Jalobeanu, “Experimental Philosophers and Doctors of the Mind: The 
Appropriation of a Philosophical Tradition.” in V. Alexandrescu & R. Theis (eds), Naturel et surnaturel: 
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324 Thomas Sprat, History of the Royal Society of London for the Improving of Natural Knowledge (London, 
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across as a fundamentally practical philosophy that was conductive to a moral life and even 
a better civic society. Even the great Isaac Newton echoed such a sentiment: 
And if natural philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method, shall at length be perfected, the 
Bounds of Moral Philosophy will also be enlarged. For so far as we can know by natural Philosophy 
what is the first Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so far our 
Duty towards him as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of Nature.325 
If the outcome of an experimental approach to nature was practical piety, then the character 
of the natural philosopher, it was argued, was also removed from the curious pursuer of 
profitless knowledge or the purveyor of vain disputes. Thus, the experimental philosophy was 
a discipline that enhanced the moral integrity of its practitioners. In practical terms, such a 
claim meant that the experimental approach had moral and religious benefits; that engaging 
in experiments led to moral improvements, that the experimental philosophy was, 
concomitantly, a practice of virtue. As a result, the experimental philosopher, the virtuoso, 
acquired the moral qualities and the religious expertise that formed the cornerstone of his 
character and hence his authority and credibility. Observe, for example, the following passage 
taken from Walter Charleton’s Immorality of the Soul, first published in 1657: 
 I can introduce you to the knowledge of a Person, noble by Birth, and of high condition, but infinitely 
more noble by the Heroick endowments of his better part, and the large measure of Knowledge he hath 
acquired in all things of most use, to the well government of our selves, in all the various occurrences 
of life. He is a prudent Estimator of mens actions and opinions, but no rigid Censor of either. A valiant 
Assertor of truth, yet far from Tyranny; where he finds an errour, as alwaies reflecting on human frailty, 
and the obscurity of things in themselves. He well knows how to overcome, but not at all to triumph; 
And when he hath overcome, you can hardly perceive he ever contended. For, he doth not seem so 
much to refute, as to teach, rather gently insinuating verity, then strugling in the detection of falshood. 
Curious in the collection of Books, diligent in reading them, accurate in examining what they deliver, 
                                                             
325 Isaac Newton, Opticks, Query 31 (New York: Dover, 1979), p. 405. 
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& alwaies more favourable to Reason, then to Authority, unlesse in matters of Faith. A great Lover of 
Experiments in Physick and Chymistry; Yet no waies infected with the vanities of the one, or frauds of 
the other. A friend to all learned & judicious men of your Profession, he meets with; and a Patron to 
the Art it self.326 
Charleton’s Immortality of the Soul was a philosophical dialogue featuring Lucretius, the 
advocate of an Epicurean view on the morality and materiality of the human soul, Athanasius, 
an advocate of the immateriality of the soul with Cartesian overtones and Isodicastes, the 
“perfect Virtuoso”, and judge of the debate.327  Isodicastes was introduced as a moral, 
religious and epistemological authority, assuming the role of weighing the arguments of the 
proponents and deciding the victor. He also assumed the role of the arbiter of the moral and 
religious implications of such a debate, preventing the arguments from going in forbidden 
directions, and safeguarding the philosophical claims from the dangers of heresy and 
immorality. The ‘perfect Virtuoso’ therefore had a dual role in the dialogue – whilst his 
qualities made him the perfect judge in a philosophical debate over the nature of the human 
soul, his moral profile and practical expertise made him the perfect candidate in the attempt 
towards finding peace of mind in a period of turmoil; to find a cure for the distempers and 
diseases most damaging to philosophers: vain disputations and sectarianism. He knew how 
to advance the dialogue and where to stop, since the debate over the nature and properties of 
the soul was difficult and potentially dangerous and because absolute certainty in such matters 
is not possible. One must therefore proceed with caution since “the thing will remain involved 
in much obscurity.”328 Isodicastes, thus, demonstrated the proper, irenic philosophical attitude 
toward major unsolved problems in philosophy and natural philosophy. In sum, he espoused 
the ideal moral and epistemological model for any natural philosopher to follow and emulate. 
                                                             
326 Walter Charleton, The immortality of the human soul, demonstrated by the light of nature in two dialogues 
(1657), p. 18. 
327 Ibid., p. 19. 
328 Ibid., p. 100, See also p.107, p. 124 
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Charleton’s introduction of such an impartial character is not coincidental. The 
Immortality of the Soul begins with a section on the current state of natural philosophy in 
England in the 1650s, describing it as a major reformation. Echoing Bacon’s New Atlantis, 
Charleton painted a vivid picture of two institutions engaged in the reformation of learning: 
an institutional one, the Royal College of Physicians akin to “Solomons House in reality” and 
an informal one, the group of virtuosi assembled in Oxford around John Wilkins, unnamed 
but identifiable through their description.329 These two groups, the dialogue tell us, are made 
up of virtuosi: virtuous individuals with high moral standards and appropriate moral qualities 
for the study of nature, who are engaged in a thorough reform of the whole state of learning. 
Such a reformation was no easy task and no less hazardous than discussing theological-
charged subjects, thus the individuals involved had to have to an impeccable moral profile 
and persona: 
So neither have we introduced any Alterations in Natural Philosophy, Physick, and other parts of 
Human Learning, but what carry their utility with them, and are justifiable by right reason, by autoptical 
or sensible demonstration, and by multiplied experience. So that every intelligent man may easily 
perceive, that it hath been the Reformation, that drew on the Change; not the desire of Change, which 
pretendeth the Reformation. Did you, Lucretius, but know the Gravity, Solidity, and Circumspection 
of these worthy Reformers of the state of Learning now in England; you would not suspect them of 
incogitancy, or too much indulgence toward the Minerva's of their own brain: but confesse that they 
have precisely followed that counsel of the Scripture, which injoynes us, to make a stand upon the 
Ancient way, and then look about us, and discover, what is the straight and right way, and so to walk 
in it.330 
The character of the virtuoso was therefore employed as a moral standard ensuring that the 
reformation of natural philosophy was carried out in a proper way, without endangering the 
civic or religious order. Charleton’s Immortality of the Soul was not alone in this apologetic 
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discourse. It is noteworthy, however, because it not only precedes Robert Boyle’s well known 
Christian Virtuoso (1690), but also Thomas Sprat’s and Joseph Glanvill’s apologies for the 
Royal Society. 
Its basic argument, however, was very similar to these later writings: the existence of 
a strong connection between the experimental study of nature and the process of moral and 
religious reformation in its practitioners, the fashioning of a moral persona; and that the 
experimental philosophy provided not only an advancement of knowledge, but a set of 
religious values and moral qualities.331 Moreover, as this chapter will show, such authors 
claimed that the experimental philosophy also provided a set of exercises and techniques for 
training the mind, making it fit for scientific inquiry. The concept of habit formed an integral 
part of this process – the experimental philosopher, the virtuoso, acquired moral qualities and 
religious expertise, which was informed by the notion that the mind could be transformed by 
a process of habituation, which had the potential to restore some of the natural qualities and 
powers of the fallen mind, imbuing it with good habits of examination and right judgement.  
This process was founded upon a Stoic tradition that viewed the training of the human 
mind toward the excellences of judgement, the art of self-government as well as the mastery 
of oneself in terms of habituation. Cicero, for example, suggested that the training of the 
mind’s assent was a matter of habituation: the judicious and temperate disposition of the mind 
was a habit, in opposition to the habit of the distempered mind.332  The aim of such Stoic 
philosophical exercises, as John Sellars has pointed out, was to achieve a transformation of 
character and therefore of life and behaviour, by means of a process of habituation.333 Such 
an habituation, moreover, was understood “not as an unthinking habit but rather as a 
                                                             
331 See, for example, Robert Boyle, The Christian Virtuoso (1690), pp. 710-11. 
332 See, for example, Margaret R. Graver, Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
333 John Sellars, The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003), p. 121, p. 119. 
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conscious learning process.”334 It is my contention that this pre-occupation with habit and 
acquired habitual dispositions deeply pervaded the epistemological construction of the 
experimental philosophy. Robert Hooke, for example, wrote that “without an acquired 
habitude and handiness by long practice and experience, nothing could be done to any 
certainty.”335 Of course, not every single active practitioner of the early Royal Society 
demonstrated such a preoccupation with such notions, but my aim is to understand the specific 
role that they played in the experimental life of the early Royal Society. 
Historiography 
My aim in this section is to give a brief overview of the existing literature and how the 
arguments put forward in this chapter fit into this body of work. In examining the relationship 
between the moral and the epistemological, I follow Susan James’s contribution to this issue. 
James has surveyed the inheritance of ancient and medieval doctrines about the passions and 
has shown how these were incorporated into new philosophical approaches throughout the 
course of the seventeenth-century.336 Whilst the quest for dominion over nature, for example, 
was largely seen to lie in knowledge – as Francis Bacon had pointed out, “knowledge and 
human power are synonymous” – the passions assumed also an important role as essentially 
obstacles to the production and accumulation of knowledge.337 Thus, in order to achieve 
dominion over nature, the passions had to be held in check, because they had the potential to 
impair the fundamental observations and judgements on which the new philosophy was 
based. As Robert Hooke informed his readers in the opening pages of his Micrographia 
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336 See Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 
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(1665): “The only way which now remains for us to recover some degree of those former 
perfections, seems to lie, by rectifying the operations of the Sense, Memory, and Reason, 
since upon the evidence, the strength, the integrity, the right correspondence of all these…all 
our command over things is to be established.”338 
The emergence of a moderate epistemological approach in early modern English 
intellectual thought which rejected the notion of infallible and certain knowledge, choosing 
instead to embrace an element of doubt and hold that knowledge was, at best, only probable 
has been developed in a number of studies.339 Richard Popkin’s account of the early modern 
‘sceptical crisis,’ a European intellectual crisis fuelled by the upheaval of the Reformation 
and the revivial of Greek scepticism in the sixteenth century is one such influential thesis. 
Popkin defined scepticism as "a philosophical view that raises doubts about the adequacy or 
reliability of the evidence, reasons, or proofs employed as grounds for our various beliefs".340 
On this account, the philosophical opposite of scepticism is dogmatism. Thus one could be a 
sceptic and a believer, since the sceptic was not calling into doubt the veracity of any 
particular religious belief, just the rational justification offered for the belief. Common to both 
the Reformation and Greek scepticism, Popkin explained, was a basic epistemological 
problem: the problem of measuring the standard of truth. Various solutions to this problem 
included the Cartesian “quest for certainty” approach and the “quest for reasonableness” (the 
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‘mitigated sceptical’ approach).341 This ‘mitigated sceptical’ approach was a position that 
“could accept the full force of the sceptical attack on the possibility of human knowledge, in 
the sense of necessary truths about the nature of reality, and yet allow for the possibility of 
knowledge in a lesser sense, as convincing or probable truths about appearances.”342 For 
Popkin, this was the position which was adopted and developed by a variety of Early Modern 
intellectuals: Gassendi and Mersenne in France and Wilkins, Glanvill, Boyle, and Locke in 
England. 
In the case of the early Royal Society, a variety of historians have argued that the 
major source of their moderate epistemological position was drawn from the theological 
epistemology and methodology of the reformed Church of England – the Church’s emphasis 
upon doctrinal minimalism, irenicism, and epistemological common sense, adopted as the 
safest way to not only religious knowledge but salvation in general amid theological 
disagreements and social upheaval, presented a method of mitigated scepticism and 
probability which the members of the early Royal Society embraced in the development of 
the epistemology and methodology of the new experimental philosophy. In the words of John 
Henry: The Royal Society “borrowed from the English Protestant Reformation 
tradition…[key] methodological principles which seemed to offer the best hope of settling 
disputes and arriving at ‘truth’.”343 
Similarly, Barbara Shapiro, although she focuses almost exclusively upon 
Latitudinarian thought, has labelled this development, heavily influenced by the revival of 
scepticism and Augustinianism, as a new distinctively English cultural style which was 
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characterised by the emergence of probabilistic empiricism and which permeated a wide 
range of disciplines – natural philosophy and religion, but also history, law and literature. 
Shapiro argues that this approach formed the basis of the several important features of the 
early Royal Society: emphasis upon the communal production of knowledge, an anti-
dogmatic manner of knowledge presentation, and inherent restraint in drawing observable 
matters of fact from experiments.344 
Steven Shapin has suggested that the new philosophy of the early Royal Sociey forged 
a self-conscious middle-way between scepticism and credulity, ostensibly restoring 
moderation by basing ‘epistemological decorum’ upon gentlemanly norms of conduct. Such 
norms, Shapin argues, formed an important basis for securing reliable knowledge about the 
natural world and were understood as a guarantee of both credibility and social order, since 
they contained features such as trust, decorum, and prudence, as well as “judicious scepticism 
about the quality of knowledge and a temperate probabilism about its certainty.”345 This 
crucial genteel social feature of late seventeenth-century natural philosophy, according to 
Shapin, partly informed its moderate epistemological approach; shaping the virtuosi’s method 
for assessing testimony and managing assent. 
Recent work by Peter Harrison and Joanna Picciotto has stressed the importance of 
theological anthropology for the problem of knowledge in the early modern period. Harrison 
has explored the ways in which understandings of the Fall and its effect on human nature and 
reason functioned in the seventeenth-century as a primary motive for conceiving the search 
for knowledge and the intellectual tools needed to get there. In short, a deep awareness of the 
post-lapsarian states of the human faculties underpinned any and all statements about the 
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possibility and extent of human knowledge. In context of the emerging experimental 
philosophy that was practiced by the early Royal Society, the all-pervasive influence of a 
Protestant Augustinian anthropology led to a pessimistic valuation of the capacities of the 
human faculties, which in turn fostered a scientific culture which emphasised the modest 
prospects that could be achieved epistemologically and a method which entailed a set of 
measures that could secure probable knowledge.346 
In the same vein as Harrison, Joanna Picciotto has examined how an ethic of imitatio 
Adami emerged in seventeenth-century England and what new devotional and intellectual 
practices it encouraged. She traces the change from a sacramental theology centred on the 
consumption of Christ in the Eucharist to the productive and experimental Protestantism, 
where believers needed to “work out” salvation. This development in religion was paralleled 
by the rise of Baconian experimentalism in natural philosophy, seen especially in the writings 
of key members of the Early Royal Society such as Thomas Sprat and Robert Boyle.347  
These studies of seventeenth-century intellectual thought interpret the moderate 
epistemology of the early Royal Society as: firstly, a response to the epistemological problem 
based on the justification of knowledge; secondly, a cultural approach to epistemology, one 
that emphasises shared values and characteristics and the appropriation of methods from 
English theology into English natural philosophy; thirdly, a social history of knowledge, for 
epistemological methods and solutions were informed by social discourses; lastly, a response 
to the underlying problem of the capacities of human nature informed by Augustinian 
anthropology. 
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The arguments made in this chapter do not seek to scotch any of the above positions. 
Rather, it suggests the pursuit of knowledge in this period was perceived as a process of 
habituation; habituating the mind toward right judgement and good observation which, in 
part, informed the moderate epistemological approach of the early Royal Society. Recent 
work, for example, has emphasised the persona of the experimental philosopher. Matthew 
Jones in his work on the ‘good life’ in the scientific revolution has shown that for Descartes, 
geometry was “an exemplary exercise in cognitive habituation, a good requisite for the more 
advanced stages of the philosophical life.”348 Similarly, Jan Golinski, drawing upon Michel 
Foucault’s term, ‘the care of the self,’ has argued that early modern thinkers conceived of the 
passions as threats to proper mental functioning and challenges to the formation of the 
intellectual persona. As a result, practices of the care of the self were of central importance 
in seventeenth-century knowledge production and natural philosophers were “particularly 
concerned to protect and enhance the capacities of their senses to register external 
conditions.”349 Golinski identifies such regimens in the works of Boyle, Locke, and Newton. 
It also draws upon work on the body as a vehicle for natural knowledge, represented 
by Christopher Lawrence’s and Steven Shapin’s collection, Science Incarnate (1998). The 
chapters in this volume explored the historical embodiments of scientific knowledge, its 
rootedness in specific modes of bodily experience, behaviour, and deportment. Their case 
studies demonstrate how ‘self-fashioning’ by natural philosophers required bodily discipline 
– regimen, exercise, fasting, or celibacy – in order to avert the interference of the body in the 
workings of the mind.350 
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More recently, Sorana Corneanu has suggested that a crucial dimension to the new 
science can be witnessed in “its capacity to serve as a practice that cultivates the moral 
person.” She argues that the experimental programmes of the early Royal Society virtuosi 
fulfilled the role of regimens for curing, ordering, and educating the mind toward an ethical 
purpose, an idea that she traces back to the ancient tradition of cultura animi.351 In short, her 
basic claim is that discussions of epistemology and method in the early Royal Society were 
also fundamentally debates about how the human mind should be regulated with the aim of 
moral improvement. This chapter seeks to build upon Corneanu’s work by examining the 
notion of habit and acquired habitual dispositions in the epistemological schemes of the early 
Royal Society, arguing for the central role of ‘habit’ in the English experimental natural 
philosophers’ approach to knowledge.  
I depart from Corneanu’s work only in regards to my focus upon the role of religion 
regarding the context of habit and new experimental philosophy. Whereas Corneanu argues 
that the early Royal Society drew upon writings concerning the ‘cure of the mind’, such as 
the works of Francis Bacon and Edward Reynold’s Treatise of the Passions and the Faculties 
of the Soul of Man (1640) which espoused an “anthropological-therapeutic core” of ideas 
about the mind, (im)perfectibility and the conditions for its assent to real truths, she does not 
consider the role played by religion in the construction of the Society’s epistemological and 
methodological schemes.352 In my analysis of Robert Boyle’s Christian Virtuoso (1690), I 
suggest that the ‘religious virtues’ which the experimental philosophy secured for the 
virtuoso, in fact, had an important epistemological dimension since they helped secure proper 
cognitive functioning. 
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The previous chapter demonstrated the prevalence of habit and acquired habitual 
dispositions in Restoration religious discourse. This chapter makes the case for an analogous 
one in English experimental philosophy, and for a different kind of connection between the 
two during this period. I want to suggest that not so much a mutually supportive relationship 
existed between the two, but rather that they shared a significant identity. The main pay-off 
with such an approach is that it reveals that the fusion of religion and natural philosophy was 
one of the most important features of Restoration intellectual life. Religion, for example, long 
seen as the apologetic adjunct to the English natural philosophical enterprise, comes across 
more clearly as a discourse with close conceptual and practical links to its schemes of inquiry 
and natural philosophical investigations. Isaac Barrow, teacher of Newton, for example, held 
that the same principles governed both religious and scientific discourse: 
[When religion] “hath, to the satisfaction of man’s mind, with solid reason made good its principles; it 
then enjoins men to surcease further scruple or debate concerning what it teaches or draws from them; 
which is a proceeding most reasonable, and comfortable to the method used in the strictest sciences 
being either demonstrated out of some higher science, or evidenced by fit experiments to common 
sense.”353 
The arguments made in this chapter also complement Harrison’s position on the notion of the 
Fall in seventeenth-century epistemological thought: the awareness of the limits of man’s 
capabilities, his reason, and thus the knowledge that he could acquire was often presented in 
terms of the regulation of the mind and the need to develop virtuous habits. I depart from 
Harrison, however, in my emphasis upon a more optimistic view of man than the Augustinian 
perspective which is Harrison’s focus, a view that found room, in keeping with a Christian 
humanist reworking of the ancient traditions, for both virtue and habit. Thus, against Harrison, 
I show that the virtuosi found the mind to be somewhat perfectible, given the application of 
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the right habits and habitual dispositions. Therefore, I want to suggest that the moderate 
epistemological methodology of the early Royal Society was shaped by an appreciation of 
the importance of habituating the mind toward mental self-control. Accordingly, the 
mitigated scepticism and emphasis on the probability of knowledge advocated by its fellows 
was informed, in part, by self-fashioning mental exercises which disciplined the intellectual 
activity of the mind. In this interpretation, the experimental philosophy comes across not only 
as a method which expounded the values of moderation, regimentation, and temperance, but 
also as an edifying programme which aided the experimenters mind in their search for 
knowledge and as a regimen for cultivating mental virtues. Thus, for instance, in his 
Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Naturall Philosophy (1664), Robert 
Boyle informed his readers that he sought to demonstrate “Usefulnesse in reference to the 
Mind of Man”354 whilst Joseph Glanvill was convinced that the experimental philosophy 
yielded “practical knowledge” that “will assist and promote our Vertue, and our Happiness, 
and incline us to imploy our selves in living according to it.”355 
Experimental Philosophy and the Cultivation of the Mind 
In her book, Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, Locke and the Early Modern Cultura Animi 
Tradition, Corneanu demonstrates how the early modern cultura animi tradition – “an eclectic 
approach that interweaves Stoic, sceptical, and Christian virtues and that makes it possible to 
conceive of the virtues of the mind without associating them with the activity of 
(metaphysical) contemplation” - informed the epistemological approaches of late 
seventeenth-century English experimental philosophers.356  Falling squarely within the 
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realms of what R. C. Roberts and Jay Wood have termed “regulative virtue epistemology,”357 
its practitioners aimed “to offer ‘medicine’ or ‘physick’ […] to prescribe the best ‘culture’ 
for a mind described as ‘diseased,’ ‘distempered’, or ‘perturbed’.”358 Its literature spanned 
Anglican, Puritan, and Protestant treatises and drew in different measures from two traditions. 
The first was Augustinian - as Peter Harrison has demonstrated, early modern Protestant 
thinkers followed Augustine in stressing the deep-set limitation on human epistemic 
capacities resulting from the Fall, and the imbrication of man’s epistemic judgements in the 
post-lapsarian vices of self-love, pride and curiosity.359 The second was the classical pagan 
tradition in the forms of neo-Stoicism which equally challenged the Aristotelian notion that 
people’s contemplative capabilities operated independently from the passions, rather than 
themselves being shaped by characteristic, emotively-shaped forms of intellectual vice.360 
Why was the experimental philosophy helpful in regulating the mind? And, more, 
importantly, why was a cure of the mind required in the first place? Francis Bacon, for 
example, believed that attaining a true philosophy of nature was intimately connected to the 
health of the human mind: 
Is not knowledge a true and only natural pleasure, whereof there is no satiety? Is it not knowledge that 
doth alone clear the mind of all perturbation? (…) Is there any such happiness as for a man’s mind to 
be raised above the confusion of things, where he may have the prospect of the order of nature and the 
error of men?361 
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Similarly, Descartes stressed the importance of “Rules for Direction of the Mind”  while 
Robert Hooke emphasised the need for “methodical proceedings in the making experiments 
and observations.”362 Additionally, there is a range of claims in Thomas Sprat’s History of 
the Royal Society in which experiments are presented as crucial for a variety of non-
epistemological reasons. Experiments, according to Sprat, would lead to “the liberty of Mens 
Minds”363  
Bacon’s use of elements of the cultura animi tradition has already been noted by 
others, most specifically in relation to how his treatment of this moral theme was related to 
his natural philosophical programme.364 Moreover, recent scholarship on Bacon’s medical 
vocabulary has also convincingly shown that his discipline of the mind is worth taking 
seriously and that it can be placed within the larger cultural context of the Renaissance 
tradition of medicina mentis.365 
Bacon believed that the natural process of knowledge acquisition was fundamentally 
flawed – that it was distorted at each stage by various impediments. His Great Instauration, 
therefore, aimed to provide the human mind with the necessary ‘aids’ and ‘instruments’ which 
would restore some of the lost capacities of the pre-lapsarian mind. Such ‘aid’ and 
‘instruments’ were diverse and ranged from particular techniques to discipline the mind and 
the use of experimental investigations to keep the idols of the mind at bay. The Great 
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Instauration, then, aimed to accomplish both a reformation of the mind as well as a 
reformation of knowledge by following the proper method. For Bacon, this method amounted 
to the successful construction of two intellectual disciplines: natural history and natural 
philosophy. 
As well as providing the materials for induction, Bacon presented natural history as a 
good exercise for the mind to keep a constant contact with nature – it allowed the investigator 
to escape from the limited and distorted perspective of a ‘private experience,’ keep the idols 
at bay, record facts undistorted by private beliefs and contribute to the advancement of 
knowledge. It was important, according to Bacon, for the natural historian to “consider what 
[were] the true ends of knowledge,” and to “seek [natural knowledge] not either for the 
pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, or 
power, or any of these inferior things; but for the benefit and use of life.”366 Moreover, in the 
preface to the Great Instauration, Bacon wrote that “it is necessary that a more perfect use 
and application of the human mind and intellect be introduced.”367 Thus, Bacon believed that 
natural history, properly undertaken, had the potential to remove the bad habits of the mind 
and as well as remedy the mind of its ‘idols.’368 As Dana Jalobeanu has correctly argued, for 
Bacon, there was no medicinal propaedeutic prior to natural history: natural history was a 
cultura animi itself.369 Natural history offered ‘observances’ and ‘exercises’ that would 
“keepe mynd in continual obedience.”370 Bacon was adamant that the natural history of his 
predecessors had narrowed the world “till it w[ould] go into the understanding (which has 
been done hitherto).” Bacon’s approach to natural history, on the other hand, would develop 
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and nurture the understanding, empowering it “to be expanded and opened till it [could] take 
in the image of the world, as it is in fact.”371 Natural history, thus, would augment the attention 
and memory while also furnishing “the intellect with the most trustworthy aides and 
bodyguards.”372 In sum, Bacon viewed natural history as a therapeutic discipline – that it was 
able to treat some of the ailments of the mind, such as the problem of hasty generalisation 
and could liberate the mind from its slavery to a specific theory or doctrine. 
The apologists of the early Royal Society absorbed much of this therapeutic aspect 
present within Bacon’s concept of natural history. Bacon’s idols, for example, occupied an 
important role in Hooke’s posthumously published General Scheme or Idea of the Present 
State of Natural Philosophy (1705), in which he wrote that his main aim was to develop “the 
true method of building a solid philosophy” or a “Philosophical Algebra.” The emergence of 
the new experimental philosophy in Restoration England was marked by a growing number 
of discourses which stressed the moral and religious value of studying nature. Natural 
Philosophers of the early Royal Society claimed that the empirical study of the natural world 
brought the mind closer to nature, enhanced the intellectual faculties, regulated the passions 
of the mind and brought a variety of moral and religious benefits. Robert Boyle, for example, 
suggested that the proper study of nature placed the intellect of the true knower – a “minister 
of nature”373 – in a better, more privileged position: 
The study of nature, with design to promote piety by our attainments, is useful, not only for other 
purposes, but increase our knowledge, even of natural things, if not immediately, and presently, yet in 
time, and in the issue of affairs. For, at least, in the great renovation of the world, and the future state 
of things, those corporeal creatures, that will then, be knowable, notwithstanding such a change, as the 
universe will have been subject to, shall probably, be known best by those, that have here made their 
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best use of their former knowledge, which there will, together with their other gifts, be congruously, as 
well as munificently, rewarded, And then the attainment of a high degree of knowledge, which here, 
was so difficult, may, to the enlightened and enlarged mind, become as easy, as it will be satisfactory; 
and our improved understanding will, with joy, perceive, how much all the knowledge, that we can 
give ourselves of God’s works, is inferior to what their divine author can impart to us, or them.374 
Most apologists of the Royal Society agreed that a proper investigation of nature had moral 
and religious value as well as therapeutic benefits. In his History of the Royal Society, Thomas 
Sprat explained how the experimental philosophy served as an important moral function 
because it worked to discipline the practitioner’s mind, “composing, and purifying…their 
thoughts.”375 For Joseph Glanvill, the experimental philosophy was a discipline of the mind 
which was connected to moral, religious, epistemological and theological questions alike. It 
provided medicines for the common illnesses of the philosophers, tools for taming the 
passions and methods for enlarging the bounds of the understanding: 
So that the Philosopher thinks much, and examines many things, separates the Certainties from 
the Plausibilities, that which is presumed from that which is prov'd, the Images of Sense, 
Phansie, and Education, from the Dictates of genuine and impartial Reason. Thus he doth before 
he Assents or Denies; and then he takes with him also a Sense of his own Fallibility and Defects, and 
never concludes but upon resolution to alter his mind upon contrary evidence. Thus he 
conceives warily, and he speaks with as much caution and reserve, in the humble Forms of [So I 
think, and In my opinion, and Perhaps 'tis so---] with great difference to opposite Perswasion, candour 
to dissenters, and calmness in contradictions, with readiness and desire to learn, and great delight in 
the Discoveries of Truth, and Detections of his own Mistakes. When he argues he gives 
his Reasons without passion, and shines without flaming, discourses 
without wrangling, and differs without dividing. He catcheth not at the Infirmities of his Opposite, but 
lays hold of his Strength, and weighs the substance without blowing the dust in his eyes. He entertains 
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what he finds reasonable, and suspends his judgment when he doth not clearly understand. This is the 
Spirit with which men are inspired by the Philosophy I recommend.376  
 
The experimental philosophy, therefore, had therapeutic effects. It kept speculation in check 
and revealed the limitations of one’s explanations. It functioned as a ‘guardian’ for the mind, 
keeping it in a constant ‘regulation,’ and only focused on the ‘things themselves.’ Such 
techniques for disciplining the mind and cultivating the intellect were a characteristic feature 
of the new experimental philosophy. 
Robert Boyle 
This section is divided into two parts; the first part details Robert Boyle’s irenic approach to 
natural philosophy; the second part makes the case that Boyle’s irenic programme of natural 
philosophy was partly informed by a deep seated preoccupation with habit, a focus upon 
habituating the human mind toward careful examination, right judgement, and discernment 
of the facts of nature. It will argue that the ideal Boylean natural philosopher was one whose 
mind was furnished with habitual dispositions that guided the investigator only to discern the 
observable evidence and not to engage in lengthy conjectures and speculations. 
Robert Boyle’s natural philosophy and his experimental method was characterised not 
only by the doctrines it included, but also by those doctrines that it excluded. An important 
feature of the new mechanical philosophy as Boyle articulated it was the fact that certain 
doctrines and debates were considered off limits. When Boyle introduced the new mechanical 
philosophy it did not matter whether there really was a vacuum, a genuinely empty space, or 
whether the interior of his vacuum pump was filled with some kind of ether.377 He set aside 
such issues and concentrated on the issues that he thought were of the most importance – that 
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there was one matter in the physical world, that it was divided into parts through motion, and 
that all the phenomena of the natural world could be explained in terms of size, shape and 
motion. In the preface to his Some Specimens, Boyle’s irenic approach is evident: 
I esteem’d that notwithstanding these things wherein the Atomists and the Catesians differd, they might 
be thought to agree in the main, and their Hypotheses might by a Person of a reconciling Disposition 
be look’d on as, upon the matter, one Philosophy, which because it explicates things by Corpuscles, or 
minute Bodies, may (not very unfitly) be call’d Corpuscular; though I sometimes stile it the Phoenician 
Philosophy, because some antient Writers inform us, not only before Epicurus and Democritus, be ev’n 
before Leucippus taught in Greece, a Phoenician Naturalist was wont to give an account of the 
Phaenomena of Nature by Motion and other Affections of the minute Particles of Matter, which because 
they are obvious and very powerfull in Mechanical Engines, I sometimes also term it the Mechanical 
Hypothesis or Philosophy.378 
 
Boyle was definitely a natural philosopher ‘of a reconciling Disposition’: he desired to 
convince advocates of the competing positions to put aside their disagreements, and recognise 
one another as heeding to a single philosophy. In the experimental part of his Some 
Specimens, as well as his other chemical writings, Boyle focused precisely on the elements 
of the mechanical philosophy that thoughts were uncontroversial, making plausible through 
experimentation that everything could be explained in terms of size, shape, and motion, and 
crucially setting aside questions relating to infinite divisibility or the real existence of empty 
space.379 
Boyle’s natural philosophical approach was partly to undermine and overcome the 
disagreements between various camps, especially between those who advocated atoms and 
the void, and those who preferred infinite divisibility and the plenum, by focusing on 
fundamentals. His main point, ultimately, was to direct actual empirical research on those 
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parts of natural philosophy that fell into this common area. Furthermore, Boyle went farther 
still by suggesting that the issues of disagreements that went beyond the possibility of being 
settled through empirical means, were therefore not appropriate subjects for discussion and 
debate. In the preface to Some Specimens Boyle stated that the difference between “the 
Cartesians and the Atomists” over “the Notion of Body in general, and consequently about 
the Possibility of a true Vacuum, as also about the Origine of Motion, the indefinite 
Divisibleness of Matter…seem to be rather Metaphysical than Physiological Notions…”380 
Moreover, in his New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring of the Air and 
its Effects (1660), Boyle presented the results of the experiments with his air-pump and was 
very explicit about excluding debates about the nature of the vacuum from the realm of what 
was empirically meaningful and useful, and thus from serious debate. 
In this work Boyle refused to come down on one side as to whether the chamber of 
his air-pump was “truly empty, that is, devoid of all Corporeal Substance.” After carefully 
analysing arguments from both sides, Boyle concluded that in the end, the controversy was 
over anything that could be determined experimentally, but over the notion of a body: He 
concluded: 
This reason, I say, being thus desum’d seems to make the Controversie about a Vacuum, rather a 
Metaphysical, then a Physiological Question; which therefore we shall here no longer debate, finding 
it very difficult either to satisfie Naturalists with this Cartersian Notion of a Body. Or to manifest 
wherein it is erroneous, and substitute a better in its stead.381 
 
This approach, whereby Boyle eliminated certain questions from the natural philosophical 
inquiry in order to promote agreement among different factions can be viewed as the irenic 
programme of the mechanical philosophy. It must be pointed out that Boyle’s version of the 
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mechanical philosophy was not the only conception in play in the seventeenth-century. One 
has to consider other different conceptions of the mechanical philosophy in the period. 
Descartes, Gassendi, and Hobbes, for example, were all in sharp contention with one another. 
All of them set themselves against Aristotelian orthodoxy about the natural world. All three 
were attempting to present a vision of what a new natural philosophy should look like, 
something that could replace the accepted world of prime matter and substantial form. But 
each also opposed the ‘new philosophies’ proposed by their competitors. Though they all 
agreed that Aristotelian natural philosophy was sterile, and that everything in nature should 
be explained in terms of size, shape, and motion, they pointedly disagreed about a variety of 
other issues. And they were also unwilling to set aside these disagreements. The three 
represented what they considered to be importantly different visions for the future of natural 
philosophy. In this way, there was nothing irenic about their programmes: Descartes, 
Gassendi, and Hobbes directed their insults as much against one another as they did against 
their common enemy, the philosophy of the scholastics. Thus, their intellectual programmes 
departed in a significant way from Boyle’s mechanical philosophy. Though they may have 
agreed with the explanatory project that Boyle proposed, they were quite at odds with his 
irenic project. 
 
The conflict between Descartes, Gassendi, and Hobbes is only the tip of the iceberg. 
There were plenty of others who vigorously opposed the Aristotelianism of the schools. And 
it is this intellectual context which can help us understand where Boyle’s irenic approach 
came from. Boyle’s mechanical philosophy, I think, should be viewed as a reaction to this 
context. The programme that he laid out in his Origin of Forms and Qualities and in other 
related texts can be read as a call for a new programme intended to diffuse the chaos of anti-
Aristotelian views fighting it out with one another. In identifying certain doctrines as the 
central issues, and in setting aide all others which intellectuals had differed, Boyle created 
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something new in early 1660. Boyle’s position was essentially irenic: he strove to convince 
adherence of opposing positions that their agreements were more important than their 
disagreements. This was a central part of Boyle’s project to undermine disagreement by 
focusing on fundamentals, indeed, to eliminate those points of disagreement from even being 
a part of natural philosophical activity. In sum, Boyle’s irenic approach, to paraphrase John 
Henry, was not merely to arrive at an interim position until something better came along, it 
was the only sure way to approach the truths of nature.382 
This irenic approach in natural philosophy was also echoed in Thomas Sprat’s History 
of the Royal Society. In Book II, Sprat described the Royal Society’s “way of inquiry” in 
terms of its free, flexible and tentative approach383 – great care was taken that the mind 
remained free from any imposition so that it would be alert to circumstances and able to 
follow the direction of the observed things themselves, even if they indicated a different 
course to the one already engaged in: 
They are careful…to keep themselves free, and change their course, according to the different 
circumstances, that occurr to them in their operations; and the several alterations of the Bodies, on 
which they work. The true Experimenting has this one thing inseparable from it, never to be 
a fix'd and settled Art, and never to be limited by constant Rules.384 
 
Boyle’s irenicism was also demonstrated by his approach to the ministrations of Valentine 
Greatrakes and his subsequent correspondence with Henry Stubbe over the issue. Stubbe 
formulated his theory after witnessing Greatrakes performing cures at the Conway estate and 
had immediately published his praise of Greatrakes’s effort in a pamphlet, The Miraculous 
Conformist, written in the form of an open letter to Robert Boyle. In the pamphlet, Stubbe put 
forward his firm belief in Greatrake’s curative powers, which he described as miraculous in 
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origin but natural in implementation: God had bestowed upon Greatrakes a sanative 
temperament which Greatrakes could utilise when performing his cures. This particular 
mixture of supernatural and natural explanation worked to upset the religious sensibilities of 
a substantial group of his contemporaries and provoked a variety of responses, not least from 
Boyle. The primary concern, of course, was Stubbe’s physical explanations of Greatrakes’s 
so-called powers. Boyle was particularly aggrieved about the introductory section of Stubbe’s 
pamphlet, which described the origins of Greatrakes’s gift as miraculous and compared his 
healing powers to those of Christ and the apostles. 
 
Boyle replied to Stubbe in a lengthy letter - while most of which outlined the heretical 
implications of Stubbe’s depiction of Greatrakes as a miracle worker, Boyle also detailed his 
specific reservations regarding Stubbe’s physical explanation of Greatrakes. He was critical 
of attempts to explain natural phenomena in terms of insufficiently proven theories and 
evidence. Boyle’s approach to Greatrakes was that of an impartial observer, whose mind was 
free of all perturbation and flawed judgement, devoted to making numerous observations in 
order to discover an explanation for the miraculous performances. As Michael Hunter has 
pointed out, Boyle had “adopted the persona of experimentalist in defence of Christian 
orthodoxy.”385 He was, therefore, unable to accept Stubbe’s argument that Greatrakes’s 
performances were miracles, though he conceded that he had never “met with…any cogent 
proof, that miracles were to cease with the age of the Apostles.” Boyle disavowed Stubbe’s 
“meddling with theological matters” and “irreverent mention” of Scriptural writers: 
 
I must confess to you, that I was somewhat surprised to find this epistle of yours brought [to] me from 
the press, before I had seen it any other way: and it is no small trouble to me, both upon your score and 
my own, that I did not see the manuscript before it came abroad. For if I had seasonably seen what you 
wrote about miracles, I should freely have dissuaded you from publickly addressing to me, what I 
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cannot but differ from you; and perhaps I should have been able to prevail with you to omit all that part 
of your epistle. For besides that since you take notice yourself of the prejudice your former meddling 
with theological matters has done you, you can scarcely doubt, but that it has made many persons 
indisposed to put the best construction upon what you write; besides this, I say, I think you might have 
spared so much pains as you take in the former part of your letter, to show that Mr Greatrak’s gift may 
be miraculous, since the latter part of it is employed to make out what he performs is by natural 
means… 
 
But by what hitherto appears to me of Mr Greatrak’s cures, I must take leave to think, that either they 
are not real miracles; or, if they have anything in them of a supernatural gift, it is far short of the gifts 
of our saviour Christ and his apostles…And…reflecting on the passage you cite, that there are 
differences of administration, but the same Lord, think it more fit to look upon this gift of Mr Greatraks 
as a distinct and inferior kind, than degrade the unquestionable miraculous gifts of the apostles, to 
depress them to the same level with his. 
 
In looking at Boyle’s reaction to the Greatrakes affair and his reply to Stubbe, his irenicism 
is unmistakeable. Michael Hunter has characterised Boyle’s attitude to the Irish Healer and 
his miracle cures as “non-committal,” and thus indicative of the Christian virtuoso’s 
reluctance to commit to a particular position that threatened to spill over into religious and 
political disputes.386 According to Hunter, Boyle refused to subscribe, in public at least, to 
the notion the Greatrakes’s cures were true miracles, though he was unwilling to rule out the 
possibility that they might proceed from the immediate hand of God. Whilst miracle cures by 
men such as Greatrakes were by no means unproblematic, either in a religious or political 
sense, it must be noted that Charles II had introduced again the treatment of patients of 
scrofula with the royal touch. Yet Boyle’s cautious approach to Greatrakes as well as his 
ambivalent stance on miracles was entirely in keeping with his irenic programme. 
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In his reply to Stubbe, it is clear that Boyle was anxious to show that he considered 
Greatrakes’s cures to be understood in physico-mechanical terms, that they were not 
miraculous phenomena. Stubbe had based his entire explanation of Greatrakes’s curative 
abilities “upon the Doctrine of Fermentation,” maintaining that Greatrakes’s body was 
composed of several particular ferments, the effluvia of which were transferred into the body 
of his patient by the physical contact of his touching or rubbing. These ferments then, 
according to Stubbe, acted upon the blood and spirits, invigorating and strengthening them, 
which enabled the body to dissipate the morbific matter by means of its own natural healing 
capacity.387  
 
Whilst Stubbe’s argument in terms of fermentation was carefully constructed, Boyle 
was highly critical of attempts to explain natural phenomena in terms of insufficiently proven 
theories. His own natural explanations for Greatrakes’s abilities may not have been so 
different from Stubbe’s – Boyle too stated that it was possible for “the sanative, and perhaps 
Anodine streames of his Body to be of such a Texture that they may both reinvigorate the 
Spirits & by appropriated Qualities, subdue the moribifick Matter or Ferment” thereby 
producing “a great, & therefore probably sometimes a lucky, commotion in the Blood & 
Spirits” which lead to a cure.388 Boyle also insisted upon the ongoing possibility of 
supernatural events, the existence of spiritual beings and witches, but he was circumspect in 
claiming that supernatural events of such a kind occurred in Greatrakes’s case. The key point, 
however, here is that Boyle made sure he was more careful and irenic than Stubbe in refusing 
to claim that his account of Greatrake’s touch was definitive or exhaustive, describing himself 
characteristically as “one that is almost as backward to acquiesce in the explications of strange 
things as to believe the Narratives,” and at the close of his reply he was careful to explain 
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how he was “very shye of admitting any thing as a Principle in matters purely Phisicall that I 
cannot well undertand and do not find proved.”389 Boyle offered only possible explanations 
for Greatrakes’s miraculous touch. In doing so, he demonstrated to Stubbe the proper manner 
in which experimental inquiry ought to be conducted: he presented his views courteously, in 
private correspondence, with careful attention to their circumstantial nature and the 
paramount importance of maintaining civility and piety. 
 
So how did notions of habit and habitual dispositions operate within Boyle’s irenic 
programme of natural philosophy? In the Christian Virtuoso (1690), Boyle presented the 
experimental philosophy as a practice that required one to rectify the mind of errors, fallacies, 
and passions as well as a practice that could contribute to such a rectification. In other words, 
it could make up for man’s inherent weaknesses and permit the discovery of truth. Boyle 
emphasised the importance of an “Attentive and Penetrating Mind,” one that was “well-
dispos’d,” as well as “docile, and inclinded to make pious applications of the Truths he 
discovers.”390  
 
Furthermore, such a state of mind could only be achieved by cleansing and regulating 
one’s “Inferior Passions and Appetites,” “Prejudices,” “Vices,” “Sensuality” and “ Lusts” 
from one’s mind.391 As Sorana Corneanu has demonstrated, the regulation of assent implied 
by the experimental method could endow the natural philosopher with virtues that were both 
moral and intellectual.392 Thus, through the application of the experimental method, the 
practitioner stood to gain moral-epistemological virtues such as “Probity and Ingenuity,” 
“Curiosity and Attention,” “diligent and skilful Scrutiny,” “sincere love of Truth,” “Serious 
and Setled application of Mind,” “docility” and “Modesty.”393 
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For Boyle, such qualities of mind were not only required for the experimental study 
of the natural world, but were also the potential benefits of it – and it was in reference to the 
latter that Boyle used to support the notion that the experimental philosophy “Dispos[ed] the 
Minds of its Cultivators” to “afford the Christian Religion.”394 The new philosophy, therefore, 
not only revealed the truths of God’s creation, but also promoted piety and particular virtues 
in its practitioners. One of the chief objectives of The Christian Virtuoso (1690) was to 
establish this in some detail: “that both the Temper of Mind, that makes a Man most proper 
to be a Virtuoso, and the Way of Philosophising, he chiefly employ's, conduce much to give 
him a sufficient, and yet well grounded and duly limited, Docility; which is a great 
Disposition to the Entertainment of Reveal'd Religion.”395 What’s more, Boyle was 
convinced that the experimental study of nature was capable of confirming belief in the divine 
creator. In describing the religious sentiments that the experimental philosophy could instil 
into the experimental, Boyle told his readers that: 
…since Man is the noblest of God's visible Works; since very many of them seem made for his 
Use; since, even as an Animal, he is (as the Psalmist truly speaks) wonderfully made, and curiously, or 
artificially wrought; and since God has both given him a Rational Mind, and endow'd it with an 
Intellect, whereby he can Contemplate the Works of Nature, and by them acquire a Conviction of the 
Existence, and divers Attributes, of their supremely perfect Author; since God hath planted Notions 
and Principles in the Mind of Man, fit to make him sensible, that he ought to Adore God, as the most 
Perfect of Beings, the Supreme Lord and Governor of the World, the Author of his own Nature, and 
all his Enjoyments: Since all this, I say, is so, Natural Reason dictates to him, that he ought to express 
the Sentiments he has for this Divine Being, by Veneration of his Excellencies; by Gratitude for his 
Benefits; by Humiliation, in view of his Greatness, and Majesty; by an Awe of his Justice; by Reliance 
on his Power, and Goodness, when he duly endeavours to serve and please him; and, in short, by those 
several Acts of Natural Religion, that Reason shews to be Suitable, and therefore Due to those several 
Divine Attributes of his, which it has led us to the knowledge of. 
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It is interesting to note that Boyle refers to the religious virtues that were to be gained from 
the experimental philosophy as ‘sentiments,’ thus stressing their difference with other virtues. 
Thomas Dixon, for example, has suggested that the notion of ‘sentiments’ was employed to 
define those kind of virtues which exhibited a stronger cognitive constitution and were much 
more congenial with virtue than other categories, particularly within the realms of theological 
discourse.396 Furthermore, the ideal Boylean natural philosopher, the Christian virtuoso, had 
to first cultivate moral-intellectual virtues before gaining access to such religious 
‘sentiments.’ According to Boyle, only a virtuoso who was “qualify’d in his Morals” was 
“thereby dispos’d to make use of the knowledge of the Creatures to confirm his Belief, and 
encrease his Veneration of the Creator.”397 Moreover, one’s “Inferior Passions and Appetites” 
also had to be regulated and kept in check in order to acquire the sentiments of religion.398 
Consequently, “if a deep insight in Nature be acquir’d by a man of Probity and Ingenuity, or 
at least free from Prejudices and Vices that may dispose him to entertain and improve those 
Truths of Philosophy,” then, for Boyle, such knowledge “would naturally lead him to 
Sentiments of Religion.”399 In this reading, then, the experimental philosophy not only 
cultivated moral and intellectual virtues within its practitioners, it was also, as Peter Harrison 
has recently argued, a form of devotion unto the creator, assisting practitioners towards 
religious ‘sentiments’.400 
 
Upon closer observation, it is clear that Boyle’s ‘sentiments’ served an 
epistemological purpose. One example is the virtue of “Humility” – a sentiment drawn from 
the Aristotelian-Stoic tradition. For Boyle, it was characterised as “Humiliation, in view of 
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his Greatness, and Majesty.”401 The epistemological outcome of which instilled an awareness 
about the limits of his knowledge of God’s creation and thus worked to regulate his assent. 
Another similar sentiment was “Docility” which, according to Boyle, was a disposition of the 
mind which made “a man most proper to be a Virtuoso”.402 A ‘docile’ virtuoso was only 
concerned with the observational facts of the nature and would “easily discern, that he needs 
further information, and therefore ought to seek for it where ‘tis the most likely to be had; 
and not only admit, but Welcome it.”403  He also did “not require Credulity” and did not 
indulge in the “Litigious Philosophy” of the Scholastic Schools which encouraged little better 
than “Dialectical or Probable Arguments.”404 For Boyle, the ideal virtuoso possessed only a 
“sincere Love of Truth” and that 
a Virtuoso, that is wont in his Reasonings to attend to the Principles of Mathematicks, and sound 
Philosophy, and to the clear Testimonies of Sense, or well verifi'd Experiments, acquires a Habit of 
discerning the Cogency of an Argument, or way of Probation; and easily discerns, That Dialectical 
Subtilties, and School Tricks, cannot shift off its force, but finds more Satisfaction in Embracing a 
Demonstrated Truth, than in the vain Glory of Disputing subtilly against it.405 
 
Such a habit was an essential quality of mind which was required for the experimental life 
and was, in effect, a governing principle. It dictated the mental operations of the virtuoso’s 
mind, affording him: 
an Accustomance of endeavouring to give Clear Explications of the Phaenomena of Nature, and 
discover the weakness of those Solutions that Superficial Wits are wont to make and acquiesce in, does 
insensibly work in him a great and ingenuous Modesty of Mind.406 
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This ‘modesty of mind,’ according to Boyle, was an intellectual as well as a moral virtue and 
linked to the proper cultivation of assent; of avoiding the danger of hasty assents and only 
assenting to what could clearly be demonstrated by way of experimentation. Joseph Glanvill 
echoed a similar sentiment in his essay ‘The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion’ when 
he observed that:  
 
An intimate Commerce with God's Works, gives us to see the mighty Difficulties that are to be met in 
the speculation of them; and thereby Men are made less confident of their Sentiments 
about Nature, and by many Considerations and Observations of this kind, are at length brought to such 
an habitual Modesty, that they are afraid to pass bold Judgments.407 
 
Glanvill’s reference to an ‘habitual modesty’ as well as Boyle’s notion of a ‘habit of 
discernment’ reflects the important connection between the discipline of judgement and 
virtues of the mind and knowledge making in the Royal Society’s experimental enterprise. 
For Boyle, the ideal experimental philosopher had to assent only to things that had been 
clearly and distinctly perceived. In Things Above Reason (1681), for example, Boyle wrote 
that “a sincere understanding is to give, or refuse its assent to propositions according as they 
are or are not true, not according as we could or could not wish they were so.”408 Boyle 
labelled this virtue as ‘impartiality.’ The Boylean experimenter, therefore, had to develop a 
habitual frame of mind for assessing the evidence and managing their assent to that evidence: 
 
An assiduous Conversation with the exquisitely Fram'd, and admirably Manag'd, Works of God, brings 
a Skilful Considerer of them to discover from time to time, so many things to be Feazable, or to be 
True, which, whilst he argu'd but upon grounds of incompetently Inform'd Reason, he judg'd False or 
Unpracticable; that little by little he acquires a Habit of receiving some sorts of Opinions, and 
especially those that seem unfriendly to Religion, but as Probationers, with a disposition to Reform or 
Discard them upon further Information. And This, as he is resolv'd to Submit to, in case he meets with 
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it, so he is dispos'd to Receive, if not to Expect it, by having often found himself oblig'd, upon 
subsequent Information, to mend or lay aside his former Opinions, tho' very agreeable to the best Light 
he had to judge by, when he entertain'd them. As, tho' it seems a visible Truth, that 
the Discus of Venus is, in all respects to the Sun, totally Luminous; yet when the Telescope discovers 
her to have her Full and her Wane, like the Moon, he will believe this further Observation, against the 
first made with his Naked Eyes. And indeed, I have sometimes doubted, whether to be vers'd in 
Mathematicks, and other Demonstrative parts of Philosophy, bring a greater advantage to the Mind, by 
Accustoming and Assisting it to Examine Strictly Things propos'd for Truths, and to Evince Strongly 
the Truths a Man knows, to Others; than by Fitting him to Discern the force of a good Argument, and 
Submit willingly to Truths clearly evinc'd, how little soever he may have expected to find such 
Conclusions true.409 
 
Boyle’s experimenter had to form only tentative conclusions and to always remain open to 
new evidence, always ready and willing to discard their own opinions and inclinations on the 
basis of new “proofs.”410 They had to cultivate a habitual disposition of adopting the position 
best supported by empirical observation and evidence. The above cited passage also reveals 
Boyle’s position on the training of the human mind and the best method for such training. 
Boyle compares the virtues of experimental philosophy not only with the scholastic approach 
but also with mathematics and “other Demonstrative parts of Philosophy.” While 
demonstrations, according to Boyle, could bring the advantage of strict examination, they 
only dealt with “the Truths a Man knows.” 
Rose-Marie Sargent has argued that Boyle’s experimental programme was based on 
a theological view of creation and on a related ontology of the “cosmic mechanism.” Nature, 
for Boyle, was a divinely complex and theological text, and as a hermeneutic operation, his 
corpuscular philosophy aimed to discover the hidden mechanisms beyond “the determination 
of regularities.” However, the complex interrelations that hold among the qualities of bodies 
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are not absolute self-evident principles, that the mind could grasp immediately by the light of 
reason, but are only known in relation to each other, as parts of the system, and therefore 
subject to “conditional propositions.” As a result, the investigation into nature could only deal 
in probabilities, or moral certainties, and therefore required a “diligent and devout reader,” 
rather than a superficial one, who could remain flexible and moderate in order to grasp the 
“concurrences of probabilities.”411 While God’s wisdom and knowledge in the creation could 
have been apparent to even “a superficial philosopher,” Boyle claimed that “how wise an 
agent he has in these works expressed himself to be, none but an experimental philosopher 
can well discern.” A key theme of his Some consideration touching the Usefulnesse of 
Experimental Natural Philosophy was that only an experimental philosopher had the capacity 
and regiment to discover “the more unobvious properties of things.”412 Thus, the attentive 
and pious inquiry into nature was an open-ended process of understanding as well as a 
procedure to transform the investigator’s own moral persona: “an experimental approach to 
nature can help eradicate…prejudices because it is the way by which one’s vision of the world 
can be expanded.”413 
The superiority of the new experimental philosophy, therefore, lay in its ability to 
cultivate the mental capacities of the experimenter, furnishing their mind with good habits of 
experimentation -  “Fitting him to Discern the force of a good Argument, and Submit 
willingly to Truths clearly evinc’d, how little soever he may have expected to find such 
conclusions true.”414 There are several points that can be extracted from Boyle’s statement; 
first, that the method of the experimental philosophy led to true discoveries and facts of 
nature; second, that once the practitioner had accustomed themselves to such a methodology, 
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then they would have the ability to see unexpected truths; third, that its practitioners would 
also develop a deep appreciation that their knowledge was only very small since “he has been 
accustom’d to be sensible of his Ignorance, or desire further Instruction…[and] will examine 
more strictly, than Ordinary Men are Wont or Able to do, the Proofs brought for this or that 
propos'd Revelation.”415  
For Boyle, the new experimental philosophy was a genuine religious activity: it 
“accustoms him to value and delight in abstracted truths” thus making him “more disposed 
to value divine truths.” Therefore, both “the temper of mind” and “the way of philosophising” 
that the experimental philosophy demanded and instilled within its practitioners, nurtured a 
greater understanding of the divine nature.416 Hence, an experimental approach to the study 
of nature which cultivated the mind had the capability to confirm the virtuoso’s belief in the 
divine creator: 
…from divers other matters of fact, which he heedfully observes, though he had no share in the 
effecting them; and on which he is dispos'd to make such Reflections, as may (unforcedly) be apply'd 
to confirm and encrease in him the Sentiments of Natural Religion, and facilitate his Submission and 
Adherence to the Christian Religion.417 
Moreover, for Boyle, the actual process of exercising feelings of admiration and awe towards 
the Creator and his creation assisted the virtuoso in arriving at a variety of conclusions 
regarding the natural world. The acknowledgement, for example, that the world was “a 
Machine so Immense, so Beautiful, so well contriv'd, and, in a word, so Admirable” led the 
virtuoso to the belief that it was not a product of “mere Chance” or the “Tumultuous Justlings 
and Fortuitous Concourse of Atoms” but that it must have been “produc'd by a Cause, 
exceedingly Powerful, Wise, and Beneficent” who “hath not Abandon'd a Masterpiece so 
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worthy of him, but does still Maintain and Preserve it.”418 It was only after realising how 
“Admirable” the world is that the virtuoso is able to comprehend “the Truth of this 
Assertion, That God governs the World he has made.”419 The study of nature, then, not only 
provided evidence of God’s existence, it was also in some sense a religious activity. Matthew 
Hale, whose emphasis upon habit in matters of religion was noted in the previous chapter, 
echoed a similar view to Boyle, writing in his Contemplations Moral and Divine how 
…the knowledge of divers parts in Natural Philosophy, and the rules, motions, and variety of Qualities 
and Operations of divers Natural Objects, the connexion of Causes and Effects, the observation of the 
Order of things in Nature, are of singular use to carry the Mind up to the acknowledging and admiration 
of the Great Efficient and Governour of the World, of His Wisdom, Power, Goodness, Bounty, and 
consequently to raise up the Heart to veneration of Him, dutifulness and gratitude unto Him, 
dependance upon Him, and a deep impression of Natural Religion towards Him, and of all those 
consequents that arise in the Mind and Life from this habit of Religion. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, Boyle believed not only that the new experimental 
philosophy provided evidence for the existence and wisdom of God, but also that it cultivated 
piety and particular virtues within its practitioners. The concept of ‘habit’ formed an 
important part of this cultivation. Virtuous habitual dispositions such as ‘docility,’ ‘modesty’ 
and ‘caution’ were crucial in order to secure proper epistemic practice because they ensured 
the regulation of the mind, preventing it from assenting to its own prejudices, and allowing 
the experimental practitioner to attain the truths of God’s creation. Boyle’s irenic programme 
of natural philosophy was informed, in part, by a process which habituated the human mind 
toward the experimental life: disciplining the practitioner to concentrate solely upon the 
‘things themselves,’ to be ever open-minded and form only tentative conclusions. Such 
virtuous habitual dispositions were an important requirement for the experimental life since 
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they shaped the practitioner’s moral behaviour which, in turn, regulated their cognitive and 
intellectual endeavours, and permitting them to “make a great progress in Real 
Philosophy.”420 
In his Occasional Reflections, written around 1647-48 and appearing in print in 1665, 
Boyle also emphasised the importance of habit and acquiring habitual dispositions. The work 
itself developed a natural theology which constituted an early attempt at the ‘physico-
theological’ arguments that Boyle would later formulate. It set out a scheme for the moral 
contemplation of objects and experiences, based on the assumption that an ordinary man 
could search for divine mysteries by looking into the Book of Nature, grounded on a 
voluntarist theology which saw God as directly involved in all of the universe’s activity. In 
short, the Occasional Reflections functioned as a systematic manual of instruction in how to 
refashion one’s inner life by cultivating an experimentalist orientation toward everyday 
experience and presented another strategy for the disciplined management of one’s conscious 
life. Furthermore, Boyle’s emphasis on the spontaneity of each meditation was similar to the 
immediacy of experience that Boyle presented in his natural philosophical writings: a 
rhetorical device he used in order to establish his experimental accounts as authoritative 
testimony.421 
 
By meditation, Boyle meant a carefully directed train of thought. In ‘The Doctrine of 
Thinking’, for example, he explained how he “set my Thoughts a work upon in those shreds 
of Time […] to recall to mind any thing I have almost forgotten, or repeate any thing I desire 
to retaine more firmly in my Memory.”422 Boyle’s emphasis on active review was also 
apparent in his ‘Dayly Reflection’, addressed to ‘my Lady Ranalaugh’, his sister. Here, Boyle 
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advised that we should “recall orderly to mind, whatever  new observables in any kind 
Knowledge, either your Study or Conversation has afforded or your owne Thoughts 
suggested yow, the foregoing Day.”423 This kind of regular, contemplative, and careful 
reflection, according to Boyle, helped to guard against “Intervening Fancys” and the 
proclivity of the mind to wander.424 Not only did Boyle describe and justify this mental 
regimen in Occasional Reflections, he also wrote about it in terms of a habit, a regimen that 
had to be learned, developed and practised by the individual. 
Boyle informed his readers that such a meditative habit was not easy to attain, that 
one could only “purchase this habitude at the rate of a little difficulty.” However, despite such 
difficulty Boyle was convinced that the habit of occasional meditation was conducive to “the 
exercise and improvement of the divers of the faculties of the mind.”425 According to Boyle: 
the habit, produced by the practice of Occasional meditating, should accustom a man to heed only such 
Objects as are like to suggest to him devout thoughts; yet, not to mention now that I shall advertise you 
anon, that there is no necessity of confineing occasional meditations, to matters Devout, or Theological, 
I shall only represent, that, since we know not, before we have considered the particular Objects that 
occurr to us, which of them will, and which of them will not, afford us the subject of an Occasional 
Reflection, the mind will, after a while, be ingag'd to a general and habitual attention, relating to the 
Objects that present themselves to it. Besides, that though we should at first apply our heedfulness to 
circumstances of only some few sorts of Objects, yet the habit, being once acquir'd, would easily reach 
to others than those that first occasion'd it; as men, that by Learning to sing Anthems, are come to have 
critical ears, will be able to judge, much better than they could before, of the resemblances and 
differences of Tones in other Songs, and will take Notice of divers particularities in Voices, which 
would not be heeded by an unpractised Ear: And as we have made it appear, that the way of thinking 
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we would recommend, does very much dispose men to an attentive frame of mind; so, that such a frame 
or disposition is a great advantage in the whole course of a man's life.426 
 
Boyle’s strategy of “Persuading and Teaching men to Improve their Thoughts” was, in a way, 
a self-conscious attempt on his part to extend his interventions into nature to the improvement 
of other people: those who were engaged in meditation, in improving their mental capacities 
would learn how to “Husband their Time” rather than simply trying to “get ridd” of it. As in 
experimentalist practice, the demands of the work would habituate practitioners to the 
acquisition of skills necessary for success.427  
 
Robert Hooke 
In a lecture given at Gresham College in 1679 Robert Hooke also alluded to the significance 
of habit and habitual dispositions for the study of nature. According to Hooke: “without an 
acquired habitude and handiness by long practice and experience, nothing could be done to 
any certainty.” Furthermore, Hooke, like Boyle, was adamant that the new experimental 
method could rectify the operations of the mind, understood as a distinctive kind of mental 
discipline. Hooke stressed the importance of “methodical proceedings in the making of 
experiments” and placed his natural philosophical programme within the larger context of the 
Fall and mankind’s salvation, claiming boldly that new experimental philosophy would 
inevitably result in the “rectifying the operations of Sense, the Memory and Reason,” thus 
restoring the mind to its prelapsarian state.428 While he insisted upon the advantage of using 
instruments like the microscope and the telescope to assist the senses since “everything is 
reduced to Regularity, Certainty, Number, Weight and Measure,” he also, in the same vein as 
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Boyle, was adamant that the very methodology of the experimental philosophy provided a 
therapeutic value.429 
Hooke developed a kind of philosophical algebra for rectifying the judgement of the 
experimental practitioner which he described as a “Method or Engine” which was to guide 
the practitioner’s observations and inquiries: 
Some other Course therefore must be taken to promote the Search of Knowledge. Some other kind of 
Art for Inquiry than what hath been hitherto made use of, must be discovered; the intellect is not to be 
suffered to act without its Helps, but is continually to be assisted by some Method or Engine, which 
shall be as a Guide to regulate its actions, so as that it shall not be able to act amiss; Of this Engine, no 
Man except the incomparable Verluam, hath had any thoughts, and indeed hath promoted it to a very 
good pitch; but there is yet somewhat more to be added, which he seemed to want time to compleat. 
By this, as by that Art of Algebra in Geometry, ‘twill be very easy to proceed in any Natural Inquiry, 
regularly and certainly: and indeed it may not improperly be called a Philosophical Algebra, or an Art 
of directing the Mind in the search after Philosophical Truths, for as ‘tis very hard for the most acute 
Wit to find out any difficult Problem in Geomerty, without the help of Algebra to the quaesitum, and 
altogether as easy for the meanest Capacity acting by that Method to compleat and perfect it, so will 
be in the Inquiry after Natural Knowledge.430 
According to Hooke, there were two different sorts of philosophic algebra: the first involved 
a “preparation of the mind” which was basically a moral investigation of the self: “An 
examination of the constitution and powers of the soul, or an attempt of disclosing the soul 
to itself, being an endeavour of discovering the perfections and imperfections of humane 
nature, and finding out ways and means for  the attaining of the one, and of helping the 
other.”431 The second, which Hooke never fully developed, involved rules of reasoning. Both 
were designed to work on what Hooke called “philosophical natural history” which 
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functioned, in part, as a cultivation of the human mind.432 Lotte Mulligan in a number of 
articles, for example, has shown how Hooke conceived of the compilation of natural histories 
as both the groundwork of philosophy and the best remedy for the faculty of the memory.433 
In his General Scheme, Hooke stressed the importance of recording all aspects of the 
experimental methodology in the proper order, paying close attention to questions of selection 
and relevance. He did so since, for Hooke, the natural historian was not a collector, but an 
experimenter, thus the act of recording involved complex procedures of ratiocination. Natural 
History, therefore, was both an instrument for the production of natural knowledge and 
assumed an important therapeutic capacity. In Hooke’s reading, then, one had to begin with 
the human mind: “the Intellect should first like a skilful Architect, understand what it designs 
to do.”434 
The point here is that Hooke’s method for improving natural philosophy referred to 
the actual process of experimentalism: a set of instructions and direction for the mental 
conduct of the experimental practitioner in order to produce right observation, examination 
and judgement. Such a remedy was necessary since, according to Hooke, “every Man’s own 
peculiar Structure Every Man has born with him, or contracted by some way or other, a 
Constitution of Body and Mind, that does or less dispose him to…[a] kind of Imagination or 
Phant’sy of things…”435 The experimental practitioner, therefore, was required to clear the 
mind before setting upon an exploration of nature, purging the intellect and tempering the 
passions - as Francis Bacon had proposed in his Novum Organum that “before we can get the 
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more distant and hidden aspects of nature, we are necessarily obliged to bring in means of 
bettering and perfecting the exercise and practice of the human mind and intellect.”436 
Hooke advocated the importance of an experimental flexibility which required  
“finding out of what constitution one self is, and to what is either naturally or accidentally 
most inclin’d to believe, and accordingly by reasoning and comparing things together to 
consider what the things themselves hint, and what Imitation proceeds from ones own 
Constitution.”437 Such an habitual virtue guarded against the dangers of intransigency and 
narrow-mindedness and allowed the practitioner to develop a habit “not to receive any Notion 
for certain till thoroughly confirm’d by very Cogent Arguments and Ratiocinatons, and 
always suspect that which seems most consonant and pleasing to our Inclination.”438 
Furthermore, he also recommended “an Hypotheical Scepticism” which was designed to 
regulate one’s assent and judgement which involved imposing upon: 
our selves a Disbelief of every thing whatsoever, that we have already imbraced or taken in as a Truth: 
And in so doing, to throw out not only those things we may a little doubt of, but even all those things 
of which we are most confident, and those especially which our particular Constitutions seem most of 
all to incline us to believe, rejecting them all as Impostures and Fallacies, that have by some indirect 
means or other crept into our Understandings…”439 
The ideal experimental natural philosopher or the archetypal “natural historian,” for Hooke, 
had to proceed “with the greatest Degree of Candor and Freedom from Prejudice, not to be 
byassed by this or that Opinion in making of Deduction, nor by the Pleasantness or 
Gainfulness of the Experiment, or any other Consideration that does not immediately look at 
the present Discovery he is searching after.”440 Cultivating such a strict experimental 
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disposition and  persona, however, was no easy task. John Wilkins, for example, emphasised 
the difficulty of attainting such an indifferent attitude: “Tis very difficult for any one, in the 
search of Truth, to find in himselfe such an indifferencie, as that his judgement is not all 
swayd by an overweening affection unto that which is proper unto himselfe.”441 Hooke was 
well aware of this difficult and rigorous methodology but also mindful of its potential 
benefits, informing his readers that although “the Roots and Beginnings of Knowledge and 
Practice…[were] bitter and tedious,” the “Fruits are sweet and pleasant; and whoever attains 
the end, will never repent the time they spent in the beginning.”442 One advantage to the 
experimental philosophy was that it improved the practitioner’s cognitive capacities, 
furnishing their mind with good habitual dispositions: 
Now though this way of Demonstration and Reasoning may seem tedious and too long to detain the 
Mind and Attention in finding out the Properties of Quantities, yet ‘twas the way made use of by the 
Ancients. And ‘tis altogether necessary, especially in the beginning of this Study, to accustom the Mind 
to Attention and Circumspection, that it may receive nothing for Truth but what is sees clearly by the 
Reasons and Causes of it, that thereby the Mind may acquire a Habit of Intention, and of examining 
the whole Chain of Consequences from the first Principles to the Truth evidenced.443 
 
The experimental approach instilled the practitioner with crucial virtuous habits of the mind, 
training the mind in the discipline of examination, for example, regulating it to resist 
premature conclusions as definitive and to carry out thorough evaluations at every stage of 
the inquiry or experimentation. Furthermore, such a habit of examination, according to 
Hooke, was an essential requirement for the proper investigation of nature since 
Without [the habit] of Examination, we are to apt to run away with a thing, and think we know it and 
see it clearly before we are sure we do, and are impatient of Delay in examining and considering, 
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whereas if the Mind be a little at first accustomed to this leisurely and strict way of reasoning, after it 
has got a habit it will make as much Dispatch in receiving things with sufficient Examination, as 
another shall without it.444 
Moreover, Hooke distinguished between better trained minds whose senses “have been more 
cultivated than others, and brought to a much greater Perfection” than regular minds.445 
Hooke was also by no means alone with his emphasis upon the importance of a ‘habit of 
examination’ for the rightful inquiry into nature. We also find similar resonances in the works 
of Boyle. In his Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy (1664), for example, Boyle 
stressed the importance of “attention” in the context of the search for truth and that the 
acquisition of such truth could be carried out by an “Intelligent Spectator, who is able both to 
understand and to relish it” since “the Book of Nature is to an ordinary Gazer…like a rare 
Book of Hieroglyphicks to a Child.”446 Additionally, in the Christian Virtuoso Boyle also 
hinted at the existence of a hierarchy of examiners of nature which was based on their degree 
of attention as well as their mental discipline: 
For some Men, that have but superficial, thô conspicuous, Wits, are not fitted to penetrate such Truths, 
as require a lasting and attentive Speculation; and divers, that want not Abilities, are so taken up by 
their Secular Affairs, and their Sensual Pleasures, that they neither have Disposition, nor will have 
Leisure, to discover those Truths, that require both an Attentive and Penetrating Mind. And more than 
of either of these sorts of Men there are, whom their Prejudices do so forestal, or their Interest byas, or 
their Appetites blind, or their Passions discompose, too much, to allow them a clear Discernment, and 
right Judgment, of Divine Things.447  
Hooke too, like Boyle, stressed the importance of “Attention and Diligence in Making 
Observations and Experiments.”448 Joseph Glanvill also presented a similar approach when, 
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in his Vanity of Dogmatising (1661), he warned that the “treasures” of nature could not be 
discovered by the “careless inquirer.”449 For Glanvill, the virtue of the new experimental 
philosophy was to be found in its strict mental regimen – opinion was an easy and superficial 
gain while the acquisition of truth required real effort: 
Verisimilitude and Opinion are an easie purchase; and these counterfeits are all the Vulgars treasure: 
But true Knowledge is as dear in acquisition, as rare in possession. Truth, like a point or line, requires 
an acuteness and intention to its discovery; while verisimility, like the expanded superficies, is an 
obvious sensible on either hand, and affords a large and easie field for loose enquiry.450  
The emphasis on the development of a clear and acute mind that was fit for the investigation 
of nature reinforces Dana Jalobeanu’s notion of the “intelligent observer” - an individual 
trained in the discipline of experimentation with the capacity to make a range of sound 
judgements.451 Hooke, for example, described an individual who had fortified “himself 
against...Prejudices, which are too apt to obtrude his Mind and prepossess him against a clear 
View and Observation,”452 while Boyle compared the ‘intelligent observer’ to a skilled diver 
who could make his way to the very bottom of the sea and “fetch up Pearls, Corals, and other 
precious things, that in those Depths lye concealed from other men’s Sight and Reach.”453 
In sum, Hooke believed that mankind’s inability to carry out rightful investigation of 
nature stemmed from “a deriv’d corruption, innate, and born with him” since the fall from 
Eden.454 Mankind, therefore, was “not indued with an intuitive Faculty, to see farther into the 
Nature at first, than the Superficies and out-sides, and so must go a long way about before he 
can be able to behold the Internal Nature of things.”455 Hooke’s remedy for this, as we have 
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seen, was in the same vein as Boyle’s - an experimental inquiry that was largely habitual, 
intended to furnish the experimenter’s mind with habitual dispositions and methods that 
would make them capable of making sense of the natural world. 
Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society  
In the third part of his History of the Royal Society of London (1667), Thomas Sprat described 
the benefits that were to be gained by the experimental philosopher when they followed the 
strict and arduous methodology of the new philosophy:  
The satisfaction that he finds, is not imaginary, but real: It is drawn from things that are not out of the 
world, but in it: It does not carry him farther off, but brings him neerer to Practice. 'Tis true, 
that Knowledge which is only founded on thoughts and words, has seldom any other end, but 
the breeding and increasing of more thoughts and words: But that which is built on Works (as his will 
be) will naturally desire to discover, to augment, to apply, to communicate it self by more Works. Nor 
can it be thought, that his mind will be made to languish by this pleasure of observation, and to have 
any aversion from the difficulty and tediousness of human affairs; seeing his way of observation itself 
is so laborious. It is a good Precept, which is wont to be given, in respect of all sorts of Exercises, that 
they should be at least as hard and toilsom, as that Art which we strive to gain by them. And by this 
rule Experiments are an excellent preparation towards any habit or faculty of life whatsoever. For what 
thing, which can be effected by mortal Industry, can seem impossible to him who has been ingag'd in 
these Studies, which require such an indefatigable watchfulness? What can overcome his diligence, 
who has bin able to sustain with patience the escapes;/the delaies, the labyrinths of Nature? whom the 
repetition of so many labors, so many failings, with which he meets, and so long attendance could not 
tire?456 
What kind of ‘habits’ is Sprat referring to here? Sprat’s account of the “Character of a True 
Philosopher,” for example, emulated that of Boyle’s habitual experimenter: an individual 
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“well practis’d in all the modest, humble, [and] friendly Vertues.”457  Furthermore, much like 
we have seen in the works of Boyle and Hooke, Sprat’s History treated the experimental 
investigation of nature as form of training and exercise of the mind. The third part of the 
History, for example, had a section dedicated to showing how the experimental approach was 
“usefull for the cure of mens minds.”458 The experimental approach increased the 
practitioner’s awareness of their own limits, making him “modest in his judgement.”459 It also 
shaped the practitioner’s moral virtues as well as guarded against the innate idols of the mind: 
in Sprat’s own words - “the Real Philosophy will supply our thoughts with 
excellent Medicines, against their own Extravagances, and will serve in some sort, for the 
same ends, which the Moral professes to accomplish.460 
Sprat also elaborated on the strict mental regimen of the experimental philosophy, 
stressing the importance of a clear and cultivated mind, noting how it was essential that the 
experimental practitioner “judge aright of himself; he must misdoubt the best of his own 
thoughts; he must be sensible of his own ignorance, if ever he will attempt to purge and renew 
his Reason.”461 Such a strict and introspective regimen was necessary because the proper 
investigation of nature was not an easy process. The practitioner’s judgement, for example, 
was always in dangers of giving in to the fallacies of dogmatism and radical scepticism: “The 
first Danger,” Sprat explained, was “an over-hasty, and praecipitant concluding upon the 
Causes, before the Effects have been enough search’d into,” whilst “The second mischief” 
was an eternal instability, and aversion from assigning of any. This arises, from a violent, 
and imprudent hast to avoid the first.”462 The solution to such flawed experimental behaviour, 
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according to Sprat, was to pursue a delicate middle way between the two: “So easie is the 
passage from one extreme to another; and so hard it is, to stop in that little point, wherein the 
right does consist.”463 This epistemic via media fostered a mitigated sceptical approach which 
permitted “the advantage of probability to one Opinion, or Cause, above another” coupled 
with “a long forebearing of speculation…till the matters be ripe for it; and may not by madly 
rushing upon it in the very beginning.”464 Such a carefully regulated methodology produced 
better, less biased results, whilst also offering therapeutic effects of the experimenter. In 
Sprat’s view, then, the experimental philosophy was a kind of continuous discipline of the 
mind, instilling it with experimental habitual dispositions necessary for attaining truth. 
John Hartcliffe’s Revision of the Aristotelian Virtues  
This final section focuses on a text that reflects a set of issues to do with what I take to be the 
transformation, rather than demise of the traditional virtues of the intellect that have been 
examined throughout this chapter. The text in question is entitled A Treatise of Moral and 
Intellectual Virtues, published in 1691 by John Hartcliffe. Hartcliffe was a member of a group 
of Anglican ministers patronised by John Tillotson, all of whom were actively involved in 
the project of legitimising the Glorious Revolution. His Treatise was largely intended as a 
vindication of the moral righteousness made possible by the new regime.465 It also seems to 
have had some notoriety and was remembered in Thomas Birch’s Life of Dr. John Tillotson 
(1752) as “an excellent system of Ethics.”466 
The interesting thing about this Treatise was its treatment of the intellectual virtues. 
Hartcliffe’s list included the traditional Aristotelian group of five: ars, prudentia, intellectus, 
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scientia and sapientia. On the traditional conception, the first two – art and prudence – were 
the virtues of the practical and productive intellect, whereas the other three – intellect (or 
understanding), science and wisdom – were the virtues of the contemplative or speculative 
intellect.467 What Hartcliffe did was to take over the names of these virtues while completely 
changing their content. He did this by plundering Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society 
for the most relevant parts in his description of the virtues of the intellect. 
As far as art was concerned, he adopted the polemical dichotomy found in English 
experimental works between the value of practical pursuits involved in the production of 
useful things and set the uselessness of metaphysical speculations.468 He therefore placed the 
arts and manufactures in contrast with: 
the abstracted Ideas of Science, and the airey Notions of Metaphysicks; which are like the curious 
Argumetations, concerning quantity and motion in natural Philosophy; if they only hover aloof and are 
not squared to particular Matters, they may give an empty satisfaction, but no benefit, and rather serve 
to swell, than fill the Mind.469 
In order to make a further point, that art cured idleness, Hartcliffe then takes over a whole 
passage from Sprat’s History that elaborated on the way that experiments were “useful for 
the cure of mens minds.” According to Sprat, experimenting was an industrious art that kept 
the mind busy with wholesome impressions, which is a sure way of ridding it of the bad 
impressions of the passions, all of which were ultimately due to the vice of idleness: 
If we shall cast an eye on all the Tempests, which arise within our Breasts, and consider the causes, and 
remedies of all the violent desires, malicious envies, intemperate joyes, and irregular griefs, by which 
the lives of most men become miserable, or guilty: we shall find, that they are chiefly produc’d by 
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Idleness, and may be most naturally cur’d by diversion. Whatever Art shall be able to busy the minds 
of men, with a constant cours of innocent Works, or to fill them with as vigorous, and pleasant Images, 
as those ill impressions, by which they are deluded; it will certainly have a surer effect on the 
composing, and purifying of their thoughts, than all the rigid praecepts of the Stoical, of the empty 
distinctions of the Peripatetic Moralists.470 
Hartcliffe reproduced this passage quasi-verbatim (with the exception of ‘Business’ instead 
of ‘diversion’), as he does the immediately following paragraph: “Now then it is required in 
that Study, which shall attempt according to the force of Nature, to cure the Diseases of the 
Mind; that it keep it from idleness by full and earnest Employments, and that it possess it with 
innocent, various, lasting, and even sensible Delights.”471 
The notion that learning in general was an industrious activity able to cure sloth and 
to order, strengthen and refine all the capacities of the mind also features in Isaac Barrow’s 
Of Industry (1693), in the chapter “Of Industry in our Particular Calling, as Scholars”: the 
calling of a scholar, the most accomplished model of which is the biblical king Solomon, 
accords with “the general end of our being,” which is “the perfection of our nature in its 
endowments, and the fruition of it in its best operations.” It employed us in 
those angelical operations of the soul, the contemplation of truth, and attainment of wisedom; which 
are the worthiest exercises of our reason, and sweetest entertainments of our mind; the most pretious 
wealth, and most beautifull ornaments of our soul; whereby our faculties are improved, are polished 
and refined, are enlarged in their power and use by habitual accessions: the which are conducible to 
our own greatest profit and benefit, as serving to rectify our wills, to compose our affections, to guide 
our lives in the ways of virtue, to bring us unto felicity.472  
Here, too, as we have seen in Sprat and Hooke, and even Boyle, study was invested with the 
power of rectifying the mind’s faculties, including the will and affections, and thus of 
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bringing the whole mind to a state of well-being which also accounted for its intellectual 
accomplishments. 
In his discussion of prudence, Hartcliffe borrowed from Sprat a passage that followed 
the same line of contrasting the experimental life with that of the speculative philosophers, as 
well as with that of the empirics; this is the substance of Sprat’s famous comparison between 
“the prudent,” “the formal” and “the crafty”: 
Experimental Philosophy will prevent mens spending the strength of their thoughts about Disputes, by 
turning them to Works. […] And indeed of the usual titles by which men of business are wont to be 
distinguish’d, the Crafty, the Formal, and the Prudent; The Crafty may answer to the Empyric in 
Philosophy; that is, he is such a one who has a great collection of particular Experiences, but knows 
not how to use them but to base and low ends. The Formal may be compar’d to the meer Speculative 
Philosopher: For he vainly reduces every thing to rave and solemn general Rules, without discretion, 
or mature deliberation. And lastly, the Prudent man is like him who proceeds on a constant and solid 
cours of Experiments.473 
Again, Hartcliffe reproduced this passage quasi-verbatim, yet modified the first quoted 
sentence so that it spoke directly about the virtue of prudence: “Prudence will teach Men not 
to spend their thoughts about empty Contemplations, by turning them to the practices of a 
virtuous and an useful life.”474 In his further clarifications of the other virtues, Hartcliffe’s 
comments on science (scientia) is particularly noteworthy. For him, since science was a 
limited thing, and reason’s role was to fairly assess these limits and not to presume to go 
beyond them, then modesty as to the prospects of science had to be coupled with knowledge 
of ourselves, which was the “best Science” that one could hope for. Here, again, Hartcliffe 
felt that there was no one who could speak better about such matters than Sprat. In the relevant 
passage, Sprat extolled both self-knowledge and the “modest, humble, friendly Vertues,” as 
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well as one’s capacity to be taught and to submit oneself to the judgement of others, as the 
virtues of a “True Philosopher” – again, in contrast with the vicious “Temper of mind” of the 
dogmatists.475 And wisdom had to be pitted against the same arch-enemy (the “system and 
models” of speculative philosophers) and was defined as the virtue of being directed to the 
“true End of Eternal Blessedness.”476 
In sum, Hartcliffe formally retained the traditional Aristotelian names of the virtues 
of the intellect but redefined them in keeping with material about the moral value of 
experimental inquiry taken over mainly from Sprat. Hartcliffe’s unabashed borrowing, 
however, is not the point here. Rather, for the purposes of the arguments that have been put 
forward in this chapter, the interest here is that Hartcliffe felt that Sprat’s reflections on the 
moral value of experimental inquiry could be understood in terms of the virtues of the 
intellect. The main features of these virtues as Hartcliffe saw them were: first, they rested on 
a valorisation of the practical and productive over the speculative; as a consequence; second, 
they were subsumed under the virtue of prudence; and third, that they were correlated with a 
governed mind; one that reason could govern both itself and the affections. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how habit was a key part of several discourses of the new 
experimental philosophy that flourished in England during the second half of the seventeenth-
century. It has attempted to contribute to recent scholarship in the cultural and intellectual 
history of science by demonstrating how the epistemological approaches and endeavours of 
the early Royal Society were, in part, pre-occupied with notions of habit, habitual 
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dispositions, as well as cultivating good experimental habitual behaviour – notions that 
exhibited both an epistemic and a moral dimension.  
I have primarily drawn on recent work by Sorana Corneanu which has emphasised 
how the new emerging experimental philosophy was a vehicle for managing the passions, 
cleansing the faculties of error and of building moral, intellectual and religious virtue. What 
this chapter has shown, and what Corneanu’s work does not give adequate coverage to, is that 
‘habit’ and the process of ‘habituation’ were also crucial features of this mental rehabilitation 
and cultivation of virtue. Habits, properly cultivated, secured proper epistemic functioning 
and had therapeutic effects. They kept speculation in check and revealed the limitations of 
one’s explanations. They functioned as a ‘guardian’ for the mind, keeping it in a constant 
‘regulation,’ and only focused on the ‘things themselves.’ The experimental natural 
philosopher was required to possess them in order to carry out a proper investigation of nature 
and attain truth. 
I have also suggested that the professed anti-dogmatic methodology of the early Royal 
Society – which was rooted in a mitigated sceptical approach to knowledge claims, as well 
as a commitment to the matters of fact – was informed by an early modern tradition of thought 
which was rooted in a regimen approach to the human mind. That approach was constructed, 
in part, upon a process of habituation – instilling good habits of experimentation that would 
guide the virtuous inquirer of nature. In many ways, the arguments that have been presented 
here support Corneanu’s suggestion that the methodology of the Royal Society operated as a 
“method-as-internal-regimen” rather than a “method-as-formalized-procedure.” They learned 
and lived, rather than followed, the rules for conducting experimental enquiry that were 
rooted in a conception of the virtues of the mind. Experimental inquiry was thus an “education 
of the mind” whereby the natural philosopher’s investigation of nature was disciplined by 
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habitual dispositions: the habit of rightful examination and observation, the habit of 
regulating one’s assent, and the habit of right judgement.477  
It has also been shown, in the case of Robert Boyle, at least, that religion played a part 
in fashioning the persona of the experimental natural philosopher. A careful analysis of 
Boyle’s Christian Virtuoso reveals how the “Sentiments of Natural Religion” or ‘religious 
virtues’ that were thought to be attained from the study of nature actually assumed an 
important epistemological relevance. One such example was the ‘religious virtue’ of 
‘humility’ towards God which was analogous to the virtue of epistemic modesty since it made 
man acknowledge the limits of his knowledge of God’s creation and thus regulated his 
assent.478 In this reading, then, we can see how religion could provide the natural philosopher 
with appropriate epistemological behaviour. 
Above all else, it is clear that the new experimental philosophy was a complex and 
practical discipline. It must be understood not only as an epistemological category but also as 
a regimen of self-discipline. Such a regimen, as was noted in the beginning of this chapter, 
carried with it a paradoxical claim since is it not always clear from the literature whether it 
was the cultivation of the mind which made possible a reformed natural philosophy, or 
whether it was the practices of the experimental philosophy that constituted the cultivation of 
the mind. The answer perhaps lies somewhere between them. What is clear, however, is that 
the experimental philosophy was essentially a “devotional practice” which contributed to the 
moral and religious formation of the natural philosopher, placing them in a better position to 
not only attain the truths of nature, but also to receive Divine grace. Such an understanding 
was the standard position in the works of Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke and Thomas Sprat.479 
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More generally, we have also briefly seen how Sprat’s talk of the “modest, humble, 
friendly Virtues,” in other words the mental habits relevant to natural knowledge, made their 
way into Hartcliffe’s Treatise of Moral and Intellectual Virtues.480 Such an occurrence was 
not the fruit of Hartcliffe’s idiosyncrasies but rather the natural result of an early modern 
process of redefinition whereby the traditional intellectual virtues were replaced by a new, 
albeit less systematic and more diffusive, set of virtues of the mind relevant to the 
experimental pursuit of natural knowledge. 
In the broader sense of the major intellectual themes that this thesis has unpacked thus 
far, we can now see how the experimental philosophy, as a discipline and as a regimen, fitted 
into a broader intellectual culture that focused on acquired habitual dispositions as way to 
neutralise the potential threats of not only the Fallen mind, but also civil strife that could be 
brought upon by faulty reasoning, poor judgement as well as disagreement. In chapter 1, we 
observed how John Wilkins attempted to solve the problem of right reason and the process of 
reasoning correctly with acquired habitual dispositions that would allow the individual to 
make right judgements, reason properly, and behave in accordance to God’s natural laws. In 
a similar vein, chapter 2 showed how a group of moderate divines shared a comparable 
approach in matters of religion. They emphasised the importance of habitual dispositions that 
could strengthen the faith of the individual, enabling them to carry out their religious duties, 
apprehend religious truths, as well as understand the true end of faith. Likewise, this chapter 
has also demonstrated a similar theme, albeit in the context of the new experimental 
philosophy. We have seen that experimental natural philosophers such as Boyle and Hooke 
shared a parallel preoccupation with habit, and they drew upon the notion of acquired habitual 
dispositions in order to secure the experimental life. They were adamant that such habitual 
dispositions, once inculcated within the human mind, could moderate the epistemic behaviour 
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of the investigator. Habit thus formed a part of their rhetoric of modesty, communication of 
epistemological authority as well as securing assent. The next chapter will now show how 
John Locke essentially consolidated these several intellectual strands into a coherent 



















John Locke, Education, and Habitual 
Scepticism 
 
By 1706, with the publication of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, John Locke had 
challenged the traditional philosophical view of custom as a wellspring of unthinking habit 
and had founded a novel epistemology on the idea of making habit’s inherent educative power 
the object of social strategy, of disciplinary and moral cultures. This new approach of 
constructing and moulding subjects was, in effect, an attack on the conscience as too radical 
and too submissive and an effort to inculcate habitual dispositions that would replace the 
conscience and guide conduct.481 Locke viewed habit not only as a site for the strategic, rather 
than chance reproduction of human understanding but also as a possible opportunity for 
cultivating improvement on a national scale – especially in children.  
The purpose of this chapter is to present a re-reading of John Locke’s work on 
education and his idea of the individual in light of the genealogy of habit that has been 
sketched out in the preceding three chapters. Although John Locke’s educational curriculum 
has traditionally been viewed as aiming to create free citizens capable of independent thought, 
the centrality of habituation to his pedagogy has recently raised concerns that his educational 
curriculum was nothing more than indoctrination for compliant subjects. This chapter argues 
that by re-examining habituation in light of Locke’s epistemology as well as the genealogy 
of habit detailed in this thesis, we find that Locke’s education did aim at freedom, but that 
this freedom required a strong will and a cultivated habitual scepticism. It will be shown how 
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the habits that Locke asked parents to instil were aimed not at programming specific 
behaviour, beliefs or opinions, like the approach of John Wilkins in chapter 2, the moderate 
divines in chapter 2, or the experimental philosophers in chapter 3, but rather at training 
children to cross their desires to strengthen their wills against the impositions of nature, 
custom, and fashion, which Locke argued posed a far more serious threat to independent 
thought than parental discipline. In other words, Locke’s education aimed to cultivate a 
sceptical habitual disposition that permitted the individual to resist other sources of habit and 
to continually question and revise their own convictions. 
Recent Lockean scholarship has also indicated that a reassessment of liberalism is 
underway which owes much to a concerted recovery of Locke’s writings on education. This 
reading proposes that liberalism should no longer be seen to revolve exclusively around the 
atomistic, rights-bearing subject of a social-contract theory but also perceived to develop a 
nuanced account of a socially embedded subject, the product of early training in the family. 
However, the shift from what one scholar has called the “Teflon” subject of earlier 
understandings of liberalism to the “sticky” or socially embedded subject has largely served 
to reinforce earlier critiques of liberal autonomy as a fundamentally flawed ideal.482 Since the 
Lockean subject, several scholars have contended, developed as a consequence of 
unreflective habits instilled by parents and educators in early childhood, its freedom was 
highly circumscribed and mostly took the form of consent to established parental-communal 
models of virtue.483 Whilst Locke separated political and paternal power in his political 
writings, paternal power, in these readings, remained essential to his vision of the liberal 
                                                             
482 John Baltes, “Locke’s Inverted Qurantine: Discipline, Panopticism, and the Making of the Liberal Subject,” 
Review of Politics 75 (2013): p. 189, 191. 
483 In addition to Baltes, see Joseph Carrig, “Liberal Impediments to Liberal Education: The Assent to Locke,” 
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Liberal Thought,” Res Publica 7 (2001): pp. 39–55;Robert Sumser, “John Locke and the Unbearable Lightness 
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polity: it oversaw the creation of a subject allowed considerable latitude in the public sphere 
because their education, in the private sphere, ensured a predictable pattern of assent. This 
chapter proposes a modified interpretation of Locke’s educational writings – within which I 
include not only Some Thoughts concerning Education (1693), the focus of recent 
commentary, but also the posthumously published Of the Conduct of the Understanding 
(1706) – and their implication for discipline, habituation, and liberal autonomy.484  In short, 
the main point that I want to stress is that the question that must be posed of Locke’s 
educational writings is not why habits matter but which habits matter and whether these are 
as autonomy-friendly as Locke takes them to be. The arguments made in this chapter also 
supplement the recent powerful argument put forward by Timothy Stanton who, in what he 
has termed as “the fable of liberalism,” has examined the ways in which Locke was claimed 
by liberalism and refashioned in its image. Stanton’s main conclusion that Locke was not a 
liberal or that his liberalism is not the same as modern secular liberalism suggests a different 
way of thinking about Locke.485 This chapter endeavours to do the same. 
In the first part of this chapter, then, I summarise recent and past scholarship on 
Locke’s educational writings, paying particular attention to the Foucauldian-disciplinarian 
reading of Locke, as well as explaining how the arguments presented in this chapter align 
with this substantial body of work. In the next part I show that early habituation in the 
Education primarily consisted of the experience of crossing one’s desires which demonstrated 
                                                             
484 John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Ruth W. 
Grant and Nathan Tarcov (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1996). I will cite these separately as STCE and CU. Written 
in 1697, Of the Conduct of the Understanding was intended as an addition to (and the longest chapter of) a 
revised edition of the Essay concerning Human Understanding. On the relationship of the educational writings 
to the Essay, see especially James L. Axtell’s introduction to The Educational Writings of John Locke 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and Peter A. Schouls, Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and 
Enlightenment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 183–84. Ruth W. Grant and Benjamin R. Hertzberg 
also contend that it important to consider the Thoughts in relation to the Conduct, and both works in relation to 
the Essay. See “Locke on Education,” in Matthew Stuart (ed.), A Companion to Locke (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2016), 448–65. 
485 See Timothy Stanton, “John Locke and the Fable of Liberalism,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 61, 3 (2018), 
pp. 597-622, p. 600, 621. 
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to young children the difference between their desires and their wills as well as the possibility 
of controlling the former with the latter. I then examine the role of parental authority in later 
childhood and adolescence, when the family was fortified to guard against the dangerous 
habituating influence of custom and fashion. I then trace the basis of these concepts in the 
Essay, where a strong will that was capable of suspending desire was an important 
prerequisite for the difficult task of reasoning. Finally, I then connect the sceptical disposition 
that Locke aimed at in the Education to the possibilities for adult intellectual freedom in a 
society governed by opinion and custom. The relationship between the Education and 
Locke’s political theory that I hope will emerge from this re-examination of Lockean 
habituation is neither the Foucauldian-disciplinarian view that the Education supplied 
predictable, disciplined subjects for the liberal project, nor quite the traditional view that the 
Education was designed to instil the positive behaviours and beliefs necessary to sustain a 
limited government. Instead, it was limited government that permitted the Education’s 
epistemic ends. While Lockean education supported the liberal order, the freedom at which 
it aimed went beyond the political liberty of the Second Treatise to the epistemic autonomy 
of the Essay. Epistemic autonomy was essentially individual rather than civic; in its most 
developed form, it allowed the individual to understand, invent, and discover ideas. The 
means to it was a childhood spent in an inward-oriented and even isolated family and an adult 
commitment to examining prevailing custom and fashion. The pedagogy in the Education did 
not reach as far as guaranteeing such an outcome, but it established the foundations of such 
liberty by cultivating a will capable of suspending desire and opening the door to reason. 
Locke’s ultimate aim was to arm the child’s mind with the discipline, scepticism, and modesty 
necessary to think clearly in the face of the hostile forces arranged against such thought. 
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Locke Scholars and Disciplinary Liberalism  
For many years, the scholarly reading of Locke’s writing on education emphasised its basic 
compatibility with the liberal political theory espoused in the Two Treatises. The need for 
education was implicit in Locke’s deferral of liberty for children, who were not “born in” a 
state of equality but rather “born to it.”486 Locke’s pedagogical emphasis on habituation was 
noticed, but not thought to undermine Lockean liberty. Rather, scholars such as James Axtell, 
Peter Gay, and John Yolton compared it favourably with the prevailing methods against 
which Locke set out his advice – teaching good conduct by rules and subjects by rote.487 Co-
opting children’s wills by teaching them through games and adapting the curriculum to their  
understandings and inclinations was, not unreasonably, thought a more liberal experience 
than beating Latin grammar into them. Alex Neil reconciled the tension between habituation 
and liberty by arguing that, “A good education fosters autonomy and virtue through 
habituating the child…to reason.”488 Moreover, as Nathan Tarcov pointed out, the Education 
filled a gap left in the Two Treatises, that allowed the family’s private authority to inculcate 
virtue, a task necessary for the Lockean state but one neglected by its limited government.489 
Recently, however, a growing number of scholars, especially those influenced, 
directly or indirectly, by Michel Foucault’s account of the rise of modern disciplinary society 
in Discipline and Punish, have suggested that the liberty of the Second Treatise can only be 
properly understood in light of the pedagogy of the Some Thoughts concerning Education. 
Uday Mehta, Joseph Carrig, and John Baltes, for example, have argued that the non-coercive 
                                                             
486 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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487487 See James Axtell, The Educational Writings of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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politics of the first presupposes “the disciplinary subject” of the second, a subject whose 
education governs their demands and consent. According to Baltes, Locke’s educational 
prescriptions mobilised the insight that limited government required liberal subjects who “are 
made rather than found, constructed from the ground up by discipline.”490 As a result, Locke 
the educationist “entangles his subjects in an architecture of power of which they become 
bearers, a system of surveillance and power forming and norming those in its sway.”491 
Furthermore, Uday Mehta has argued that “while forging individuality, Locke simultaneously 
truncates its reach, its singularity, its independence,” and Joseph Carrig has concluded that 
“The implication to be drawn from Locke’s Education is…that liberalism is no less 
authoritarian than any other system.”492 In fact, Carrig goes as far as to argue that the degree 
of authoritarianism and psychological manipulation demanded by Locke so thoroughly 
conditioned children through habituation by their parents and tutors that it amounted to 
“nothing more than indoctrination”: 
Through the enforced repetition of desired behaviour and the constant association of this behaviour and 
its undesired counterpart with rewards and punishments, a ‘natural’ connection is established between 
the desire/will of the child and thoughts and actions determined by the father to be good.493 
These interpretations of Locke, as Hina Nazar has recently commented, can be referred to as 
the “disciplinary reading of Locke, or the reading of Locke by the disciplinarians.” Those 
who interpret the ideal Lockean subject as being shaped by distinctively modern techniques 
of power, “relying less on the rod than on the subtle, often invisible, manipulation of infantile 
                                                             
490 See John Baltes, “Locke’s Inverted Quarantine: Discipline, Panopticism, and Making of the Liberal 
Subject,” The Review of Politics Vol. 75, No. 2 (March 2013): p. 191. 
491 Ibid., p. 192. 
492 Uday Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke’s Political Thought (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 124; Joseph Carrig, “Liberal Impediments to Liberal Education: The 
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will and desire.”494 This disciplinary reading has replaced communitarianism as the most 
important criticism of liberalism at the present, and it has the potential to be far more 
damaging because it does not presuppose a straw-man version of the liberal subject: it, in fact, 
concedes to liberalism a more nuanced account of selfhood and subjectivity than did 
communitarianism. John Baltes, for example, has written that, “There are no ‘Teflon’ subjects 
here [in Lockean liberalism], detached from the background of discipline, autonomously 
choosing as they slide effortlessly past their entanglements.”495 Rather, the aim of Locke’s 
educative programme was “the construction of a ‘sticky subject’ who would govern desire 
with a virtuous character inculcated by his parents and tutors.” The subject is sticky because 
their education has instilled indelible habits in them from the onset of subjectivity. Instructed 
and moulded before rational choice is available, these habits place the child in a network of 
parental and communal values, of which they become the unwitting bearer. Their immersion 
is then reinforced, the disciplinarian reading argues, by Locke’s emphasis on early obedience 
to parental and paternal will, and by the importance they attach to reputational concerns as an 
instrument of education. On these readings, Locke’s crucial advice is that the educator should 
replace rewards and beatings with public reputation and shame as new cornerstones of 
education as they seek to ensure that the child adopts their community’s virtues – as Uday 
Mehta has described it: “Locke’s ostensibly liberal and compassionate program is 
counterbalanced by the demand that the child internalize the standards—the anguishing 
standards—of shame, guilt, and responsibility.”496 As a result, the Lockean child’s will, 
Joseph Carrig suggests, is not their own but is actually “directed by ‘other People’s Reason,’ 
a ‘public’ reason ‘communicated’ to him by the ‘paternal’ power.”497 Baltes does, however, 
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concede a minimal degree of liberty to the Lockean subject in his reading, but is keen to stress 
that this subject is “free” only in the sense that as an agent, he chooses to follow the model of 
virtue promoted by the parent. Baltes inevitably comes to the conclusion that we must 
relinquish autonomy as “the gold standard of liberalism.”498  
Hina Nazir has recently criticised the disciplinarian reading – whilst she concedes that 
there are elements in Some Thought concerning Education that are tinged with 
authoritarianism, she argues that the disciplinarians are wrong to view such elements as 
necessary entailments of Locke’s liberalism. Against the contention that Locke’s liberalism 
was built on an illiberal foundation, she has proposed that the Thoughts is “a divided text, 
torn between two understandings of education, with different implications for freedom as the 
goal of education.”499 These divisions, according to Nazir, are derived on the extent to which 
Locke viewed education as a child-responsive project, shaped by the reason of the pupil, as 
well as by an understanding of childhood as a distinct phase of human life. A child-responsive 
approach is widely taken to constitute Locke’s principal educational innovation: both Locke’s 
defenders and critics interpret him as marking a radical shift from the earlier Augustinian 
paradigm of childhood, which placed children on-par with unreformed adults, and interpreted 
education as a forcible weeding out of sin. Nevertheless, vestiges of earlier approaches, such 
as those transmuted by Puritanism and Protestantism, continued to populate Some Thoughts 
concerning Education.500 Hugh Cunningham’s review of the Protestant literature on 
childhood, for example, in his Children and Childhood in Western Society Since 1500 (1995) 
sounds very much like a summary of the aspects of Locke’s Thoughts. The model Protestant 
child, Cunningham observes, was the product of  
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training by parents from an early age in good habits. The analogies and metaphors, which pervade  
[Protestant] books are not ones of natural growth, but of horticulture, of preparing good soil, of rooting 
out weeds, of training young shoots in the direction you want them to go; or they are of the instilling 
of obedience into puppies or colts. Left to themselves, children will turn out bad. Their wills must be 
broken…So far as possible this training should be done rationally and calmly, but there might be 
occasion for inflicting corporal punishment; if so, it must not be too severe, and it must not be 
administered in anger.501 
Likewise, W. M. Spellman has emphasised Locke’s indebtedness to the Puritan belief in 
natural depravity.502 Such elements are implicit in Locke’s periodic anxiety about children’s 
“unruly and disordered appetites,” which must be “silenced” as early as possible, and in his 
argument, early on in the Thoughts, that the child’s will must be brought to conform near-
automatically to parental will. Children, according to Locke, had to be taught to “deny their 
appetites…by the custom of having their inclinations in subjection.” They had to be 
accustomed “early to silence their desires” and to learn “the art of stifling their desires as soon 
as they rise up in them.”503 The interconnection between silencing desire and obeying parents 
originated from Locke’s belief, espoused in the Thoughts and Essay, that children lacked the 
reason to reflect upon desire or control it, and it was only in obedience to their educators that 
they could, in effect, practise the adult virtue of self-command. Hina Nazir has described this 
nexus in Locke’s thought as the “adult-imitative paradigm of education” – an inheritance 
from Augustinian/Protestant writings in which Locke effectively blurred the line between 
childhood and adulthood by identifying adult self-command as an appropriate goal of early 
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childhood education and the child’s will as the primary focus of education. This had to be 
bent into adult shape in the hope that such self-command became a lifelong habit.504 
Unsurprisingly, then, habituation is a key theme of the Essay, as it is of the Conduct 
and the Thoughts. In the Essay, Locke focused on the bad mental habits that prohibited 
individuals from thinking clearly and independently, especially the erroneous association of 
ideas that had no connection:  
some independent Ideas, of no alliance to one another, are by Education, Custom, and the constant din 
of their Party, so coupled in [men’s] Minds, that they appear there together. …This gives Sence to 
Jargon, Demonstration to Absurdities, and Consistency to Nonsense, and is the foundation of the 
greatest, I had almost said, of all the Errors in the World.505  
 
If the Essay focused on bad habits, then the educational writings presented the good ones. 
The importance that Locke attributed to education was derived from his sense that it had the 
potential to cultivate “autonomy-friendly” habits.506 Without the right kind of education, 
Locke believed that habits would still be formed but that they would be formed 
heteronomously – without due regard to the duty to exercise one’s power of freedom. Recent 
studies have focused on this aspect of Locke’s thought, identifying him as a pragmatist who 
looked to education to reinvent custom and habituation in an autonomy-friendly direction. 
Mark E. Button, for example, has argued that Locke’s response “to the conditions of habits 
and custom is not an inquiry into how these extrarational features might be extirpated from 
the calculus of social and political order but, more pragmatically, how these necessary 
characteristics of political society might be given a different structure and different 
purpose.”507 Furthermore, Jad Smith has suggested that for Locke, “the relentless occurrence 
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of social reproduction – whether delivered of necessity, desire, dependence, indifference, or 
reason – always bears with it moral and social consequences. In an attempt to shape these 
consequences, Locke undertakes the transvaluation of custom.”508 Ruth Grant has observed 
that Locke astutely recognised that “there is no escape from custom’s power…The only 
possibility for improvement is to enlist custom’s power in the service of reason’s 
authority.”509 
Such scholarship offers a valuable counterpoint to the disciplinary reading of Locke 
which views habituation as fundamental by contradictory to Locke’s liberal project. 
However, it is worth nothing that Grant, Smith and Button do not consider in detail the habits 
that matter to Locke as an educationist. In the two most extended discussions of these issues, 
Alex Neil and Peter Schouls have suggested that Lockean education sought to habituate 
children to reason and self-mastery.510 Neil argued that Locke was especially interested in 
training children’s understandings, since only through such training can the individual 
exercise self-mastery. Such training, according to Neill, was not opposed to autonomy since 
Locke believed that the mind had to be influenced by the outside world, including by other 
people, in order for reason to develop. Schouls also interpreted the influence of the educator 
to be fundamentally benign, arguing that it was parental reason rather than parental will which 
directed the child: “Since it is the parents’ reason that forces the child to the freedom of 
rational action, it is, in effect, reason that is the child’s teacher.”511 In this reading, parental 
reason must ensure, above all else, that the child developed the habit of moderating pressing 
desires: “At the age when children are still incapable of rational examination, they can be 
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conditioned to suspend action on desire through the process of denying them immediate 
gratification.”512 
 
Locke’s Programme of Education 
The general aim of Locke’s programme of education, as we have seen with many of his 
contemporaries in previous chapters, was to seek the health of both body and mind. While 
the health of the body occupied a generous introductory portion of Some Thoughts concerning 
Education, where medical and moral considerations combined to support prescriptions 
towards the achievement of bodily temperance and strength, the majority of the work, 
together with most of Locke’s Of the Conduct of the Understanding, were devoted to the 
health and virtue of the mind. Excellence of both character and intellect was a matter of 
“set[ting] the Mind right, that on all Occasions it may be disposed to consent to nothing, but 
what may be suitable to the Dignity and Excellence of a rational Creature.”513 The process of 
education involved both desires and judgement as well as cultivation of the human faculties, 
which could bring “the powers of the mind to perfection.”514  
The main methodology that Locke proposed to that end was the gradual habituation 
of the mind toward self-mastery and right reasoning by means of constant, initially tutored 
but gradually self-assumed, practice.515 Furthermore, an important part of that habituation 
was a steady orientation of the mind which was achieved by means of the development of a 
‘love’ or ‘relish’ for truth and moral virtue.516 The great secret of education, according to 
Locke, was to harmonise discipline and freedom, or the mastery over one’s immediate 
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appetites and the keeping of a “Child’s Spirit, easy active and free.”517 Against two of the 
most frequent, yet terribly corrupting, parental methods of his time (beating and flattering), 
Locke proposed the employment of “Esteem and Disgrace” as a guide and an incentive to the 
child’s education into a love of virtue.518 The middle ground between discipline and freedom 
was expressed in the development of an “inward civility,” which was a habitual disposition 
of the mind built by means of “Credit and Commendation.”519 
The focus of the Thoughts was on early childhood education and rested on the 
fundamental insight of Locke’s epistemology that the key to proper education was about 
paying close attention to how one learns rather than the content of what one studies. The 
emphasis in the Thoughts is on learning through experience and development of habits 
encouraging rational self-control of one’s appetitive desires. Locke presented the 
establishment of these mental habits in youth as both a preventative measure to avoid the 
unfounded association of ideas in error and prejudice, and as originally relatively unreflective 
practices that would hopefully develop over time into the basis for rational, unconscious 
activity. Locke opened the Thoughts with the admission that his collected reflections on 
education were not originally intended “for public view,” but had become convinced to 
publish them only once he became convinced that they “might be of some use if made more 
public.”520 From the private correspondence with his friend Edward Clarke, in which he 
proposed an educational regime for that gentleman’s son, Locke concluded that the “method 
here proposed” had much more general application than that for which it was initially 
designed. One of the most prominent features about Locke’s method from the outset is the 
extent to which it emphasised the deep underlying connection between physical and mental 
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education: “A sound mind in a sound body is a short but full description of a happy state in 
this world.”521 
The solid foundation of a sound body trained to endure physical hardship provided 
support for Locke’s later recommendation for a general method of education. However, 
whereas the key for physical development was to avoid corrupting customs that encouraged 
delicate sensibilities, Locke indicated that the most important, and potentially dangerous, 
issue in mental development related to proper punishments and rewards. Use of incorrect 
rewards and punishment would undermine any system of education, much like proper rewards 
and punishments were the irreplaceable instruments for correct socialisation.  The reason 
behind Locke’s effort to direct early education toward proper socialisation involved replacing 
the ubiquitous practice of corporal punishment with a new system of incentives based on 
esteem and disgrace. In short, Locke rejected the “rough discipline of the rod,” which was the 
“ordinary way of education” on the grounds that it provided no positive reinforcement for 
good conduct and the inculcation of good habits and habitual dispositions.522 
The Thoughts also contained Locke’s most complete account of human development, 
especially the development of the will, which detailed the importance of the intervention of 
a single, coherent, and personal authority to direct the will at the beginning in order for the 
will to be self-directing afterwards. Furthermore, the intervention of parents in the 
development of the child’s will was especially important for taming his “love of dominion” 
and ensuring a correct approach to habituation. Although Locke had gone to great lengths to 
diminish the power of parents over children in the Second Treatise, the Education reversed 
the parental position, extending them “absolute power” and instructing that “children, when 
little, should look upon their parents as their lords, their absolute governors; and, as such, 
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stand in awe of them.”523 The reason for Locke’s abrupt reversal was two-fold: first, that 
personal authority in childhood was necessary for independence of mind in adulthood; 
second, that the personal authority of parents in particular was required to shield against all 
the competing authorities to which children were exposed. The Thoughts was, therefore, in a 
sense as much an education for adults as it was for children – requiring parents to reform their 
own conduct in order to attain the elusive but momentous authority that was to be their only 
source of influence with their children. 
Many scholars have assumed that Locke’s idea of habituation was that the child was 
to be made to practise a predetermined set of ‘liberal’ behaviours and opinions until their own 
natural predilections was overcome, and they took their habituation for their own nature, 
emerging from their education with a kind of “liberal gentlemanly automation.”524 
Furthermore, such scholars tend to differ in their ideas of the kind of freedom which they 
claim that Locke denied. Baltes, for example, argues that Lockean education permitted 
“liberty,” since the pupil observes norms voluntarily instead of by coercion, but not 
“autonomy,” since their compliance is pre-determined by habituation.525 For Mehta, Locke 
foreclosed the freedom of unbounded imagination and “self-expression:”  
The attempt to regiment [the imagination], to prescribe and standardise its content, to make it submit 
to conventional authority…In Locke’s rationality and the means for its inculcation, such as his 
pedagogy, function to close off forms of individual self-expression, to raise barriers against the 
eccentric; they are deployed to construct, consolidate, and impose a norm of ‘normality.’526 
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Carrig has argued that “the free mind is one that is purified of external influence,” but given 
Locke’s empiricism, such insulation from the external world is impossible and all but the 
most rudimentary sensations require external influence.527 
However, upon a close examination of the first sections of the Education, it is clear 
that Lockean habituation was not as straightforward a matter as the use of adult authority to 
praise children for whatever was considered good behaviour and punish them for 
waywardness until they reflexively demonstrated desirable behaviour. Locke’s estimation of 
habit was very much profoundly ambivalent. In the Conduct of the Understanding, which 
was written initially to be appended to the Essay as a guide to overcoming intellectual errors, 
Locke warned that: 
Many men firmly embrace falsehood for truth; not only because they never thought otherwise; but also 
because, thus blinded as they have been from the beginning, they never could think otherwise; at least 
without a vigour of mind able to contest the empire of habit, and look into its own principles.528 
Habit, according to Locke, was plainly the enemy of freedom and the tension running through 
Locke’s educational and epistemological writings was that the vigour of mind necessary to 
“contest the empire of habit” was itself developed by means of habit. Furthermore, it is also 
worth noting that both Baltes and Carrig draw on this passage to claim that Lockean education 
aimed to “construct an ‘empire of habit’ governing conduct,” an odd conclusion given that 
the above passage seems to show that Locke exhorted the opposite.529 The highest form of 
freedom that Locke sought to establish was what Alex Neil has usefully described as 
“epistemic freedom,” which required a will strong enough to resist both the importunities of 
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nature and those of society.530 The development of such a will was, in a sense, the main aim 
of Lockean education.531 
Further investigation of the habits and habitual dispositions which Locke 
recommended in the Education, soon reveals that they are actually counter habits and 
dispositions – intended to undo those habits which nature and fashion had instilled on their 
own. The goal of early habituation, therefore, was not to programme desirable and foreclose 
future undesirable behaviour, much like the approach of leading intellectuals in previous 
chapters, but rather to inculcate physical and mental flexibility – a combination of scepticism 
and humility necessary to overcome the countervailing forces of self-love and “obstinacy” 
and to permit the individual to continually question and revise their own opinions.532 Such an 
intellectual disposition was a habit in a certain sense, but one which obstructed predictability 
rather than dictating it. 
Lockean habits, consequently, were neither as substantive or as subjugating as the 
Foucauldian-disciplinarians have alleged, but were rather aimed at the paradoxical habit, or 
habitual disposition, of having no habits. What habituation primarily consisted of, then, was 
the repeated experience of crossing one’s desires, which would demonstrate to the child the 
difference between their desires and their wills, and the possibility of controlling the former 
with the latter.533 
Habit and Habituation in the Education 
The first sections of the Education dealt primarily with the instruction of the body and marked 
Locke’s first engagement with the place of nature in human development. In these sections, 
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Locke suggested that the child could be made maximally flexible by habitual exposure to 
discomfort: “Our bodies will endure anything, that from the beginning they are accustomed 
to.”534 Children were to go out with wet feet in winter, subsist on the plainest food and to 
have no regular meal times.535 Whilst this regimen was aimed at accustoming the child to 
pain and discomfort, Locke recommended two other forms of physical habituation in these 
sections that would enhance the child’s comfort – a regular sleeping schedule and regular 
bowel movements to prevent constipation.536 What all these varied recommendations had in 
common is that they ran contrary to the habits that a child naturally developed if left to their 
own devices to pursue pleasures and avoid pains. 
Children naturally seek warmth and dryness, tasty and ample food, and they habituate 
themselves to enjoying them. In order to counteract this, Locke directed parents to pre-empt 
and break the habits that formed from these natural pleasures. By contrast bowel movements 
and bedtimes are things that children do not naturally make habitual on their own. They prefer 
to remain awake for “the unhealthy and unsafe hours of debauchery, which are those of the 
evenings” and, “being usually intent on their play and very heedless of anything else, often 
let pass those motions of natures, when she calls them but gently.”537 When it came to useful 
but unpleasant activities that children naturally avoided, Locke demanded that parents 
regularised “motions that were not perfectly voluntary,” as he tactfully described them.538 
Where habit implied itself naturally, Locke directed parents to break it, but where it did not, 
he instructed them to introduce it. In both cases, this kind of calculated habit opposed what 
the child desired. Read in this light, Locke’s habituation comes across actually as counter-
habituation since uninstructed nature instilled its own habits. 
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What is striking about Locke’s idea of habituation is that he did not ask parents to 
inculcate any particular opinion or lifelong behaviour in children by means of habit. Rather 
than being habituated into a specific profession, political conviction, or doctrinal confession, 
Locke’s pupil was offered the rudiments of a wide range of ideas, opinions, and occupations. 
They were taught skills otherwise beneath their class like carpentry and gardening, as well as 
others like bookkeeping and law that were more suitable for gentleman.539 The pupil, perhaps 
surprisingly, was to come away with few particular political opinions. The Education itself 
was silent on contemporary political polemics, recommending only that the child be made 
familiar  with ancient literature, ancient and modern natural law, and English law.540 Locke 
elsewhere recommended political texts, but in a letter to a 36-year old man rather than a child. 
There, he included his own Two Treatises, along with Greek and Roman philosophers, 
modern natural lawyers, Whig histories, and the sermons of broad churchmen. This was a 
notable contrast to Hobbes’s recommendation that students absorb primarily the principles of 
his Leviathan, a strategy that was perhaps closer to an indoctrinating education than Locke’s 
suggestions.541 
Even in religion, Locke, in the same vein as the moderate divines, avoided doctrine. 
He recommended that the child be taught a simple axiom about God’s existence and power: 
There ought very early to be imprinted on his mind a true notion of God as of the independent supreme 
Being, Author, and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all our good, who loves us, and gives 
us all things: and, consequent to this, instil into him a love and reverence of this supreme Being. This 
is enough to begin with, without going to explain matter any farther.”542 
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In order to ensure that this teaching directed the child towards Christianity, Locke also added 
that the pupil “should learn perfectly by heart…the Lord’s prayer, the creed, and ten 
commandments,” but they should not be asked to read the Bible itself or any theology, which 
will only confuse them.543 It could be argued that failing to habituate a child to religious 
practice and doctrine early on was itself a way of inculcating indifference or even irreligion, 
but Locke’s caution with respect to religion arose from his efforts to balance the necessity 
against the danger of habituation precisely to “prevent the undue connexion of ideas in the 
minds of young people.”544 
The danger of early exposure to theology was that children’s “yet tender minds should 
receive early impressions of goblins, spectres, and apparitions.”545 Once such fears were 
inspired in a child, they would then develop a chain of habitual associations among spirits, 
the dark, and danger that would eventually harden into phobias that were nearly impossible 
to extirpate, even for those who eventually came to understand, as most people did, that there 
were no goblins lying in wait for them at night.546 It is worth noting that this example also 
appeared in the Essay in a chapter (2.33.10) that Uday Mehta has taken to be exemplary of 
Locke’s equation of individuality with “madness” and thus his desire to suppress such 
aberrant thought processes. What Mehta has missed here is that Locke was in fact arguing 
that such irrational associations were not marks of individuality, but rather acquired mental 
habits, which had themselves been “normalized.”547  
Thus, to become an individual driven by occult fears was a kind of habit, but the kind 
that Locke wanted to avoid precisely because it was particular and concrete – it was based on 
a false chain of mental associations that prevented individuals from thinking clearly and 
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associating ideas logically.548 At the same time, Locke was worried that without any 
introduction to the ideas of God and salvation, the child would reflexively lapse into 
materialism since “matter being a thing that all our senses are constantly conversant with, it 
is so apt to possess the mind, and exclude all other beings but matter.” Furthermore, this 
“prejudice…often leaves no room for the admittance of spirits, or the allowing any such 
things as immaterial being…when yet it is evident, that by mere matter and motion, none of 
the great phaenomena of nature can be resolved.”549 In sum, if teaching a child religion in too 
much detail formed the foundation for their future fear of the dark and if on the other hand 
teaching them too little turned them into an unthinking materialist – then they will have been 
habituated in exactly the way that Locke’s education tried so much to avoid. Again, Locke 
here was taking a similar approach to that of the moderate divines: he was far more interested 
in the kinds of habitual dispositions that would strengthen religion and one’s faith, rather than 
getting entangled in the intricacies of them that could potentially be divisive. 
In a sense, this comes across as paradoxical: that habituation was the basic method 
that underlined Lockean education, but its subject was not habituated to do or believe 
anything in particular. The subject was taught to be flexible, civil, and accommodating of 
others, but few ways of life or opinions were actually foreclosed to them. The reason for this 
was because Locke did not enjoin habituation in the straightforward sense of inculcating fixed 
conduct for life. It was never his aim to raise a subject who never stayed up past dark or 
enjoyed wine or company. Rather, the habits he prescribed for children were only to be 
practised only during childhood; it was their intellectual residue that Locke hoped would 
remain with the adult. 
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The principle governing early habituation, then, was that every habit, whether it 
countered a natural desire or a natural aversion, contributed to the development of the child’s 
capacity for “self-denial,” which Locke described as itself a “habit” that is “contrary to 
unguided nature” but was “the true foundation of future ability and happiness…to be wrought 
into the mind, as early as may be, even from the first dawnings of any knowledge or 
apprehension in children.”550 Self-denial was not inculcated for its own sake, or for the neo-
stoic goal of minimising desires, but because the experience of having their desires denied 
was foundationally educative for the child: it taught them to distinguish between their desires 
and their will by showing them that none of their spontaneous desires were strictly necessary, 
at least not in the sense of requiring immediate gratification. Locke’s detailed regimen for 
regulating bowel movements, strange as it may seem, demonstrates just how important it was 
not to assume the necessity of even our most basic physical desires since even these may be 
amenable to control by the will.551 Thus, the child who was permitted to follow their earliest 
and apparently most ‘natural’ desires and aversions missed precisely that experience of 
feeling their will as a faculty separable from their desire, and so risked mistaking every mere 
desire for a natural necessity. Furthermore, Locke did not deny that natural necessity existed, 
“but yet, the more children can be inured to hardships of this kind, by a wise care to make 
stronger in body and mind, the better it will be for them…Parents being but too apt of 
themselves to incline, more than they should, to the softer side.”  
In other words, for Locke, the experience of habituation acquainted the child with the 
possible strength of their wills and the lack of necessity in their desires - the child’s 
spontaneous development was not especially bestial or in need of suppression.552 However, 
spontaneous development usually failed to disclose the child to equally natural but higher 
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possibilities in themselves – particularly the capacity of their wills to suppress their desires – 
while the experience of being habituated and forced to cross their desires revealed them. One 
important error in the Foucauldian reading of Lockean education is that it has presumed that 
the spontaneous nature of a child is free, and habituation itself is “denaturing.”553 Yet Locke 
thought that habits that obstructed our liberty crept in as much from spontaneous nature as 
from conventional sources, and that such habits made one’s desires appear as compulsions 
more effectively than the conventional habits that one’s parents tried to instil into them, or 
that they try to instil in themselves. Natural habits slipped in unnoticed, whilst learning 
conventional habits was always a painful process. In this sense, Locke’s retort about 
costiveness that “people are very loose, have seldom strong thoughts” was not entirely in 
jest.554 The strength of will necessary to control one’s bowels was not altogether unlike that 
necessary to resist the power of fashion and custom and direct one’s thoughts according to 
reason instead. 
Authority and Rebellion in the Education 
The basic experience of dissonance between will and desire forced the child to wonder what 
they should desire, and it was this puzzle, Locke believed, that motivated the development of 
reason. At first, such dissonance required straightforward imposition by parents in order to 
demonstrate that desires could be crossed. But as children aged, Locke encouraged parents to 
relax their “absolute” authority into “friendship.” The early imposition of parental authority 
was required to make flexibility possible in the child but the gradual relaxation of this 
authority was as necessary as its initial imposition. This was due to the fact that the primary 
threat to the will later in childhood was no longer natural inclination mistaken for necessity, 
but “the law of fashion and reputation” by which “the greatest part” of mankind “govern 
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themselves chiefly, if not soley…and so they do that, which keeps them in Reputation with 
their Company, little regarding the Laws of God, or the Magistrate.”555 
In order to protect children against the danger of early submission to fashion and 
custom, Locke encouraged an intensely inward-oriented and even socially isolated family life 
grounded in mutual affection between parents and children. Such a family, Locke hoped, 
discouraged the child from seeking esteem elsewhere and created a family culture that stood 
in contrast to the fashions and customs of broader society. When the child eventually entered 
society, the familial education they had received would act as another source of dissonance 
for them, demonstrating that there were alternatives to fashion and the prevailing opinions of 
society, forcing them to weigh their relative merits. Even though Locke used parental 
authority in childhood to counteract competing authorities, first those of nature and then of 
fashion – that threatened to habituate the child, he also took advantage of children’s natural 
dislike of being ruled to soften parental authority from command into advice, producing an 
adult who ordered their desires according to their own understanding.556  
That Locke expected children to rebel against their parents may come across as a 
shock considering his strong statement about the “absolute” authority which he expected 
parents to wield, and the “fear and awe” in which children should regard them.557 However, 
Locke also added that: “Fear and awe ought to give you the first power over their minds, and 
love and friendship in riper years to hold it: for the time must come, when they will be past 
the rod and correction.”558 Since Locke’s aim was a strong will that was capable of 
suspending its desires, he was careful not to prescribe pedagogical measures that weakened 
the will, no matter however useful such measures might have been for promoting docility. 
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Locke warned that frequent beatings, “chidings,” and humiliations would result in 
“dejection,” as well as a sense that one’s will was entirely ineffectual in carrying out desires, 
and a subsequent loss of desire itself.559 The dejected child would appear to be master of 
themselves to adults, since with their “unnatural sobriety he may please silly people, who 
commend tame inactive children,” but this would’ve been because they had mistaken their 
desire that children be inactive for the child’s own desire to be so.560 Consequently, the task 
of paternal authority in middle childhood was no longer to turn the will, or the child’s conduct, 
against their desires, but rather to co-opt the most potent of their desires, their love of self-
esteem, before anyone else could: “Esteem and disgrace are, of all others, the most powerful 
incentives to the mind…which I took on as the great secret of education.561 
The difficulty was that nearly anyone in a position to bestow esteem could effectively 
exercise authority over a child, and “servants, and other ill-ordered children” posed a 
particularly “great danger.”562 Their authority was either irresponsible or malicious: servants 
were not held to account for children’s educations, and other children, who lacked 
understanding of their own, were simply vectors for the transmission of fashion. The danger 
with placing children under such conditions was so great that Locke warned against schools 
because the sheer preponderance of the young undermined adult authority and replaced it 
with the tyranny of other children, whose “misbecoming and disingenuous ways of shifting 
in the world must be unlearned.”563 In order to prevent a child being misruled by such 
potential distempers of esteem and disgrace, authority was to be exclusive to parents and 
extended only at their discretion to those deemed acceptable influences. Locke flattered 
parents by implying that they were better suited to govern their children than anyone else, but 
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he did not assume that his readers would be more reasonable than servants or children, or less 
susceptible to the delusions of popular opinion. The demands of his education were therefore 
themselves correctives for wayward parents. Locke, for example, demanded that children 
respect their parents, but he also demanded the reverse: “He that will have his son have a 
respect for him and his orders, must himself have a great reverence for his son…You must 
do nothing before him, which you would not have him imitate.564 Parents could therefore 
become authoritative sources of esteem and disgrace for their children only by being 
admirable to them, and that called on adults to develop self-mastery as much as their children. 
Parenting, for Locke, thus turned out to be one of the best ways for “grown men” to “enlarge 
their understandings,” which was otherwise “seldom done.”565 
It was also necessary “to make [children] in love with the company of their parents,” 
but this required that parents enjoyed the company of their children, since if Locke’s 
instructions were to be followed, parents would have to spend a great deal of time with 
them.566 Everything in Locke’s pedagogical programme, from his prohibition against 
swaddling, which immobilised infants precisely so that adults could ignore them, to his 
encouragement of home education and the employment of fathers as tutors demanded that 
parents attended more closely to their children than was expected and what his readers would 
have desired. If the prevailing fashion of late seventeenth-century English society was to be 
“indulgent and familiar [with children] when they were little, but severe to them, and [to] 
keep them at a distance, when were grown up,” Locke reversed these imperatives by 
demanded early strictness and increasing warmth and familiarity as the child grew.567 
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The sheer amount of time that parents would have had to spend with their children to 
the exclusion of most other company and the demands that Locke placed on parents to study 
their children’s unique constitutions and adapt their childrearing to them inclined the family 
to form its own opinions and judgements against those of society at large.568 This ensured 
that education did not simply recapitulate prevailing fashions and customs. Ruth Grant, for 
example, has pointed out that the experience of raising children according to Locke’s 
pedagogy helped adults “develop the ability to resist, when necessary, this need for social 
approval which provides the foundational support for the dominion of custom or 
‘fashion.’”569 Indeed, Locke recommended his book for parents “so irregularly bold, that they 
dare venture to consult their own reason, in the education of their children, rather than wholly 
to rely upon old custom.”570  
Likewise, children themselves were partial authors of this family culture, in part, 
because of such insular conditions in which they were brought up, but also because they 
engaged in frequent conversations with their parents conducted as if between equals, with a 
father “advis[ing] only as a friend of more experience,” particularly about matters concerning 
family life such as the management of the familial estate.571 The obedience imposed in early 
childhood became the “reasoning with children” of middle childhood.572 This admitted the 
possibility of objection and compromise: “You must not expect his inclinations should be just 
as yours…youth must have some liberty, some outleaps.”573 Locke also added that consulting 
an older child in family questions would “not at all lessen your authority, but increase his 
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love and esteem of you.”574 All of this, in turn, fostered a distinct family culture that diverged 
from the main current of fashion of public opinion.575 
Nonetheless, the Education did not aim at a society of permanently isolated families 
living in eccentric worlds of their own, disconnected from broader civil society. Locke 
admitted that even “the milder sort of government” which he enjoined on older children was 
likely to become ineffectual in adolescence, “that boiling boisterous part of life” when boys 
chafed under even the best parents’ rule “think[ing] themselves too much men to be governed 
by others, and yet hav[ing] not prudence and experience enough to govern themselves.”576 
This was the point at which children became most susceptible to fashion because they were 
most sceptical of the familial judgements that had up to that point shielded them: 
What can be hoped from even the most careful and discreet governor, when neither he has power to 
compel, not his pupil a disposition to be persuaded; but, on the contrary, has the advice of warm blood, 
and prevailing fashion, to hearken to the temptations of his companions, just as wise as himself, rather 
than to the persuasion of his tutor, who is now looked on as the enemy to his freedom?577 
In order to counter the ill effects of this stage, Locke advised delaying the customary period 
of travel until the age when “reason and foresight begin a little to take place” so that children 
were not exposed to “greatest dangers of their whole life” abroad amongst strangers, but he 
nonetheless implied that even at home, adolescents would choose “the temptations of [their] 
companions” over the judgements of their parents and tutors.578 
It seems puzzling, then, that for all of Locke’s emphasis on familial authority, he 
would then concede its unravelling in adolescence. Yet, far from conceiving parental 
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authority to be total or even very effective, Locke was realistic about the rebelliousness of 
children. He established authority early but also acknowledged that there would come a point 
when the child would prefer their “companions” to their parents and that they must be 
permitted some “outleaps.”579 By keeping them out of school and away from the influence of 
servants, however, Locke delayed the child’s exposure to fashion and custom, supplying them 
first with a family education that would act as a source of dissonance when they finally 
entered the broader society. Locke was willing to give children some space during 
adolescence to diverge from their family so that by the time they reached adulthood, they 
would have both obeyed and resisted, and parental authority was far from absolute. The final 
element of education – travel –was to be delayed until they could undertake it alone, under 
the guidance of their own reason for the first time, which they would put into the service of 
comparing not their family’s customs to those of their countrymen, but rather their country’s 
customs to those of foreigners: “Being thoroughly acquainted with the laws and fashions, the 
natural and moral advantages and defects of his own country, he has something to exchange 
with those abroad, from whose conversation he hoped to reap any knowledge.”580 
At each stage of development, Lockean pedagogy attempted to insert dissonance into 
the child’s experience in order to obstruct conventional habituation and preserve the will’s 
flexibility in the face of desires that threatened to cement their conduct and beliefs before they 
had had a chance to weigh and reflect upon them. In their first years, their parents substituted 
their wills for theirs and crossed their inclinations. Then the parents had to make themselves 
sufficiently admirable to the child so then they would prefer to do that which would win their 
approbation instead of following the alluring example of servants or other children. In 
adolescence, the family’s coercive power receded while its opinions and customs stood as an 
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alternative to the fashions of civil society. Then, as the child entered adulthood, they had to 
confront the hallmark of sceptical argument – the diversity of customs – on their own. The 
main aim of education was the move from being mastered by authority to partial self-mastery 
guided by the love of authority, to full control of the desires by one’s own strengthened will. 
Not unlike John Wilkins’s conception of right reason as a habitual disposition that guided 
conduct and ensured conformity of the will in a Fallen world. Familial authority, then, for 
Locke, was a necessary counterweight to the habits that arose from submitting to nature and 
fashion, and its role was to consciously preserve the child from easy acquiescence to such 
pleasures. 
It is also worth considering for a moment that Locke’s claims about filial obedience 
and the naturalisation of parental power and familial authority are amongst the Foucauldian-
disciplinarian scholars’ principal targets, exposed especially forcefully by Joseph Carrig. 
Carrig has contended that the goal of Lockean education was less virtue than obedience, and 
it accomplished this goal by making “the will of the father appear to the child as his own.”581 
The child’s liberty, Carrig has suggested, was entirely incidental to Locke’s project, invoked 
only as a means to the end of cementing parental authority: “This new method makes the 
exercise of power ‘invisible,’ or unnoticed, and it is precisely this characteristic that gives 
paternal power its perpetual effect.”582 Thus, according to Carrig, whereas in the Second 
Treatise, Locke advocated that paternal power was legitimate only temporarily, the Education 
endorsed its permanence: “Perpetual respect for paternal authority is the principal goal of 
Locke’s education system.”583 
                                                             
581 Carrig, “Liberal Impediments,” p. 50. 
582 Ibid., p. 52. 
583 Ibid., p. 48. Locke’s precise argument in the Second Treatise is that fathers, even though they cannot prescribe 
actions to their grown sons, can expect to enjoy “a perpetual right to respect, reverence, support and compliance 
too, more or less, as the Father’s care, cost and kindness in his Education, has been more or less” (Locke, Two 
Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], p. 312). 
31404700 A Culture Of Habit  Words: 80,325 
214 
 
Such a reading would be more convincing, however, if Locke did not complicate his 
own claims about the reach and import of parental authority. If, on the one hand, Locke 
suggested that the goal of education was to habituate the child to self-command – and to do 
so, in the first instance, by dissolving the gap between the child’s will and the adult will – on 
the other hand, he also argued that the child’s will should not be bent into adult shape, in the 
service of an adult goal. A child-responsive approach to education emerges in the Education 
because most of Locke’s pedagogical prescriptions flowed out of the insight that childhood 
and adulthood were distinct stages of human life, with different needs and capabilities, and 
that adult freedom could not be the goal of early childhood education.584 While children are 
born dependent and hence reliant upon adult reason, the child’s will still mattered as an entity 
distinct from the adult will. Rather than forcing it to conform to parental reason, Locke 
believed that educators had to give it considerable leeway – to be determined by the individual 
child’s age and temperament – and focus their efforts on encouraging habits of desiring and 
reasoning that would enable a future autonomy.585 
Locke foregrounded three ways in which the child’s particular will became a force in 
early habituation, constraining the exercise of parental power. First, he argued that parents 
had to recognise that the child’s will was the will of a child and even suggested that could not 
be subjected to adult standards of virtue. Children had to be allowed to be children rather than 
expected to behave like little adults: “Never trouble yourself about those faults in them which 
you know age will cure.”; “They must be permitted…the foolish and childish action suitable 
to their years without taking notice of them.”: their “gamesome humour, which is wisely 
adapted by nature to their age and temper, should rather be encouraged to keep up their spirits 
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and improve their strength and health than curbed or restrained.”586 Second, Locke called 
upon educators to respect the innate talents and temperament of the pupil, and tailor their 
pedagogy (and authority) accordingly: “God has stamped certain characters upon men’s 
minds, which, like their shapes, may perhaps be a little mended but can hardly be totally 
altered and transformed into the contrary.587 The educator could also not expect to “make the 
gay pensive and grave, nor the melancholy sportive, without spoiling them.”588 Instead, they 
had to constantly ask if the goals that they were setting for the child, and the methods they 
were using to accomplish them, were “suited to the child’s natural genius and constitution.”589 
Finally, Locke enjoined that even the recipient reason children manifested early in life 
should be a factor consulted by parents as they exercised power over children. For example, 
“even children discern when we do things in passion” and “that has most weight with them 
that appears sedately to come from their parents’ reason, and they are not without this 
distinction.”590 While parents were right to demand obedience of their offspring, parental 
commands had to be increasingly capable of rational justification rather than insinuated into 
children’s “unwary Understandings,” to borrow from the Essay’s formulation.591 Indeed, 
“there is no virtue they [children] should be excited to nor fault they should be kept from 
which I do not think they may be convinced of, but it must be by such reasons as they age 
and understanding are capable of and those proposed always in very few and plain words.”592 
Locke’s suggestion that the child’s will mattered as an entity distinct from parental 
will diminished the value of self-command as a goal of early childhood education since the 
child was incapable of self-command.  It also identified the parent-child relation as marked 
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by much greater reciprocity than has been suggested by the disciplinarians’ regime of 
invisible parental power. In other words, parental authority provided the framework for an 
education that focused less on bending the child’s will to adult reason than on encouraging 
habits that would permit the child’s own reason and desire to shape its will in a future 
freedom. 
Desire and Will in the Essay 
In order to fully understand the relationship between Lockean education and ‘habituation,’ it 
is also important to examine the relationship between his account of freedom and liberty and 
his pedagogical emphasis on experiencing a distinction between will and desire and choosing 
among competing desires. The education of desire was the most important aspect of education 
as described in the Education since the book’s focus was childhood, and desire, according to 
Locke, addressed the child’s will before reason. 
In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke presented a definition of 
liberty that was far more individuated, self-contained, and cognitive than the more well-
known political definitions from the Two Treatises. Liberty in the Essay did not depend 
directly on the rights or limits of the law, but rather on the will’s “power to suspend the 
execution and satisfaction of any of its desires”: 
There being in us a great many uneasiness always soliciting, and ready to determine the will to the next 
action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For the mind having in most cases…a power to 
suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires…is at liberty to consider the objects of 
them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from 
the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errours, and faults which we run into in the 
conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness…To prevent this, we have a power to suspend 
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the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me 
the source of all liberty.593 
This definition of liberty relied on a stark distinction between the faculties of will and desire, 
but a distinction which posed two difficulties. First, it was not logically demonstrable and 
was denied by the competing Hobbesian account of the will. Second, it did not actually 
operate in most people, whose weak will gave way to their stronger desires. The process of 
education, which consisted in forcing the child to “daily experiment in himself,” was central 
to demonstrating – experimentally rather than logically – that these faculties really were 
distinct and that one might be strengthened to control the other. Without the will’s ability to 
suspend desires, an ability acquired by habituation, reason would have been rendered 
impotent, and the individual would submit to the desires inculcated in them by nature, fashion, 
and custom. 
Locke’s account, as Douglas Casson and Steven Forde have argued, was a challenge 
to Hobbes’s conception of the will: “the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to 
the action, or to the omission thereof.”594 In Hobbes’s account, there was no more than a 
semantic distinction between will and desire, since the will was only that desire which 
immediately preceded action. Locke, on the other hand, insisted that will was not merely 
another term for desire, but rather the distinction between will and desire could not be 
demonstrated, only experienced. Language failed to convey it, so the only way to ascertain it 
was to examine one’s own mind: 
Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by sounds, that I must 
here warn my reader that ordering, directing, choosing, preferring, & c, which I have made use of, will 
not distinctly enough express violation, unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he 
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will…whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and 
observing what it does when it wills.595 
“Reflecting on his own mind” was, as we have seen, exactly what Lockean habituation forced 
the child to do by pitting their desire against first the wills of their parents and then their own 
will.596 Although, in principle, anyone could suspend and reflect on their desires, “we see 
men abandon themselves to the most brutish, vile, irrational, exorbitant actions, during the 
whole current of a wild or dissolute life without any check or the least appearance of any 
reflection,” and this was due to the omission of precisely the kind of education that Locke 
required. Such dissolute individuals were those who 
From their cradles…were never accustomed to reflect but by a constant indulging of their passions 
have been all along given up to the conduct and swing of their inconsiderate desires, and so have by a 
contrary habit lost the use and exercise of reflection.597 
The point here that Locke was trying to reinforce was that the power of the will to suspend 
and examine the desires had to be demonstrated to the child early on if it was to be effective.  
Desire, according to Hobbes, was endless, the result of the “general inclination of all 
mankind” towards “perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in 
death.”598 Indeed, Locke advanced a version of this Hobbesian premise in the Essay, where 
he defined desire as the “uneasiness of the Mind for want of some absent good,” which 
determines the Will to the successive voluntary actions whereof the greatest part of our Lives 
is made up.”599 Uneasiness, Locke wrote, was “the chief, if not only spur to human territory 
and action,” and so was similar to Hobbesian desire: perpetual and restless.600 Desire began 
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in the basic sensations of the body, our “ordinary necessities,” and most of life’s activity was 
in turn driven by a  
…fantastical uneasiness (as itch after Honour, Power, or Riches, etc.) which acquir’d habits by Fashion, 
Example, and Education have settled in us, and a thousand other irregular desires, which custom has 
made natural to us, that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses, as to leave us 
free to the attraction of remoter absent good.601 
All our activity, according to Locke, was in the pursuit of some desire, but most of 
the desires that we pursue were not natural but acquired – either from the identifiable sources 
like the people who please us or we seek to please, but at least as equally often from the more 
amorphous forces of custom or fashion. Although the passions were innate, the specific 
objects to which they were attached was potentially limitless and as Ruth Grant has recently 
shown, Locke believed that this depended largely on the custom of one’s own country.602 
The difficulty with this account, as James Tully has pointed out, is its determinism.603 
In other words, if the individual was constantly beset by desires which determined their 
conduct, and they surrendered to whichever desire eased the greatest immediate pain, then 
reflection would be rendered meaningless, because the individual could only reflect on which 
of their pains was the most pressing and no further. The will, according to Locke, was 
determined not by “the greater good in view; but some (and for the most part the most 
pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under.604 Thus, to act according to custom or from a 
desire for affirmation was still to act voluntarily, but if the greatest part of mankind 
“govern[ed] themselves, chiefly if not solely, by this Law of Fashion,” as Locke put it, and if 
this was really the most powerful determinant of one’s conduct, and the anxiety of being out 
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of step with one’s companions was the source of one’s most immediate pain, then one’s will 
could only be directed at the alleviation of it.605 This was hardly different from Hobbes’s 
definition of the will as “the last appetite,” which precluded the individual from carrying out 
any long-term endeavours.606 Locke himself argued that there were many “greater good[s] in 
view” that nevertheless pinched us less than the “present pains” of the body or of being out 
of favour with one’s companions, yet the pursuit of such greater goods would seem to have 
been foreclosed by this account of will and desire.607 
Locke was not a reductive hedonist, however, and insisted that not all pleasures 
resulted in happiness, and that mankind was capable of directing its conduct over the long 
term and pursuing distant goods determined by reason rather than habit, custom, or fashion. 
Simply understanding a greater good was insufficient, as Locke demonstrated by the example 
of the drunkard who understands perfectly well how drinking ruined their life. He sees that 
“his Health decays, his Estate wastes; Discredit and Diseases, and the want of all things, even 
of his beloved Drink, attends him in the course he follows” but “the habitual thirst after his 
Cups, at the usual time, drives him to the Tavern…The greater good, though apprehended 
and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably 
to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it.”608 At one point, Locke suggested that desire could 
be “raised proportionably” by means of straightforward conditioning: “It is in a man’s power 
to change the pleasantness, and unpleasantness, that accompanies any sort of action” so that 
the individual might, by repetition, take pleasure in what he has judged good for themselves 
and displeasure in what they determined to be bad.609 However, Locke’s sensitivity to the 
strength of individual dispositions casts doubt on this belief that a “relish” for anything could 
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be conditioned into anyone, especially without them having “apprehended” the good of it 
themselves.610 
There is, nevertheless, another way to understand how education could orient our 
desires to better ends that does not point to conditioning. James Tully has suggested that the 
aim of Locke’s pedagogy was to “develop an educational practice that would form mental 
‘inclinations’ or ‘relish’ to examine and assent in accordance with the probable proofs.”611 
This was the goal for adults, but it was too abstract for children, who were unlikely to desire 
or even understand rigorous probabilistic inquiry. What they could learn was to question their 
desires by crossing them, and through the ‘reasoning’ of the Education, eventually to question 
their parents’ desires as well.  
Now, much of what Locke had to say about reason’s education in the Education 
involved drawing children into a rational conversation, pitched at their particular rational 
capacities. Indeed, education and conversation emerge as coterminous developments.612 
Hence, a trusted tutor became necessary as soon as the child began to talk: “I would from 
their first beginning to talk have some discreet, sober, nay, wise person about children.”613 A 
key quality of the tutor had to be “the skill to carry himself with gravity, ease, and kindness 
in a constant conversation with his pupils.”614 Nor were children perceived to be the only 
gainers from such an exchange: “The native and untaught suggestions of inquisitive children 
do often offer things that may set a considering man’s thoughts on work.”615 Children’s 
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relatively unprejudiced viewpoints, then, could be engaged productively even by their 
rational betters, in order to better question the legitimacy of custom. 
Locke’s argument that one of the best means of educating a child’s reason was 
engaging them in rational conversation opened up another understanding of - to borrow 
Joseph Carrig’s phrase - “other people’s reason” than the conventional wisdom highlighted 
by the disciplinary reading of Locke.616 Other people’s reason, it appeared, took the form not 
only of reputational standards that a child, hungry for the esteem of the rational adults in their 
life, brought to bear on their actions, but also the more critical form of other people’s rational 
arguments, in dialogue with the child then realised their own powers of reasoning. The claim 
that debate and dialogue sharpened one’s critical faculties was a principal line connecting the 
Education and the Conduct. In the latter work, Locke observed that: 
We are all short sighted, and very often see but one side of a matter; our views are not extended to all 
that has a connection with it…This might instruct the proudest esteemer of his own parts, how useful 
it is to talk and consult with others, even such as come short of him in capacity, quickness and 
penetration.617 
Engaging others was important, then, not only in the service of a liberal many-sidedness, but 
was fundamentally so because, as Locke elaborated, most of our knowledge – including our 
knowledge of the principles grounding our actions – was to do with probabilities rather than 
certainties. Moreover “in probabilities…it is not enough to trace one argument to its source, 
and observe its strength and weakness, but all the arguments, after having been so examined 
on both sides, must be laid in balance one against another, and upon the whole the 
understanding determine its assent.”618 In other words, informed assent to principles 
presupposed taking into account the perspectives of others. Locke summarised: “To prejudge 
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other men’s notions before we have looked into them is not to show their darkness, but to put 
out our own eyes.”619 
Together, the Conduct and the Education indicated a complex role of “other people’s 
reason” in Lockean education.620 While children engaged other people’s reason, to begin 
with, as a standard, against which they could measure their own actions and arguments, they 
had to engage it more critically as their own reason strengthened. They would have the tools 
to do so because, as Locke put it in the Conduct, “every man carries about him a 
touchstone…which is natural reason.”621 This inner resource suffered attrition at the hands of 
custom and traditional education but an education in autonomy-friendly habits could restore 
its strength. Again, this is very much reminiscent of Wilkins’s approach to the problem of 
right reason – an emphasis upon the inculcation of habitual dispositions that allowed the mind 
to reason properly and function efficiently. One of these habits, for Locke, that was relevant 
to both children and adults, was the habit of discoursing rationally with others. “Other 
people’s reason” offered a diversity of viewpoints that reflective adults and the child 
themselves could consult in order to sharpen their own reason; an entity that guaranteed 
mental servitude and an ever-expanding body of rational argumentation, without which no 
critical thinking or freedom was possible at all. 
As an entailment of consulting ‘other people’s reason, Locke’s subject was, in short, 
to be made sceptical of themselves and eventually of the authorities and conventions around 
them. Scepticism in the form of doubt that one’s convictions are true because they are one’s 
own and an openness to correction is a more basic disposition than the more advanced practice 
of weighing all “probable proofs.”622 By the term ‘scepticism’ here, I take to mean what 
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Douglas Casson has described in Locke’s thinking as a flexible, self-questioning disposition 
and an eventual commitment to impartiality in judgment.623 This is not to identify Locke, 
however, with Montaigne or the ancient sceptical tradition. Indeed, Locke flirted with but 
eventually rejected such scepticism.624 
Insofar as such a disposition became a regular mental practice for the child, it could 
be called a habitual disposition that supported reason, following Locke’s warning that “habits 
[work] more constantly and with greater facility, than reason; which, when we have most 
need of it, is seldom fairly consulted, and more rarely obeyed.625 Nonetheless, it was an 
exceptional habitual disposition, one that could ward off conventional habits and the kind of 
behavioural conditioning of which previous readers have accused Locke.  The mature, 
impartial understanding which Locke exhorted readers to cultivate in the Essay and the 
Conduct was, in fact, based on the extended cultivation of the sceptical disposition which 
culminated in the Education. 
Habitual Scepticism 
Scepticism – more specifically, habitual scepticism – was the primary safeguard that Locke 
offered against the power of habits that arose both from natural pleasures and pains, as well 
as from those forms of “fanastical uneasiness…which custom has made natural to us.” Such 
scepticism was, paradoxically, a habit of having no totally fixed habits, of being radically 
willing to admit error in oneself and deny authority to others, “to judge himself, and judge 
unbiasedly of all that he receives from others…Reverence or prejudice must not be suffered 
to give beauty or deformity to any of their opinions.”626 
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In the absence of such commitment, the individual would contract their opinions from 
those whose approbation they desired and then hold fast to them, making it “a hard Matter, 
to persuade any one, that the Words which his Father or Schoolmaster, the Parson of the 
Parish, of such a Reverend Doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in Nature: 
Which, perhaps is none of the least Causes, that Men are so hardly drawn to quit their 
Mistakes.”627 Self-love led to “obstinacy,” “stiffness of mind,” and “pride” – the most 
universal sort of mental error, and the one which Locke’s education tried above all to pre-
empt.628 A general scepticism towards the validity and goodness of one’s desires and opinions 
could override one’s self-regarding tendency to cling to one’s mistaken judgements in the 
face of overwhelming contrary evidence.629 It is here that we can see clear resonances, for 
example, of Boyle’s and Hooke’s approach in natural philosophy. Their emphasis upon 
habitual dispositions that directed the investigator towards caution, impartiality, and modesty, 
dispositions that were so crucial for the experimental life, also occupied a central part of 
Locke’s notion of habitual scepticism. 
The pedagogy of Locke’s Education sought to train the will to suspend its desires and 
invited the understanding to examine them. It inclined the mind toward habitual scepticism 
and modesty, flexibility and civility, but it could not guarantee that its product would always 
judge well amongst the options. The inclusion of the work of Hugo Grotius, Samuel 
Pufendorf as well as the English legal system into the curriculum of the Education worked to 
introduce the child to the natural and civil law disciplines which were essential prerequisites 
for Lockean citizenship, though one could only “presume” that the individual knew and 
understood these laws by the age of majority.630 Locke’s education project, however, did not 
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end by satisfying the modest formal requirements of citizenship. A more expansive form of 
epistemic liberty was possible for those who applied the scepticism inculcated by the 
Education to the practices of logical association and probabilistic reasoning that was 
described in the Conduct and the Essay. As Paul Schuurman has argued, the Conduct, though 
often read in conjunction with the Education, was in fact a guide for adult mental training.631 
In it, Locke suggested that partiality or bias was the primary intellectual scourge of intelligent 
and rational individuals, and the only antidote continued to be scepticism in thought and 
modesty in character – “The proudest esteemer of his own parts,” according to Locke, had to 
be shown the limits of their understanding so that they might attain “indifferency” with 
respect to truth.632 In order to avoid “stiffness of mind,” the individual had to constantly 
engage in a mental battle against calcification, exposing themselves to novelty and variety: 
I think [mankind] should be made to look into all sorts of knowledge, and exercise their understandings 
in so wide a variety and stock of knowledge. But I do not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledge, 
but a variety and freedom of thinking, as an increase of the powers and activity of the mind, not as an 
enlargement of its possessions.633 
Here again is evidence of the Lockean strategy of utilising habit to develop mental faculties 
that would be capable of undermining any fixed habits. Study was not, for the most part, 
intended to result in expertise, but rather in mental agility.634 To that same end, Locke 
recommended seeking out variety in conversation, which the city offered to a greater degree 
than the country, and appropriated even the New Testament to support his scepticism: “Try 
all things, hold fast to that which is good.”635 In doing so, the Conduct’s emphasis upon 
exposure to variety began where the Education left off. The child’s social life had to be 
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restricted to protect them from fashion, and by doing so they would be consequently insulated 
from variety in people and opinions beyond that which they could find in books. But the 
Education ended with travel, an undertaking that, in introducing the variety of customs and 
people, marked the beginning of adulthood. 
The Conduct and the Education both operated on the assumption that their reader had 
left the isolation of childhood and now had to constantly contend with the customs, popular 
opinions, and fashions of civil society. Moreover, it has been suggested by Mark E. Button 
and others that Locke intended his education writings to alter the intellectual conditions of 
society, just as he hoped that his Two Treatises would lead to a new political regime.636  While 
Locke clearly thought that the particular custom, public opinion, and our own desires could 
change, there is no evidence that he thought that such influences could be extirpated or 
replaced by universal reasonableness.637 His epistemological works did not propose a general 
mental reformation of society, but rather were meant to act as a guide, instructing the 
individual in the means to retain their intellectual independence within a society that was 
inevitably governed by custom and fashion as well as showing them how to understand such 
forces and use them to their advantage. The Foucauldian reading, then, is in this sense correct 
to call attention to Locke’s many positive appeals to the use of reputation and fashion in the 
Education. He repeatedly exhorted parents to instil in children the very “love of credit” that 
threatened their freedom from fashion as adults, and to use this love in order to manipulate 
them.638 The difficulty was that if parents failed to carry out this, then the result would not be 
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a child immune to the pull of esteem, but rather a child either wholly incapable of the social 
life or one that was wedded to the esteem of people whose purposes in manipulating the child 
were less salutary than those of Lockean parents. 
The simultaneous potential of language to expand one’s understanding and to 
compromise it also demonstrated, for Locke, how fundamentally dependent on opinion even 
the wisest individuals were. The purest instance of epistemic freedom came from one’s 
intuition and definition of “simple ideas” – perceptions like hot/cold or colour – could not be 
defined or perceived on another’s behalf. Such freedom, however, was minimal in practice – 
the individual would be limited to only a paltry grasp of the world if they relied entirely on 
the simple ideas they received through their own senses and since ideas are particular, then 
each blade of grass would be a new and interesting species to them. Nevertheless, Locke was 
adamant that it was “beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas 
of all the particular things we meet with” which meant that it was essential to generalise and 
abstract, entangling ourselves in the distortion that acquiring a pre-existing language 
imposed.639 Thus, by entering the world of complex ideas, the individual subjected 
themselves to the collective definitional authority of custom or opinion, yet because such 
authority had no identifiable locus, or king to behead, for example, and was instead 
established “by a secret and tacit consent” of all its subjects, the individual was then complicit 
in their subjection in a manner that was not entirely unlike that of the Lockean citizen to their 
legislature.640 The parallel between political and epistemic autonomy in Locke could be 
pushed further, however: just as benefits accrued to the individual from renouncing their 
“private judgement” in order to join civil society, the benefit to the individual understanding 
of giving up the impossibly daunting task of naming every impression that one experiences 
                                                             
639 Locke, ECHU, 2.11.9, 3.3.2-3. See also Dawon, Locke, Language and Early Modern Philosophy pp. 295-
298. 
640 Ibid., 2.28.10. 
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and instead abiding by socially derived definitions was access to a vast trove of existing and 
potential knowledge about the world.641 Yet the mind that was attached to a will that 
suspended its desires and an understanding that stepped back and examined their 
judiciousness was also less susceptible to having its thoughts determined by the potentially 
stupefying effects of language. Suspension and examination preserved the basic freedom of 
intuiting and defining simple ideas, and therefore shielded the individual from the impositions 
of authority. 
It was precisely in this realm of epistemic autonomy that it becomes clear why 
Locke’s education demanded such intense self-discipline: to persuade others of the reality 
and usefulness of one’s new and redefined ideas by argumentation required the sustained and 
laborious work of producing a true and compelling logical demonstration. One had to engage 
without distraction or bias in a “chain of reasonings” on the model of mathematical proofs, a 
capacity acquired by “using the mind to a long train of consequences.”642 Such reasoning 
faced the possibility of error at every step, especially when it was not mathematics that was 
being reasoned about, but “divinity, ethicks, law, and politicks.”643 In such fields, truth had 
to be determined by the internal logical agreement of constituent simple ideas. Even the most 
strenuous application of the mind to such pursuits only resulted in attenuated progress: 
All that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, in regulating their opinions and judgements once 
with care and fairness sift[ing] the matter as far as they could; and that they have searched into all the 
particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the question: and with the best of their skill 
cast[ing] up the account upon the whole evidence, and thus having once found on which side the 
probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an enquiry as they can make, they lay up the 
conclusion in their memories.644 
                                                             
641 Ibid., 3.2.7. 
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643 Locke, ECHU, 1.22.12. 
644 Ibid., 4.16.1-2. 
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All of this was only the effort required in order to accept a probable opinion and such 
dispiriting passages were a part of Locke’s rhetorical effort, particularly in Book IV of the 
Essay, to inculcate modesty in the inquirer as well as in inquiry itself by emphasising the 
limits of human understanding and discouraging “the proudest esteemer of his own parts” 
from seeking eminence and prestige in inquiry:  
If we look a little into the dark, and take a view of our ignorance: which, being infinitely larger than 
our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes, and improvement of useful knowledge; if 
discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation 
of those things that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch not out into that abyss of 
darkness…out of a presumption, that nothing is beyond our comprehension…He that knows any thing, 
knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and 
most obvious things that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate 
into.645 
Such modesty against the “presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension” was, for 
Locke, the counterpart of scepticism about the tendency of our own opinions to be correct 
because they are our own.646 It was the provision that defended against those who pursued 
inquiry for the sake of power, a motive that Locke frequently attributed to the scholastic: 
Those who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they 
profess and govern themselves by, and would have a just pretence to require others to follow them: but 
these are so few in number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing 
insolent and imperious is to be expected from them; and there is reason to think, that if men were better 
instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.647 
Locke’s Foucauldian critics have charged that aspects of his epistemology – the rigorous 
imposition of discipline, for example – actually foreclosed liberty because it narrowed the 
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646 For more information, see Forde, Locke, Science, and Politics, p. 45. 
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imagination and proscribed spontaneous “individuality” by classing it as “madness.”648 
Locke’s difficulty with ‘mad’ imaginings, however, was that they were devoid of judgement 
and even volition, and thus had to be defined as ‘unfree.’ They could not be redirected or 
even silenced, no less systemically conveyed to others either. It was the individual that was 
capable of understanding complex ideas, re-defining them where a new definition was more 
illuminating, and potentially persuading others to accept their definitions who could recapture 
in society some of the freedom that they ceded to it by adopting its language.  Joseph Carrig 
has noted this potential for recovering liberty through language when he remarked that, “[in 
Locke’s view] he is most free who has the power…to arrange circumstances in such a way 
that others agree to his usage of terms,” but at the same time has asserted that this itself 
subjugates those who accept that individual’s definitions.649 Steven Forde has gone even 
further, arguing that “Locke exhorts us to free ourselves from mental ‘enslavement’ to 
received ideas, but in reality he wishes only to make us his slaves.”650 
Lockean education, then, consequently directed pupils to both negative and positive 
liberty. By inculcating a flexible will and sceptical disposition, it promised to most pupils the 
freedom from being intellectually ruled by their own unconsidered passions and by others, 
and by extension, fashion and custom. This was, at least, in a political sense important because 
ideas, including the law, could not be fully understood second-hand, but rather had to be 
intuited anew by each individual.651 Lockean education, therefore, orientated all pupils away 
from deferring to authority and towards independent reflection. Such liberty would only be 
of interest to a minority, the sort of individual who had “a mind to carry his studies farther” 
                                                             
648 See, for example, Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom, pp. 21-24. 
649 Joseph Carrig, “Liberal Impediments,” p. 71. 
650 Steven Forde, Locke, Science, and Politics, pp. 89-90. 
651 Locke, ECHU, 4.18.3. 
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and who was able to “penetrate deeper…by his own genius and industry” into those subjects 
which the Education introduced, but it was nonetheless one at which Locke aimed. 
Conclusion (Locke’s Habituated Subject) 
Locke’s educational writings suggest that the Foucauldian-disciplinarian reading is right to 
find a ‘sticky’ subject at the heart of Lockean liberalism but this chapter has shown that 
perhaps this subject is more complicated a subject than the disciplinarians have indicated 
because Locke was unsure about the degree to which education should be a child-responsive 
project. Education, for Locke, occurred in the context of the “uneasiness” of the mind, a 
condition of perpetual dissatisfaction from which it reflexively sought relief from wherever 
it could find it. It found it more often in “hot pursuit of pleasure, or constant drudgery in 
business” than “serious thought,” and pleasure and drudgery were far more effective sources 
of habituation than education.652 The career of Locke’s own pupil, the Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, for example, who developed a theory of the passions that was critical of Locke’s, 
should stand as an illuminating example of how little substantive agreement between teacher 
and student Lockean education had to produce to remain effective.653 It was not then the 
thoroughgoing effectiveness of education that carried emphasis – the capacity to 
“indoctrinate” the child or to reliably turn out the “productive subject and good citizen that 
the liberal order demands” – but rather the relative impotence of education relative to the 
nature and social forces that were simultaneously necessary for and destructive to the 
understanding.654 
The habits that Locke would have instilled in children directed them to first feel and 
then fight their natural desires which subjected them to an early and frequent experience of 
                                                             
652 Locke, ECHU, 4.20.6. 
653 For more information, see Jason Aronson, “Shaftesbury on Locke,” American Political Science Review 53 
(1959): pp. 1101-4. 
654 Baltes, “Locke’s Inverted Quarantine,” p. 176. 
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dissonance between will and desire. The experience of this dissonance led them to question 
their own desires rather than presuming that because they appeared spontaneous and organic, 
they were necessary. If the child was not habituated to be sceptically and modestly reflective, 
they would instead habituate themselves to be unreflective. A certain kind of habituation was 
thus a crucial prerequisite for freedom, but it was not a habituation into any particular belief, 
conduct, or behaviour, as we have seen with John Wilkins’s notion of habitual right reason, 
the moderate divines’s emphasis upon a religion of acquired habitual dispositions, or Robert 
Boyle’s idea of the habitual experimental natural philosopher. It was instead habituation 
against the too-easy surrender of the will. The child had to learn not only to resist the 
temptation to heed parental and pedagogical authority, which the disciplinarian scholars have 
incorrectly taken to be the main threat to their freedom, but also the charms of nature, the 
customs of their country, and the fashions of their company. They had to acquire a strong 
capacity for self-control to guide the understanding past the dangers of distraction, illogic, 
laziness, and bias into which all minds were prone to fall. Although everyone was obligated 
to undertake at least some degree of mental cultivation since “no man is so wholly taken up 
with the attendance on the means of living as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul” 
– and the habitual scepticism and modesty which Lockean education instilled were useful for 
the civil and political life, the highest form of freedom that such education unlocked would 
only be pursued by some.655 
Lockean education is thus more profitably read neither as the introduction of a form 
of panoptic control over the child that Foucauldian-disciplinarian scholars take it to be, nor 
as the straightforward programme of civic education which earlier generations of scholars 
saw in it, but rather as an individualistic training of the mind, a safeguard against all the other 
sources of habituation to which the child would inevitably be subjected. Furthermore, John 
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Dunn has suggested that Locke’s epistemological and education writings treated their 
audience 
not as a class…but as a set of individuals who might (or might not) genuinely wish to enhance their 
understanding…The sense in which the candle, which is set in us, shines bright enough for all purposes 
was not that all human beings can now see clearly by its light or that all could ever readily be enabled 
to do so. It was simply that any human being who cared enough about the goal and took sufficient 
trouble could reconstruct themselves to do so.656 
In its individualism, then, Locke’s education was orientated towards what we have come to 
call the private sphere.657 This can be seen most clearly in Locke’s positioning of the family 
at the centre of education and the ways in which his pedagogy itself intensified nuclear family 
ties at the expense of civic unity. The sceptical and modest disposition which his education 
cultivated, and the epistemic autonomy at which it aimed was quite compatible with the 
regime of the Second Treatise, grounded as it was in individual consent. Yet, Locke’s 
education was not primarily designed to form citizens for the regime, but rather to compensate 
for the dangerous intellectual conditions which characterised all societies, and in particular 
for those aspects of his own liberal politics which exacerbated some of those dangers.658 
In a broader sense, then, the older reading of Lockean pedagogy as an “education for 
liberty” was right, but it ignored the individualistic epistemic nature of such liberty. This 
result might never satisfy the most thoroughgoing disciple of Foucault, who would insist that 
even a mental discipline intended to combat the normalising forces of nature and society is, 
after all, still a kind of discipline, a habit of rational self-control is still a habit, and rationality 
itself is a construction. Yet even if this is all conceded, it is inaccurate to accuse Locke of 
using education to subvert the liberty that he himself held out in the Two Treatises and the 
                                                             
656 John Dunn, ‘Bright Enough for All Our Purposes,’ p. 143. 
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658 See Hina Nazar, “Locke, Education, and Disciplinary Liberalism,” pp. 236-8. 
31404700 A Culture Of Habit  Words: 80,325 
235 
 
Essay. Both major scholarly approaches to the Education have understood it as a kind of 
blueprint for creating the subjects required by the commonwealth of the Second Treatise, with 
the private education of the family reproducing the customs and opinions of society at 
large.659 
The obstacles, however, to a particularly intellectual kind of freedom that arose from 
the power of fashion and opinion appeared not in the Second Treatise but instead in the 
Conduct and Essay, where it turned out that “he is certainly the most subjected, the most 
enslaved, who is so in his understanding.”660 It was these obstacles, which were not created 
by Lockean politics but exacerbated by them, that Locke’s pedagogy ultimately addressed. 
Lockean education, therefore, can be better understood as a corrective for the excesses of 
liberalism than as an assembly line for the compliant subject. Locke’s strong focus on the 
urgent and vital goal of self-control was, for him, at least, easily reconcilable with liberal 
citizenship. 
In sum, the liberalism that emerges from a re-examination of Locke’s educational 
writings is, of course, not without its problems: once we accept that autonomy was a 
contingency of education and habituation, a whole variety of thorny issues arise that Locke 
treated inconsistently. Thus, to return briefly to Timothy Stanton’s recent work on the ‘fable 
of liberalism:’ when considering Locke and liberalism, we must pay close attention to the 
“conventional stories to which it implicitly appeals, its persuasive ambitions, and its 
artfulness” not just the ideology, or history, or genealogies of liberalism.661 In that same vein, 
I have engaged with certain readings of Locke’s educational programme that have been put 
forward by a variety of modern commentators, and proposed an alternative to those readings. 
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Unlike the Foucauldian-disciplinarians, Locke refused to posit a binary opposition between 
freedom and social influence, and he delineated a frequently compelling picture of what the 
freedom of the socialised subject looked like. In a sense, the implication of Lockean education 
was not a liberal autonomy that presumed a radical disengagement that communitarians 
attributed to it, nor one that was simply a meaningless concept because the subject of Lockean 
education, as the disciplinarians have observed, is a sticky subject. Rather, Locke’s subject 
was to be habituated during childhood to cross their desires and to strengthen their will and 
were then expected to habituate themselves to look both within and outside themselves in 
order to find the resources to live a life of considerable critical independence and sceptical 
modesty. What’s more, the Lockean subject would delight at such a process, since their 
education would inspire them to love the “dignity and excellency of a rational creature.”662 
The urgent goal of self-control at which Locke’s education aimed, and which has also perhaps 
been the pervading theme of the previous three chapters, culminated in an individualistic 
training of the mind, a safeguard against all the other sources of habituation to which the child 
would inevitably be subjected. An inculcated habitual disposition of having no fixed habits; 
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This thesis has argued that notions of habit and habitual dispositions formed an important part 
of late early modern English intellectual thought which have been largely hitherto missed by 
scholarship. I hope to have offered a vision of English intellectual life that not only 
demonstrates the prevalence of a deep seated preoccupation with the importance of habitual 
dispositions, but also their centrality in several strands of English intellectual thought. It has 
not attempted to offer a history of individuals, nor of social norms, nor yet of doctrines. 
Rather, it has been about concepts – ‘habit’ and ‘habitual dispositions’ and more specifically 
how late early modern English intellectuals were preoccupied with them. The common 
themes across all four chapters have been about the emphasis that English intellectuals placed 
on instilling and inculcating the mind with habitual dispositions; habits of good judgement, 
of self-control, of epistemic modesty, and of scepticism, to name just a few. 
The immediate context was a Protestant culture that emphasised the depths of human 
depravity as well as a society still living in the long shadow of the civil war and the disruption 
of the Interregnum. Consequently, the period that this thesis has surveyed was haunted by the 
spectre of religious violence and civil disagreement as well as a lack of confidence in the 
ability of humankind to reason properly, understand religious truths, control their passions, 
and conduct themselves accordingly in civil society. The beginning of the Restoration period 
right up to the close of the century, then, was faced with a broad set of religious, 
epistemological, and civil problems as well as a whole host of important questions around the 
nature of human reason, conformity to religious truths in a Fallen world and how to best 
moderate unruly behaviour and passions. I have argued that the response to these problems 
and questions was a new-found emphasis upon habitual dispositions and the result was an 
emerging ‘culture of habit’: a preoccupation with acquired habitual dispositions that were 
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thought to hold the key to not only neutralising religious strife and ensuring conformity, but 
also reaching epistemic agreement as well as constructing sceptical and reasonable subjects. 
The task of analysing this ‘culture of habit’ is to illuminate a deep-seated, but coherent 
genealogy of habit in late Early Modern English thought. In doing so, I have attempted to 
make a decisive contribution to scholarly investigation in several areas. In chapter 1, I 
presented a new reading of the concept of ‘right reason,’ through a close examination of its 
usage in the works of Henry More and John Wilkins. I demonstrated that, despite much 
excellent scholarly work on right reason, particularly by Lotte Mulligan, historians had 
overlooked the existence of different formulations of the concept and that a juxtaposition as 
well as a fine-grained analysis of More’s and Wilkins’s work reveals this. Whilst their 
intentions were to explain how mankind came to know and apprehend the highest moral 
virtues; to judge truth from falsity, right from wrong, good from evil, and virtue from vice, 
both men formulated the operation of right reason in different ways. For More, ‘right reason’ 
was an innate law, an inner principle that could be accessed through a process of spiritual 
reformation. For Wilkins, on the other hand, it was a habitual disposition that once carefully 
developed, would not only help guide the individual onto the virtuous life, but also ensure 
conformity to religious truths. Wilkins came to this conclusion due to his empirical 
epistemology that emphasised the importance of ‘experience’ and evidence drawn from the 
senses, but also because English society could not be trusted to use their own innate 
intellection to right reason properly. Thus, the only practical solution was for the human mind 
to be inculcated with governing habitual dispositions. Ultimately, this analysis demonstrated 
how the concept of ‘habit’ fitted into the broader problem of deciding what human reason 
was as well as how it operated, as a consequence of living in a fallen world. In short, since 
most people could not grasp the dictates of reason, the dictates of reason therefore had to be 
internalised through habituation. 
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Having given a re-reading of right reason, chapter 2 then expanded upon the 
relationship between habit, religion, and reason by examining the notion of habitual 
dispositions in Restoration religion, focusing on how a group of loosely connected moderate 
divines attempted to fashion a religion that was founded on habitually acquired moral beliefs 
and dispositions. The moderate divines believed that habit was a possible solution to religious 
disagreement and civil strife because habitual dispositions, properly inculcated in the mind, 
they stressed, could provide a safeguard against uncivil behaviour, a lack of knowledge of 
religious duties and could lead to a well-exercised and grounded faith. A major aim of this 
chapter was to add a new dimension to the scholarship that has examined the changing nature 
of religion throughout the latter half of the seventeenth-century. Much excellent work has 
been done by Blair Worden, Mark Knight, Naomi Talback, and Isabel Rivers, that has 
demonstrated how religion became a civilising force rather than a saving force, how grace 
became synonymous with virtue: in short, how conduct and ethics came to slowly outweigh 
soteriology.663 What had not been fully explored was the actual underpinning operation of 
this process. In order to remedy this gap in the scholarship, I showed how by conduct, the 
moderate divines meant habitually acquired patterns of behaviour and dispositions. They 
meant a process of habituation as a pathway to living virtuously and apprehending religious 
truths. Again, their approach echoed Wilkins’s conception of right reason as we saw in 
chapter 1: that habitual dispositions could govern the human mind, allowing the individual to 
reason properly in order to make good judgements, understand their religious duty, and 
behave properly. All of which was in the pursuit of salvation. However, this did not mean 
that they were somehow less religious – they simply chose to deal less with the intricacies of 
faith than with the cultivation of those habitual dispositions that would strengthen it.  
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Another aim of chapter 2 was to supplement recent work by Ethan Shagan on how the 
rhetoric of moderation could carry an authoritarian meaning and ultimately be coercive, by 
examining an area of English intellectual thought that Shagan’s work overlooks: habit. I 
argued that whilst the moderate divines did not necessarily believe in compelling individuals 
to true beliefs and virtuous action through the threats of coercive penalties, they were adamant 
that most of society had to be habituated to adopt moral norms and ensure a peaceful 
coexistence. Therefore, whilst chapter 2’s reading of Restoration religion comes across as a 
discourse of peace, equanimity, reason and irenicism, it is also important to note that there 
existed a degree of coercion within the language of habituation and habitual dispositions that 
was recommended by the moderate divines. 
Chapter 3 then shifted the focus to the context of the new experimental philosophy 
that was practised by the early Royal Society. Recent work by Sorana Corneanu, for example, 
has demonstrated how the virtuosi of the early Royal Society regarded the community of 
investigators not just as a tool for the validation of scientific results, but also as a site for the 
government of individual selves. Thus, in Corneanu’s reading, the virtuosi saw their 
enterprise as an exercise that would improve the whole mind, making it fit for a range of 
judgements about both epistemological and moral matters. Rather than seeking to 
depersonalise knowledge in order to make assent possible, the virtuosi placed the cultivation 
of individual minds at the centre of their programme. Drawing upon Corneanu’s original 
work, while also addressing areas that it overlooks, chapter 3 showed how habit and notions 
of habitual dispositions also formed a key part of the experimental life. I argued that 
experimental philosophers such as Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke were preoccupied with 
cultivating good experimental habitual behaviour – the habit of rightful examination and 
observation, the habit of regulating one’s assent, the habit of right judgement – habitual 
behaviour that exhibited both an epistemic and a moral dimension. Accordingly, this 
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demonstrated how the moderate epistemological methodology of the early Royal Society was 
shaped by an appreciation of the importance of habituating the mind toward mental self-
control. Thus, the mitigated scepticism and emphasis on the probability of knowledge 
advocated by its fellows such as Boyle, Hooke, and Sprat, was informed, in part, by self-
fashioning mental exercises that disciplined the intellectual activity of the mind. Furthermore, 
through a fine-grained reading of Robert Boyle’s Christian Virtuoso, I showed how ‘religious 
virtues’ that were thought to be attained from the study of nature actually assumed an 
important epistemological relevance. One such example was the ‘religious virtue’ of 
‘humility’ towards God which was analogous to the virtue of epistemic modesty since it made 
the investigator acknowledge the limits of their knowledge of God’s creation and thus 
regulated their assent.664 Such a reading also allows us to consider a different way to 
understand the complex relationship between English religion and English natural philosophy 
during this period. In this reading, for example, we can see how religion could provide the 
natural philosopher with appropriate epistemological behaviour. For Boyle, they assumed a 
cognitive component and, therefore, constituted an important requirement for pursuing the 
experimental method. 
Finally, we then switched to looking at the construction of the subject rather than the 
instruction of the subject with an examination of Locke’s educational writings. Chapter 4, in 
light of the genealogy of habit that had been teased out in the preceding chapters, attempted 
to show how John Locke consolidated these several intellectual strands into a coherent 
programme of education and discipline. Whilst Locke scholars have predominantly read 
Lockean education as either the introduction of a form of panoptic control over the child as 
the Foucauldian-disciplinarians take it to be, or as the straightforward programme of civic 
education as earlier scholars have done, I argued that it is perhaps best read as an 
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individualistic training of the mind, a safeguard against all the other sources of habituation to 
which the child would inevitably be subjected. In other words, Lockean education actually 
aimed at the habit of having no fixed habits – an habitual scepticism that not only, in Locke’s 
view, made his liberal society possible, but also consolidated a preoccupation with habitual 
dispositions that had been ongoing since the mid seventeenth-century. 
To make a rather obvious point, the common trend across all four chapters has been 
about how acquired habitual disposition could exercise a profound influence over the 
individual’s patterns of thought and behaviour. It should be noted, however, that there are 
important distinctions to be made here, ones that we have already encountered on several 
occasions and ones that I have tried to draw attention to in each chapter: different languages 
of habit. In the first instance, for example, we can identify what can broadly be described as 
the habit of thinking: John Wilkins’s formulation of right reason as a habit fits neatly into this 
category. We saw in chapter 1 how Wilkins recommended the cultivation of habitual moral 
virtues as a way to correct ‘right reasoning’ that would afford the individual the ability to 
govern their passion as well as to think and reason properly. The moderate divines mirrored 
his approach. As we saw in chapter 2, Isaac Barrow, for example, emphasised how it was 
crucial that the proper Christian developed “An habitual skill or faculty of judging aright 
about matters of practice, and chusing according to that right judgment, and conforming the 
actions to such good choice.”665 The inculcation of habitual dispositions that could govern 
reason and hold sovereign power over the mind made the religious life possible because, like 
Wilkins’s habitual right reason, they permitted the individual to comprehend transcendental 
values, allowing them to grasp a divinely sanctioned, eternally present morality that was the 
bind of all society. 
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Similarly, chapter 3 revealed how Robert Boyle emphasised the importance of 
acquiring a “habit of receiving some sorts of Opinions, and especially those that seem 
unfriendly to Religion, but as Probationers, with a disposition to Reform or Discard them 
upon further Information.”666 Likewise, Robert Hooke stressed the need to “acquire a Habit 
of Intention, and of examining the whole Chain of Consequences from the first Principles to 
the Truth evidenced.”667 Here too, in the same vein as Wilkins, we can see Boyle and Hooke 
underlining the importance of habitual dispositions as a way to discipline the thinking of the 
experimental philosopher: to regulate their mind to resist premature conclusions as definitive, 
to form only tentative conclusions whilst always remaining open to new conclusions, and to 
carry out thorough evaluations at every stage of inquiry. Furthermore, Locke’s safeguard, the 
habit of having no fixed habits, was, to some degree, a habit of thinking properly. It was a 
habit that enabled the individual to admit error in oneself and deny authority to others, “to 
judge himself, and judge unbiasedly of all that he receives from others…Reverence or 
prejudice must not be suffered to give beauty or deformity to any of their opinions.”668 The 
Lockean subject, when inculcated with this habitual scepticism, would have the capacity of 
independent reflection and the mental agility that would avoid that “stiffness of mind”.669 
They would also have been instilled with the required scepticism to facilitate the constant 
mental battle against inflexibility as well as the modesty to discard of mistaken judgements 
in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence.670 
Another clear language of habit was the habit of religion. We saw this most clearly in 
chapter 2 which examined how a group of moderate divines emphasised the importance of 
acquired moral beliefs and dispositions as a key component of religious life. Matthew Hale, 
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for example, wrote about the “habit of religion,” a disposition that once acquired had the 
ability to govern the Christian, directing them towards virtuous action that would strengthen 
their faith. The habit of religion, then, directed the individual to the good Christian life. It was 
also a state of mind as John Wilkins argued: “An habitual frame of mind, whereby we are 
fitted for vertuous actions, and more especially for the Duties of Religion.”671 Again, Matthew 
Hale also echoed something similar: “The Habit [of religion] it self: it is a frame and temper 
of Mind arising from the Love of God, to give every Man his due, according to the Will of 
God.”672 Lastly, the moderate divines also believed that the Christianity best suited to civil 
peace and improvement was one that inculcated moral virtue. Thus, the habit of religion also 
had an important moral dimension and once properly inculcated, it raised the moral stock of 
the individual: as Isaac Barrow explained: it was “the habit that qualifies and denominates a 
man such or such in any kind or degree of morality.”673 
One final language of habit that is worth briefly commenting on, one that has 
permeated this entire analysis was the habit of self-control. We first encountered this with 
John Wilkin’s habitual right reason which used habit as an effective solution to fix faulty 
chains of reasons in to order to guide the mind in making right judgements and setting the 
individual’s conduct on a rightful path. Thus, the habit of self-control was an effective way 
of not only correcting an individual’s ability to reason effectively, but also to replace reason 
with habitually acquired mental dispositions and patterns of behaviour. 
As we observed in chapter 2, it was also a recurrent disposition throughout the work 
of the moderate divines. A very good example is Richard Baxter’s understanding of habit as 
a controlling faculty, which was remarkably similar to Wilkin’s conception of right reason. 
                                                             
671 Wilkins, Essay Towards a Real Character, p. 204. 
672 Cited in A.  Cromartie, Sir Matthew Hale, p. 173.  
673 Ibid. 
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According to Baxter, it was essential for every Christian to cultivate “a sincere, habitual 
intention well laid at first in the heart, will serve to the right use of many particular means.”674 
This ‘habitual intention,’ for Baxter, acted as a governing disposition, effectively replacing 
faulty reasoning, which could guide the actions of the individuals and offered a potential 
solution to misconduct and immorality. Joseph Glanvil demonstrated a similar approach in 
the context of the experimental philosophy when he stressed the importance of “an habitual 
modesty, that they are afraid to pass bold Judgments.”675 The experimental philosopher, 
according to Glanvill, had to develop a habitual frame of mind for assessing the evidence and 
managing their assent to that evidence. Self-control was crucial in these matters. Robert 
Boyle, as have seen, was in full agreement with Glanvill when he emphasised that cultivating 
“a great and ingenuous Modesty of Mind” was essential for the experimental life and the 
knowledge making process.676 
However, it was in Locke’s work on education that the habit of self-control was to be 
fully consolidated. Locke’s educational programme aimed at the most extreme mental self-
control: an habitual scepticism; the habit of having no fixed habits. Such a disposition if 
inculcated correctly, for Locke, effectively disciplined the mind against a variety of dangers 
and setbacks. It provided a safeguard not only against faulty reasoning and uncivil behaviour, 
but also against poor assent and the inability to discern the truths of religion. It demanded at 
all times that the individual  “judge himself, and judge unbiasedly of all that he receives from 
others…Reverence or prejudice must not be suffered to give beauty or deformity to any of 
their opinions.”677 
                                                             
674 Baxter, Christian Ethics, in The Practical Works of The Reverend Richard Baxter, 23 vols., ed. Willim 
Orme (London, 1830), vol. 3, pp. 101-2. 
675 Glanvill, Essays on several important subjects in philosophy and religion (1676), p. 24. 
676 Ibid., 103. 
677 Locke, CU, p. 3. 
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The habit of thinking, the habit of religion, and the habit of self-control, are just a few 
examples of some of the habits that we have examined throughout this thesis. There is likely 
many more, but the brief task of teasing some out is to show, I hope, how the culture of habit 
crossed disciplinary boundaries and allows us to chart cultural connections as well as speak 
of, and highlight commonalities and overlaps. It also reveals a late early modern English 
intellectual culture that was rich, varied, and essentially transdisciplinary. Was the language 
of habit and notions of habitual dispositions just a convenient way for the moderate divines 
to advance Protestant apologetic or for the experimental philosopher to simply profess their 
impartiality? Or was ‘habit’ and ‘habitual dispositions’ a vital conceptual tool that helped 
generate and even make more truthful the practices of the English Church or the Early Royal 
Society? The answer, I think, lies somewhere in the middle. We have seen in chapter 2, for 
example, that the relationship between religion and habit was complex – it could be read as 
both an irenic discourse of peace and harmony as well as one that was essentially coercive 
and acted as a means of authorisation, self-restraint, and discipline. Likewise, chapter 3 
demonstrated that habitual dispositions could be just as important in the moral production of 
knowledge as well as serving an important apologetic and legitimising function. 
The central point, then, that I have tried to stress is that habit- in the form of habitually 
acquired  dispositions or beliefs – made its way into the broader intellectual culture of late 
early modern England. I have shown how assertions of habitual dispositions were presented 
as a means to not only correct faulty right reasoning, but also to make the religious life, or the 
experimental life, or Lockean liberal society possible. All of which shared the common aim 
to bridle the excesses to which human beings were inevitably prone.678 This thesis thus offers 
two core conclusions. First, that late early modern English intellectuals were preoccupied 
with how habitual dispositions could solve problems of reason, religion, consensus in 
                                                             
678 See Shagan, Rule of Moderation; Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph over Reason; Schodel, Excess and the Mean. 
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experimental philosophy as well as unsociable individuals. At the heart of this preoccupation 
lay a deep-seated urgency to create methods of regulation to keep the unruly mind in check 
and unruly subjects in line. Second, that once we acknowledge the existence of this deep-
seated genealogy of habit, we can then re-read John Locke’s education programme and see 
how Locke was drawing from, and consolidating this genealogy to construct disciplined and 
self-controlled citizens that could make his vision of liberal society come true. The result of 
this analysis is not a new understanding of late Early Modern English intellectual thought but 
perhaps a new way of thinking about how late Early Modern English intellectuals addressed 
the problems of reason, religion, epistemic assent, and disobedient subjects and how they 
believed that habitual dispositions could shape the very psychology of reason, belief, assent, 
and self-control. 
Ideally, an even broader perspective could investigate the extent to which a 
specifically English version of what Foucault called ‘government of one’s self and others’ 
emerged in the seventeenth-century, establishing habitual dispositions as a basis of self-
control and restraint. We might call this, pace Norbert Elias, the habituation process. Elias 
attributed the ‘civilising process’ through which early modern Europeans overcame endemic 
interpersonal violence of the middle ages to the psychosocial development of moderation 
based upon Weberian rationalism: as states monopolised legitimate force and economies were 
differentiated to the point that individuals relied upon networks of strangers for their survival, 
self-control thus became vital for social success.679 The present thesis does not dispute this 
argument, but rather suggests that there is parallel story to told, in England at least, about the 
emergence of a culture of habit which held that most individuals governed their behaviour 
                                                             
679 See Nobert Elias, The Civilising Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, revised edition, 
trans. Edmund Jephcott (Maldon, Mass., 1994). 
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primarily through habitually-acquired mental dispositions rather than through conscientious 
internal motivations. 
This ‘culture of habit,’ I would suggest, existed in many forms. Max Weber, for 
example, in his response to the criticisms levelled by the historian Felix Rachfaul, was 
challenged to explain the means by which the Protestant Ethic, drawn from Puritan theology, 
gave rise to the productive and disciplined individual, primed for capitalist society. He 
responded thus: 
from their religious life, out of their religiously conditioned family traditions and from the religiously 
influenced life-style of their environment, there emerged a “habitus” among individuals which prepared 
them in specific ways to live up to the specific demands of early modern capitalism.680 
Weber died soon after penning this response, but his reference to a ‘habitus,’ should give us 
pause for thought. There seems to be much scope for future study into how the notion 
‘habitus’ and habitual dispositions were a driving force behind the cultural, social and 
economic changes of the early modern period, which has been hitherto left undeveloped. Such 
an examination may also reveal how the Protestant faith gave its believers a specific language 
of habit and discipline to draw upon. The evidence presented in this thesis would suggest that 
this is the case, but further investigations need to done to argue this concretely. Taking this 
into consideration, then, there seems to be much mileage in Ethan Shagan’s recent claim that 
the “Reformation rather than the Enlightenment was the organising principle” of 
modernity.681 In this reading, just as Shagan’s work allows us to understand how the central 
agonism of English modernity, the contradiction between liberty and authority, developed in 
its uniquely English form around the ideal of moderation, we may be able to more fully 
understand how a distinctively English ‘culture of habit,’ centred on the development of 
                                                             
680 See Wallace M. Davis, ““Anticritical Last Word in The Spirit of Capitalism,” by Max Weber,” American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 5 (Mar., 1978), pp. 1105-1131. 
681 Shagan, The Rule of Moderation, p. 340. 
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habitual moral dispositions and behaviour, drawn from a Protestant theology of discipline, 
comparable to what Foucault called “government of one’s self and others,” emerged in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century and was an essential feature of the transformation of late 
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